From CTF to CVE: How Application of Concepts and Persistence led to a Vulnerability Disclosure Joe Gray
About Me/Why Me www.hackerhalted.com 2 • 2017 DerbyCon Social Engineering Capture the Flag (SECTF) winner • Member of 2018 NOLACon OSINT CTF 3rd PlaceTeam • Co-founder ofThrough the Hacking Glass • Frequent Guest Blogger • AlienVault • Tripwire • ITSP Magazine • Dark Reading • CSO Online • Maintains blog and podcast at https://advancedpersistentsecurity.net
2017 DerbyCon SECTF www.hackerhalted.com 3
2018 NOLACon OSINT CTF www.hackerhalted.com 4
Objectives/Flow www.hackerhalted.com 5 • DiscussTypes of CTFs • Sources of CTFs • Common CTFThemes • Tools of theTrade • Demonstrate Pros and Cons of CTFs/Applicability • Finding a Bug • Responsible Disclosure
Types of CTFs www.hackerhalted.com 6 • Self Contained • VM • Puzzles (think DEF CON badge shenanigans) • Network orWeb Based • Network King of the Hill (popular here with dc404) • Social Engineering • OSINT • Missing Persons CTF is subset (h/t to Robert Sell andTrace Labs) • Hack-a-thons • DFIR • Pros vs Joes
Sources of CTFs www.hackerhalted.com 7 • Conferences • Vulnhub.com • Hack the Box (hackthebox.eu) • Root Me (root-me.org) • Over theWire (overthewire.org) • CTF365.com • Companies (i.e. Google) • Security groups (i.e. dc404 and dc865) • OpenSOC
Commonalities www.hackerhalted.com 8 • Wordpress, Drupal, or Joomla • Weak Passwords • “Poor” Configurations • Insecure Protocols • HTTP, FTP,Telnet • WebApplications • NamedVulnerabilities • Dirty Cow, Heartbleed, Eternal Blue, Kerberoast • Cryptography • Steganography • Packet Captures
More Specialized CTFs www.hackerhalted.com 9 • OSINT • Collect flags on predetermined targets • Specific details about people from social media (Chris Silvers’ OSINT CTF) • Collect flags about companies (and sometimes) the people of the company (Chris Hadnagy’s SECTF) • Everyone is searching for the exact same flags (Silvers’ OSINT) • Social Engineering • OSINT and Report writing element • Live vishing • Each competitor has a unique calling time and unique target • DFIR • Conduct forensics and analysis on files provided vice hacking in • BlueTeam or Pros vs Joes • Actively monitor for further attack or analyze existing logs
Typical Tools of the Trade www.hackerhalted.com 10
Arguments About CTFs Being Realistic www.hackerhalted.com 11 • …but CTFs are not realistic. • That is sometimes true. • You may not encounter the same flag format in real life. • The creative concepts used to gain access are the same in many cases. • No one puts “incriminating” info in the page source. Wanna bet?
Told You So www.hackerhalted.com 12
Arguments About CTFs Being Realistic www.hackerhalted.com 13 • …but the CTF systems are too vulnerable. • Again, this can be true. • Speaking from experience, vulnerability management is still lacking. • This also trains us to look for the most simple solution and not go “nation- state” off the bat.
Arguments About CTFs Being Realistic www.hackerhalted.com 14 • …this CTF is nothing more than a gimmicky game. • I won’t argue. • Some are. • These are about stimulating creativity and novel ways to attempt to attack.
Effective Uses of CTF Concepts www.hackerhalted.com 15 • Bug Bounties • Security Research • PurpleTeaming
Bug Bounties www.hackerhalted.com 16 • Just like a penetration test, you use the same concepts used in CTFs to attempt to find security vulnerabilities for fun and profit. • The use of nmap, Burp Suite, and fuzzers is a prerequisite. • Any guesses as to a method to gain experience and comfort in using them? • Your lack of knowledge of the target company will create a similar blackbox or greybox scenario as a CTF. • I have tried my hand at many bug bounties. I have made a total of $100 and that was from OSINT. I fail far more often than I succeed.
Security Research www.hackerhalted.com 17 • Same a bug bounties but may have different terms or scopes. • You may be targeting your internal assets (penetration testing) or your personal devices (think IOT).
Purple Teaming www.hackerhalted.com 18 • Using the concepts of a CTF can help you work on building detections for common attacks. • Especially useful if you have a small shop. • Exposes the BlueTeam to hands-on attack methodologies. • The theoretical attack method is great, but we learn more by doing. • Allows cross training and innovation.
My CTF to CVE Story www.hackerhalted.com 19 • Started on OSWP • Bought the network card and router • Finishing aVulnHub CTF • Began configuring the router • Had not backed out of my browser configuration routing traffic through Burp Suite • …the rest is history
The Router: D-Link DIR-601 www.hackerhalted.com 20
Info www.hackerhalted.com 21 • D-LINK DIR-601 Router • HardwareVersion: A1 • FirmwareVersion: 1.02NA
“Securing” a Router www.hackerhalted.com 22 • Determine and configure the following: • Hostname • SSID • Whether to broadcast SSID • Encryption (WEP, WPA, WPA-2) • Key • Channel • Connectivity and configuration abilities over wireless • HTTP or HTTPS? • All these things are configured in the web interface
My Config www.hackerhalted.com 23 • Determine and configure the following: • Hostname: Mothership • SSID: Wireless Lab • Whether to broadcast SSID: Yes • Encryption (WEP, WPA, WPA-2): WEP • Key : 123test123test123 • Channel: Auto • Connectivity and configuration abilities over wireless: Yes • HTTP or HTTPS?: No option for HTTPS • All these things are configured in the web interface
The web interface you say? www.hackerhalted.com 24
Password Change www.hackerhalted.com 25
Logging Back in www.hackerhalted.com 26
Base64 Decoding www.hackerhalted.com 27
Great! www.hackerhalted.com 28 • NowWhat?
Next Steps www.hackerhalted.com 29 • I did some precursory OSINT to see if anyone else identified this vulnerability. • CVEs • Exploit-DB • Metasploit • Google • D-Link’s website • I reached out to D-Link, a nice person namedWilliam triaged the vulnerability.
Emails www.hackerhalted.com 30
Next Steps www.hackerhalted.com 31 • After a few back and forth discussions, William acknowledged the vulnerability and advised me that the router and firmware was EOL and no patch was expected for the foreseeable future. • I asked when I could disclose andWilliam told me that I was welcome to at any time. He asked that I include specific verbiage in my disclosure and that I get a CVE for it. • Great! • Where is the manual for getting CVEs?
Getting a CVE www.hackerhalted.com 32 • I hadn’t found anything that warranted a CVE before, so I had to learn how the process worked. • I knew about CNAs (CVE Naming Authorities) and generally how they work (spoken searching for them in Exploit-DB to see if a POC was posted). • I did a Google search. Not much here. • I reached out to the dc404 mailing list. MAJOR KUDOSTO KARL S. AND MIKE C.
Path to Getting a CVE www.hackerhalted.com 33 • I was advised to go through Mitre by one and CERT by the other. • I looked at the processes of each, CERT seemed simpler.
Path to Getting a CVE www.hackerhalted.com 34 • CERT said thanks, but you need to go through Mitre. • I did the Mitre write-up. • For Mitre to publish the CVE, you must have already publicly disclosed the vulnerability. • Great.Where does one do that?
Public Disclosure www.hackerhalted.com 35 • I published in a variety of places: • Full Disclosure Mailing List (http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/) • http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/May/17 • Peerlyst (https://www.peerlyst.com) • https://www.peerlyst.com/posts/vulnerability-disclosure-insecure-authentication- practices-in-d-link-router-cve-2018-10641-joe-gray • MyWebsite – Advanced Persistent Security • https://advancedpersistentsecurity.net/cve-2018-10641/ • Github Gist (https://gist.github.com/) • https://gist.github.com/jocephus/806ff4679cf54af130d69777a551f819
The CVE www.hackerhalted.com 36
Key Points and Takeaways www.hackerhalted.com 37 • Curiosity (and dumb luck) go far! • Not all CTFs are garbage, just as not all CTFs are made of gold or even on the same level! • You can make a difference in a product! • Don’t accept answers that don’t make sense! • No formally defined process was readily available for disclosing! • Having a network of security professionals at your fingertips is invaluable (Defcon Groups, CitySec, OWASP, other groups/Slack channels). • Don’t be afraid or intimidated to ask for help.
Through the Hacking Glass www.hackerhalted.com 38 • Mission Statement: To provide free and low cost training resources to enable information security professionals and aspiring professionals to expand their skill sets and marketability to close the skills gap.This is based on the frequent occurrence of a paradigm of employers seeking entry-level people with experience beyond typical formal education curricula.This further allows professionals and those seeking to enter industry the opportunity to gain experience beyond the walls of academic institutions or capture the flags (CTFs). • https://www.peerlyst.com/ • tthg@peerlyst.com • Twitter: @hackingglass • Facebook: facebook.com/hackingglass • Peerlyst:Through the Hacking Glass (as username or hashtag) • Also hashtagTTHG
Future Speaking Engagements www.hackerhalted.com 39 • 10/4: NorthernVA (Social EngineeringTraining) • 10/5-10/7: DerbyCon • 10/16: GridSecCon, LasVegas (Social EngineeringTraining) • 10/17-10/18: Cybersecurity Atlanta (hosted alongside ISSA International Conference) • 11/10:Temple University CARE (Social Engineering training and co- presentation withTracy “InfosecSherpa” Maleeff)
Questions? • Joe Gray • jgray@advancedpersistentsecurity.net • Twitter: @C_3PJoe/@hackingglass • LinkedIn: linkedin.com/JoeGrayInfosec • Facebook: facebook.com/JoeGrayInfosec • Peerlyst: joe-gray www.hackerhalted.com 40

Hacker Halted 2018: From CTF to CVE – How Application of Concepts and Persistence led to a Vulnerability Disclosure


  • 1.
    From CTF toCVE: How Application of Concepts and Persistence led to a Vulnerability Disclosure Joe Gray
  • 2.
    About Me/Why Me www.hackerhalted.com2 • 2017 DerbyCon Social Engineering Capture the Flag (SECTF) winner • Member of 2018 NOLACon OSINT CTF 3rd PlaceTeam • Co-founder ofThrough the Hacking Glass • Frequent Guest Blogger • AlienVault • Tripwire • ITSP Magazine • Dark Reading • CSO Online • Maintains blog and podcast at https://advancedpersistentsecurity.net
  • 3.
  • 4.
    2018 NOLACon OSINTCTF www.hackerhalted.com 4
  • 5.
    Objectives/Flow www.hackerhalted.com 5 • DiscussTypesof CTFs • Sources of CTFs • Common CTFThemes • Tools of theTrade • Demonstrate Pros and Cons of CTFs/Applicability • Finding a Bug • Responsible Disclosure
  • 6.
    Types of CTFs www.hackerhalted.com6 • Self Contained • VM • Puzzles (think DEF CON badge shenanigans) • Network orWeb Based • Network King of the Hill (popular here with dc404) • Social Engineering • OSINT • Missing Persons CTF is subset (h/t to Robert Sell andTrace Labs) • Hack-a-thons • DFIR • Pros vs Joes
  • 7.
    Sources of CTFs www.hackerhalted.com7 • Conferences • Vulnhub.com • Hack the Box (hackthebox.eu) • Root Me (root-me.org) • Over theWire (overthewire.org) • CTF365.com • Companies (i.e. Google) • Security groups (i.e. dc404 and dc865) • OpenSOC
  • 8.
    Commonalities www.hackerhalted.com 8 • Wordpress,Drupal, or Joomla • Weak Passwords • “Poor” Configurations • Insecure Protocols • HTTP, FTP,Telnet • WebApplications • NamedVulnerabilities • Dirty Cow, Heartbleed, Eternal Blue, Kerberoast • Cryptography • Steganography • Packet Captures
  • 9.
    More Specialized CTFs www.hackerhalted.com9 • OSINT • Collect flags on predetermined targets • Specific details about people from social media (Chris Silvers’ OSINT CTF) • Collect flags about companies (and sometimes) the people of the company (Chris Hadnagy’s SECTF) • Everyone is searching for the exact same flags (Silvers’ OSINT) • Social Engineering • OSINT and Report writing element • Live vishing • Each competitor has a unique calling time and unique target • DFIR • Conduct forensics and analysis on files provided vice hacking in • BlueTeam or Pros vs Joes • Actively monitor for further attack or analyze existing logs
  • 10.
    Typical Tools ofthe Trade www.hackerhalted.com 10
  • 11.
    Arguments About CTFsBeing Realistic www.hackerhalted.com 11 • …but CTFs are not realistic. • That is sometimes true. • You may not encounter the same flag format in real life. • The creative concepts used to gain access are the same in many cases. • No one puts “incriminating” info in the page source. Wanna bet?
  • 12.
  • 13.
    Arguments About CTFsBeing Realistic www.hackerhalted.com 13 • …but the CTF systems are too vulnerable. • Again, this can be true. • Speaking from experience, vulnerability management is still lacking. • This also trains us to look for the most simple solution and not go “nation- state” off the bat.
  • 14.
    Arguments About CTFsBeing Realistic www.hackerhalted.com 14 • …this CTF is nothing more than a gimmicky game. • I won’t argue. • Some are. • These are about stimulating creativity and novel ways to attempt to attack.
  • 15.
    Effective Uses ofCTF Concepts www.hackerhalted.com 15 • Bug Bounties • Security Research • PurpleTeaming
  • 16.
    Bug Bounties www.hackerhalted.com 16 •Just like a penetration test, you use the same concepts used in CTFs to attempt to find security vulnerabilities for fun and profit. • The use of nmap, Burp Suite, and fuzzers is a prerequisite. • Any guesses as to a method to gain experience and comfort in using them? • Your lack of knowledge of the target company will create a similar blackbox or greybox scenario as a CTF. • I have tried my hand at many bug bounties. I have made a total of $100 and that was from OSINT. I fail far more often than I succeed.
  • 17.
    Security Research www.hackerhalted.com 17 •Same a bug bounties but may have different terms or scopes. • You may be targeting your internal assets (penetration testing) or your personal devices (think IOT).
  • 18.
    Purple Teaming www.hackerhalted.com 18 •Using the concepts of a CTF can help you work on building detections for common attacks. • Especially useful if you have a small shop. • Exposes the BlueTeam to hands-on attack methodologies. • The theoretical attack method is great, but we learn more by doing. • Allows cross training and innovation.
  • 19.
    My CTF toCVE Story www.hackerhalted.com 19 • Started on OSWP • Bought the network card and router • Finishing aVulnHub CTF • Began configuring the router • Had not backed out of my browser configuration routing traffic through Burp Suite • …the rest is history
  • 20.
    The Router: D-LinkDIR-601 www.hackerhalted.com 20
  • 21.
    Info www.hackerhalted.com 21 • D-LINKDIR-601 Router • HardwareVersion: A1 • FirmwareVersion: 1.02NA
  • 22.
    “Securing” a Router www.hackerhalted.com22 • Determine and configure the following: • Hostname • SSID • Whether to broadcast SSID • Encryption (WEP, WPA, WPA-2) • Key • Channel • Connectivity and configuration abilities over wireless • HTTP or HTTPS? • All these things are configured in the web interface
  • 23.
    My Config www.hackerhalted.com 23 •Determine and configure the following: • Hostname: Mothership • SSID: Wireless Lab • Whether to broadcast SSID: Yes • Encryption (WEP, WPA, WPA-2): WEP • Key : 123test123test123 • Channel: Auto • Connectivity and configuration abilities over wireless: Yes • HTTP or HTTPS?: No option for HTTPS • All these things are configured in the web interface
  • 24.
    The web interfaceyou say? www.hackerhalted.com 24
  • 25.
  • 26.
  • 27.
  • 28.
  • 29.
    Next Steps www.hackerhalted.com 29 •I did some precursory OSINT to see if anyone else identified this vulnerability. • CVEs • Exploit-DB • Metasploit • Google • D-Link’s website • I reached out to D-Link, a nice person namedWilliam triaged the vulnerability.
  • 30.
  • 31.
    Next Steps www.hackerhalted.com 31 •After a few back and forth discussions, William acknowledged the vulnerability and advised me that the router and firmware was EOL and no patch was expected for the foreseeable future. • I asked when I could disclose andWilliam told me that I was welcome to at any time. He asked that I include specific verbiage in my disclosure and that I get a CVE for it. • Great! • Where is the manual for getting CVEs?
  • 32.
    Getting a CVE www.hackerhalted.com32 • I hadn’t found anything that warranted a CVE before, so I had to learn how the process worked. • I knew about CNAs (CVE Naming Authorities) and generally how they work (spoken searching for them in Exploit-DB to see if a POC was posted). • I did a Google search. Not much here. • I reached out to the dc404 mailing list. MAJOR KUDOSTO KARL S. AND MIKE C.
  • 33.
    Path to Gettinga CVE www.hackerhalted.com 33 • I was advised to go through Mitre by one and CERT by the other. • I looked at the processes of each, CERT seemed simpler.
  • 34.
    Path to Gettinga CVE www.hackerhalted.com 34 • CERT said thanks, but you need to go through Mitre. • I did the Mitre write-up. • For Mitre to publish the CVE, you must have already publicly disclosed the vulnerability. • Great.Where does one do that?
  • 35.
    Public Disclosure www.hackerhalted.com 35 •I published in a variety of places: • Full Disclosure Mailing List (http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/) • http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/May/17 • Peerlyst (https://www.peerlyst.com) • https://www.peerlyst.com/posts/vulnerability-disclosure-insecure-authentication- practices-in-d-link-router-cve-2018-10641-joe-gray • MyWebsite – Advanced Persistent Security • https://advancedpersistentsecurity.net/cve-2018-10641/ • Github Gist (https://gist.github.com/) • https://gist.github.com/jocephus/806ff4679cf54af130d69777a551f819
  • 36.
  • 37.
    Key Points andTakeaways www.hackerhalted.com 37 • Curiosity (and dumb luck) go far! • Not all CTFs are garbage, just as not all CTFs are made of gold or even on the same level! • You can make a difference in a product! • Don’t accept answers that don’t make sense! • No formally defined process was readily available for disclosing! • Having a network of security professionals at your fingertips is invaluable (Defcon Groups, CitySec, OWASP, other groups/Slack channels). • Don’t be afraid or intimidated to ask for help.
  • 38.
    Through the HackingGlass www.hackerhalted.com 38 • Mission Statement: To provide free and low cost training resources to enable information security professionals and aspiring professionals to expand their skill sets and marketability to close the skills gap.This is based on the frequent occurrence of a paradigm of employers seeking entry-level people with experience beyond typical formal education curricula.This further allows professionals and those seeking to enter industry the opportunity to gain experience beyond the walls of academic institutions or capture the flags (CTFs). • https://www.peerlyst.com/ • tthg@peerlyst.com • Twitter: @hackingglass • Facebook: facebook.com/hackingglass • Peerlyst:Through the Hacking Glass (as username or hashtag) • Also hashtagTTHG
  • 39.
    Future Speaking Engagements www.hackerhalted.com39 • 10/4: NorthernVA (Social EngineeringTraining) • 10/5-10/7: DerbyCon • 10/16: GridSecCon, LasVegas (Social EngineeringTraining) • 10/17-10/18: Cybersecurity Atlanta (hosted alongside ISSA International Conference) • 11/10:Temple University CARE (Social Engineering training and co- presentation withTracy “InfosecSherpa” Maleeff)
  • 40.
    Questions? • Joe Gray •jgray@advancedpersistentsecurity.net • Twitter: @C_3PJoe/@hackingglass • LinkedIn: linkedin.com/JoeGrayInfosec • Facebook: facebook.com/JoeGrayInfosec • Peerlyst: joe-gray www.hackerhalted.com 40