PatchWork AutoFix #1416
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PatchWork AutoFix #1416
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github-actions bot force-pushed the autofix-multiple-recipient-email branch 2 times, most recently from 5c73706 to 8c6d72a Compare github-actions bot force-pushed the autofix-multiple-recipient-email branch from 8c6d72a to 6ced9b5 Compare Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
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This pull request from patched fixes 5 issues.
Implement whitelist for module imports to prevent arbitrary code execution
The code now uses a whitelist to ensure that only predefined module imports are allowed inimportlib.import_module(), preventing loading of arbitrary code via user input.Restrict import_module usage to trusted modules
A whitelist of trusted modules is introduced to ensureimportlib.import_moduleonly loads predetermined modules, reducing the risk of arbitrary code execution.Fix subprocess.run vulnerability by setting shell=False
Modified the subprocess.run call to use shell=False and pass the command as a list for safer execution, preventing shell injection vulnerabilities.Implemented a whitelist for allowed modules in
The code now uses a whitelist of allowed module names to prevent loading arbitrary code throughimport_with_dependency_group.importlib.import_module().Fix subprocess shell=True vulnerability by using shell=False with argument list.
Replacedshell=Truewithshell=Falseinsubprocess.run()and usedshlex.splitto safely construct the command arguments to avoid shell injection risks.