> And "lying" to it is not morally equivalent to lying to a human.

I never claimed as much.

This is probably a problem of definitions: To you, "lying" seems to require the entity being lied to being a moral subject.

I'd argue that it's enough for it to have some theory of mind (i.e. be capable of modeling "who knows/believes what" with at least some fidelity), and for the liar to intentionally obscure their true mental state from it.

I agree with you, and i would add that morals are not objective but rather subjective, which you alluded to by identifying a moral subject. Therefore, if you believe that lying is immoral, it does not matter if you're lying to another person, yourself, or to an inanimate object.

So for me, it's not about being reductionist, but about not anthropomorphizing or using words which which may suggest an inappropriate ethical or moral dimension to interactions with a piece of software.

I'm the last to stand in the way of more precise terminology! Any ideas for "lying to a moral non-entity"? :)

“Lying” traditionally requires only belief capacity on the receiver’s side, not qualia/subjective experiences. In other words, it makes sense to talk about lying even to p-zombies.

I think it does make sense to attribute some belief capacity to (the entity role-played by) an advanced LLM.

I think just be specific - a suicidal sixteen year-old was able to discuss methods of killing himself with an LLM by prompting it to role-play a fictional scenario.

No need to say he "lied" and then use an analogy of him lying to a human being, as did the comment I originally objected to.

Not from the perspective of "harm to those lied to", no. But from the perspective of "what the liar can expect as a consequence".

I can lie to a McDonalds cashier about what food I want, or I can lie to a kiosk.. but in either circumstance I'll wind up being served the food that I asked for and didn't want, won't I?