[5.5] [Security] Close remember_me
Timing Attack Vector #21320
Merged
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit. This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code. Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed. Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes. Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch. Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit. Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported. You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion. Outdated suggestions cannot be applied. This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved. Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews. Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments. Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge. Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
The current
remember_me
token verification process leaves the application open to a timing attack.Since the default is for the token to be stored as a cookie and for cookies to be encrypted, an attacker would have to know the application secret to exploit this. However, should a custom guard be used or cookies not be encrypted, it becomes possible to tease this value out.
The proposed change switches to comparing the token using a constant-time comparison. This makes it impossible to learn the value of the token by timing responses, independently of guard or encryption settings.