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@dscho dscho commented Dec 3, 2020

This is essentially a complete rewrite of a small part of the functionality of the Git wrapper of Git for Windows.

derrickstolee and others added 2 commits November 23, 2020 21:14
The existing mechanism for scheduling background maintenance is done through cron. The 'crontab -e' command allows updating the schedule while cron itself runs those commands. While this is technically supported by macOS, it has some significant deficiencies: 1. Every run of 'crontab -e' must request elevated privileges through the user interface. When running 'git maintenance start' from the Terminal app, it presents a dialog box saying "Terminal.app would like to administer your computer. Administration can include modifying passwords, networking, and system settings." This is more alarming than what we are hoping to achieve. If this alert had some information about how "git" is trying to run "crontab" then we would have some reason to believe that this dialog might be fine. However, it also doesn't help that some scenarios just leave Git waiting for a response without presenting anything to the user. I experienced this when executing the command from a Bash terminal view inside Visual Studio Code. 2. While cron initializes a user environment enough for "git config --global --show-origin" to show the correct config file information, it does not set up the environment enough for Git Credential Manager Core to load credentials during a 'prefetch' task. My prefetches against private repositories required re-authenticating through UI pop-ups in a way that should not be required. The solution is to switch from cron to the Apple-recommended [1] 'launchd' tool. [1] https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/ScheduledJobs.html The basics of this tool is that we need to create XML-formatted "plist" files inside "~/Library/LaunchAgents/" and then use the 'launchctl' tool to make launchd aware of them. The plist files include all of the scheduling information, along with the command-line arguments split across an array of <string> tags. For example, here is my plist file for the weekly scheduled tasks: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd"> <plist version="1.0"><dict> <key>Label</key><string>org.git-scm.git.weekly</string> <key>ProgramArguments</key> <array> <string>/usr/local/libexec/git-core/git</string> <string>--exec-path=/usr/local/libexec/git-core</string> <string>for-each-repo</string> <string>--config=maintenance.repo</string> <string>maintenance</string> <string>run</string> <string>--schedule=weekly</string> </array> <key>StartCalendarInterval</key> <array> <dict> <key>Day</key><integer>0</integer> <key>Hour</key><integer>0</integer> <key>Minute</key><integer>0</integer> </dict> </array> </dict> </plist> The schedules for the daily and hourly tasks are more complicated since we need to use an array for the StartCalendarInterval with an entry for each of the six days other than the 0th day (to avoid colliding with the weekly task), and each of the 23 hours other than the 0th hour (to avoid colliding with the daily task). The "Label" value is currently filled with "org.git-scm.git.X" where X is the frequency. We need a different plist file for each frequency. The launchctl command needs to be aligned with a user id in order to initialize the command environment. This must be done using the 'launchctl bootstrap' subcommand. This subcommand is new as of macOS 10.11, which was released in September 2015. Before that release the 'launchctl load' subcommand was recommended. The best source of information on this transition I have seen is available at [2]. The current design does not preclude a future version that detects the available fatures of 'launchctl' to use the older commands. However, it is best to rely on the newest version since Apple might completely remove the deprecated version on short notice. [2] https://babodee.wordpress.com/2016/04/09/launchctl-2-0-syntax/ To remove a schedule, we must run 'launchctl bootout' with a valid plist file. We also need to 'bootout' a task before the 'bootstrap' subcommand will succeed, if such a task already exists. The need for a user id requires us to run 'id -u' which works on POSIX systems but not Windows. Further, the need for fully-qualitifed path names including $HOME behaves differently in the Git internals and the external test suite. The $HOME variable starts with "C:\..." instead of the "/c/..." that is provided by Git in these subcommands. The test therefore has a prerequisite that we are not on Windows. The cross- platform logic still allows us to test the macOS logic on a Linux machine. We can verify the commands that were run by 'git maintenance start' and 'git maintenance stop' by injecting a script that writes the command-line arguments into GIT_TEST_MAINT_SCHEDULER. An earlier version of this patch accidentally had an opening "<dict>" tag when it should have had a closing "</dict>" tag. This was caught during manual testing with actual 'launchctl' commands, but we do not want to update developers' tasks when running tests. It appears that macOS includes the "xmllint" tool which can verify the XML format. This is useful for any system that might contain the tool, so use it whenever it is available. Co-authored-by: Eric Sunshine <sunshine@sunshineco.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Sunshine <sunshine@sunshineco.com> Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
Git's background maintenance uses cron by default, but this is not available on Windows. Instead, integrate with Task Scheduler. Tasks can be scheduled using the 'schtasks' command. There are several command-line options that can allow for some advanced scheduling, but unfortunately these seem to all require authenticating using a password. Instead, use the "/xml" option to pass an XML file that contains the configuration for the necessary schedule. These XML files are based on some that I exported after constructing a schedule in the Task Scheduler GUI. These options only run background maintenance when the user is logged in, and more fields are populated with the current username and SID at run-time by 'schtasks'. Since the GIT_TEST_MAINT_SCHEDULER environment variable allows us to specify 'schtasks' as the scheduler, we can test the Windows-specific logic on other platforms. Thus, add a check that the XML file written by Git is valid when xmllint exists on the system. Since we use a temporary file for the XML files sent to 'schtasks', we prefix the random characters with the frequency so it is easier to examine the proper file during tests. Instead of an exact match on the 'args' file, we 'grep' for the arguments other than the filename. There is a deficiency in the current design. Windows has two kinds of applications: GUI applications that start by "winmain()" and console applications that start by "main()". Console applications are attached to a new Console window if they are not already associated with a GUI application. This means that every hour the scheudled task launches a command window for the scheduled tasks. Not only is this visually obtrusive, but it also takes focus from whatever else the user is doing! A simple fix would be to insert a GUI application that acts as a shim between the scheduled task and Git. This is currently possible in Git for Windows by setting the <Command> tag equal to C:\Program Files\Git\git-bash.exe with options "--hide --no-needs-console --command=cmd\git.exe" followed by the arguments currently used. Since git-bash.exe is not included in Windows builds of core Git, I chose to leave out this feature. My plan is to submit a small patch to Git for Windows that converts the use of git.exe with this use of git-bash.exe in the short term. In the long term, we can consider creating this GUI shim application within core Git, perhaps in contrib/. Co-authored-by: Eric Sunshine <sunshine@sunshineco.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Sunshine <sunshine@sunshineco.com> Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
On Windows, there are two kinds of executables, console ones and non-console ones. Git's executables are all console ones. When launching the former e.g. in a scheduled task, a CMD window pops up. This is not what we want for the tasks installed via the `git maintenance` command. To work around this, let's introduce `headless-git.exe`, which is a non-console program that does _not_ pop up any window. All it does is to re-launch `git.exe`, suppressing that console window, passing through all command-line arguments as-are. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
We just introduced a helper to avoid showing a console window when the scheduled task runs `git.exe`. Let's actually use it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
@dscho dscho force-pushed the maintenance/macOS branch from d19d844 to 12a15db Compare December 10, 2020 11:28
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dscho commented Dec 10, 2020

@derrickstolee in addition to rebasing the patches, I snuck in the change where %ls is used as format specifier for wide-character string parameters (this seems to be the most portable way to specify this).

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@dscho I created a calendar event for tomorrow (Friday, Dec 11) to test and review these commits. Thanks!

@derrickstolee derrickstolee force-pushed the maintenance/macOS branch 2 times, most recently from 58ecce1 to 68f5013 Compare January 5, 2021 12:21
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 24, 2021
…sponse query_result can be be an empty strbuf (STRBUF_INIT) - in that case trying to read 3 bytes triggers a buffer overflow read (as query_result.buf = '\0'). Therefore we need to check query_result's length before trying to read 3 bytes. This overflow was introduced in: 940b94f (fsmonitor: log invocation of FSMonitor hook to trace2, 2021-02-03) It was found when running the test-suite against ASAN, and can be most easily reproduced with the following command: make GIT_TEST_OPTS="-v" DEFAULT_TEST_TARGET="t7519-status-fsmonitor.sh" \ SANITIZE=address DEVELOPER=1 test ==2235==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x0000019e6e5e at pc 0x00000043745c bp 0x7fffd382c520 sp 0x7fffd382bcc8 READ of size 3 at 0x0000019e6e5e thread T0 #0 0x43745b in MemcmpInterceptorCommon(void*, int (*)(void const*, void const*, unsigned long), void const*, void const*, unsigned long) /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/../sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:842:7 #1 0x43786d in bcmp /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/../sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:887:10 #2 0x80b146 in fsmonitor_is_trivial_response /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/fsmonitor.c:192:10 #3 0x80b146 in query_fsmonitor /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/fsmonitor.c:175:7 #4 0x80a749 in refresh_fsmonitor /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/fsmonitor.c:267:21 #5 0x80bad1 in tweak_fsmonitor /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/fsmonitor.c:429:4 #6 0x90f040 in read_index_from /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/read-cache.c:2321:3 #7 0x8e5d08 in repo_read_index_preload /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/preload-index.c:164:15 #8 0x52dd45 in prepare_index /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/commit.c:363:6 #9 0x52a188 in cmd_commit /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/commit.c:1588:15 #10 0x4ce77e in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #11 0x4ccb18 in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #12 0x4cb01c in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #13 0x4cb01c in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #14 0x6aca8d in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #15 0x7fb027bf5349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) #16 0x4206b9 in _start /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/glibc-2.26/csu/../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:120 0x0000019e6e5e is located 2 bytes to the left of global variable 'strbuf_slopbuf' defined in 'strbuf.c:51:6' (0x19e6e60) of size 1 'strbuf_slopbuf' is ascii string '' 0x0000019e6e5e is located 126 bytes to the right of global variable 'signals' defined in 'sigchain.c:11:31' (0x19e6be0) of size 512 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/../sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:842:7 in MemcmpInterceptorCommon(void*, int (*)(void const*, void const*, unsigned long), void const*, void const*, unsigned long) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x000080334d70: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 0x000080334d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x000080334d90: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x000080334da0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x000080334db0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 =>0x000080334dc0: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9[f9]01 f9 f9 f9 0x000080334dd0: f9 f9 f9 f9 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 02 f9 f9 f9 0x000080334de0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 04 f9 f9 f9 0x000080334df0: f9 f9 f9 f9 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 0x000080334e00: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 01 f9 f9 f9 0x000080334e10: f9 f9 f9 f9 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Acked-by: Jeff Hostetler <jeffhost@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
@derrickstolee
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This is upstream now.

@dscho dscho deleted the maintenance/macOS branch March 25, 2021 14:54
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 10, 2021
Most of these pointers can safely be freed when cmd_clone() completes, therefore we make sure to free them. The one exception is that we have to UNLEAK(repo) because it can point either to argv[0], or a malloc'd string returned by absolute_pathdup(). We also have to free(path) in the middle of cmd_clone(): later during cmd_clone(), path is unconditionally overwritten with a different path, triggering a leak. Freeing the first path immediately after use (but only in the case where it contains data) seems like the cleanest solution, as opposed to freeing it unconditionally before path is reused for another path. This leak appears to have been introduced in: f38aa83 (use local cloning if insteadOf makes a local URL, 2014-07-17) These leaks were found when running t0001 with LSAN, see also an excerpt of the LSAN output below (the full list is omitted because it's far too long, and mostly consists of indirect leakage of members of the refs we are freeing). Direct leak of 178 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a53d in malloc /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x9a6ff4 in do_xmalloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0x9a6fca in xmalloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:62:9 #3 0x8ce296 in copy_ref /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/remote.c:885:8 #4 0x8d2ebd in guess_remote_head /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/remote.c:2215:10 #5 0x51d0c5 in cmd_clone /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/clone.c:1308:4 #6 0x4cd60d in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #7 0x4cb2da in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #8 0x4ccc37 in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #9 0x4cac29 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #10 0x69c45e in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #11 0x7f6a459d5349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Direct leak of 165 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a53d in malloc /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x9a6fc4 in do_xmalloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0x9a6f9a in xmalloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:62:9 #3 0x8ce266 in copy_ref /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/remote.c:885:8 #4 0x51e9bd in wanted_peer_refs /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/clone.c:574:21 #5 0x51cfe1 in cmd_clone /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/clone.c:1284:17 #6 0x4cd60d in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #7 0x4cb2da in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #8 0x4ccc37 in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #9 0x4cac29 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #10 0x69c42e in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #11 0x7f8fef0c2349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Direct leak of 178 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a53d in malloc /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x9a6ff4 in do_xmalloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0x9a6fca in xmalloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:62:9 #3 0x8ce296 in copy_ref /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/remote.c:885:8 #4 0x8d2ebd in guess_remote_head /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/remote.c:2215:10 #5 0x51d0c5 in cmd_clone /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/clone.c:1308:4 #6 0x4cd60d in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #7 0x4cb2da in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #8 0x4ccc37 in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #9 0x4cac29 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #10 0x69c45e in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #11 0x7f6a459d5349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Direct leak of 165 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a6b2 in calloc /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154:3 #1 0x9a72f2 in xcalloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:140:8 #2 0x8ce203 in alloc_ref_with_prefix /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/remote.c:867:20 #3 0x8ce1a2 in alloc_ref /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/remote.c:875:9 #4 0x72f63e in process_ref_v2 /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/connect.c:426:8 #5 0x72f21a in get_remote_refs /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/connect.c:525:8 #6 0x979ab7 in handshake /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/transport.c:305:4 #7 0x97872d in get_refs_via_connect /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/transport.c:339:9 #8 0x9774b5 in transport_get_remote_refs /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/transport.c:1388:4 #9 0x51cf80 in cmd_clone /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/clone.c:1271:9 #10 0x4cd60d in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #11 0x4cb2da in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #12 0x4ccc37 in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #13 0x4cac29 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #14 0x69c45e in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #15 0x7f6a459d5349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Direct leak of 105 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a859 in realloc /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0x9a71f6 in xrealloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0x93622d in strbuf_grow /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/strbuf.c:98:2 #3 0x937a73 in strbuf_addch /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/./strbuf.h:231:3 #4 0x939fcd in strbuf_add_absolute_path /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/strbuf.c:911:4 #5 0x69d3ce in absolute_pathdup /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/abspath.c:261:2 #6 0x51c688 in cmd_clone /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/clone.c:1021:10 #7 0x4cd60d in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #8 0x4cb2da in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #9 0x4ccc37 in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #10 0x4cac29 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #11 0x69c45e in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #12 0x7f6a459d5349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 10, 2021
The primary goal of this change is to stop leaking init_db_template_dir. This leak can happen because: 1. git_init_db_config() allocates new memory into init_db_template_dir without first freeing the existing value. 2. init_db_template_dir might already contain data, either because: 2.1 git_config() can be invoked twice with this callback in a single process - at least 2 allocations are likely. 2.2 A single git_config() allocation can invoke the callback multiple times for a given key (see further explanation in the function docs) - each of those calls will trigger another leak. The simplest fix for the leak would be to free(init_db_template_dir) before overwriting it. Instead we choose to convert to fetching init.templatedir via git_config_get_value() as that is more explicit, more efficient, and avoids allocations (the returned result is owned by the config cache, so we aren't responsible for freeing it). If we remove init_db_template_dir, git_init_db_config() ends up being responsible only for forwarding core.* config values to platform_core_config(). However platform_core_config() already ignores non-core.* config values, so we can safely remove git_init_db_config() and invoke git_config() directly with platform_core_config() as the callback. The platform_core_config forwarding was originally added in: 2878533 (mingw: respect core.hidedotfiles = false in git-init again, 2019-03-11 And I suspect the potential for a leak existed since the original implementation of git_init_db_config in: 90b4518 (Add `init.templatedir` configuration variable., 2010-02-17) LSAN output from t0001: Direct leak of 73 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a859 in realloc /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0x9a7276 in xrealloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0x9362ad in strbuf_grow /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/strbuf.c:98:2 #3 0x936eaa in strbuf_add /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/strbuf.c:295:2 #4 0x868112 in strbuf_addstr /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/./strbuf.h:304:2 #5 0x86a8ad in expand_user_path /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/path.c:758:2 #6 0x720bb1 in git_config_pathname /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/config.c:1287:10 #7 0x5960e2 in git_init_db_config /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/init-db.c:161:11 #8 0x7255b8 in configset_iter /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/config.c:1982:7 #9 0x7253fc in repo_config /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/config.c:2311:2 #10 0x725ca7 in git_config /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/config.c:2399:2 #11 0x593e8d in create_default_files /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/init-db.c:225:2 #12 0x5935c6 in init_db /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/init-db.c:449:11 #13 0x59588e in cmd_init_db /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/init-db.c:714:9 #14 0x4cd60d in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #15 0x4cb2da in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #16 0x4ccc37 in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #17 0x4cac29 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #18 0x69c4de in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #19 0x7f23552d6349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 10, 2021
transport_get_remote_refs() can populate the transport struct's remote_refs. transport_disconnect() is already responsible for most of transport's cleanup - therefore we also take care of freeing remote_refs there. There are 2 locations where transport_disconnect() is called before we're done using the returned remote_refs. This patch changes those callsites to only call transport_disconnect() after the returned refs are no longer being used - which is necessary to safely be able to free remote_refs during transport_disconnect(). This commit fixes the following leak which was found while running t0000, but is expected to also fix the same pattern of leak in all locations that use transport_get_remote_refs(): Direct leak of 165 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a6b2 in calloc /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154:3 #1 0x9a72f2 in xcalloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:140:8 #2 0x8ce203 in alloc_ref_with_prefix /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/remote.c:867:20 #3 0x8ce1a2 in alloc_ref /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/remote.c:875:9 #4 0x72f63e in process_ref_v2 /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/connect.c:426:8 #5 0x72f21a in get_remote_refs /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/connect.c:525:8 #6 0x979ab7 in handshake /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/transport.c:305:4 #7 0x97872d in get_refs_via_connect /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/transport.c:339:9 #8 0x9774b5 in transport_get_remote_refs /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/transport.c:1388:4 #9 0x51cf80 in cmd_clone /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/clone.c:1271:9 #10 0x4cd60d in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #11 0x4cb2da in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #12 0x4ccc37 in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #13 0x4cac29 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #14 0x69c45e in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #15 0x7f6a459d5349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 30, 2021
versions could be an empty string_list. In that case, versions->items is NULL, and we shouldn't be trying to perform pointer arithmetic with it (as that results in undefined behaviour). Moreover we only use the results of this calculation once when calling QSORT. Therefore we choose to skip creating relevant_entries and call QSORT directly with our manipulated pointers (but only if there's data requiring sorting). This lets us avoid abusing the string_list API, and saves us from having to explain why this abuse is OK. Finally, an assertion is added to make sure that write_tree() is called with a valid offset. This issue has probably existed since: ee4012d (merge-ort: step 2 of tree writing -- function to create tree object, 2020-12-13) But it only started occurring during tests since tests started using merge-ort: f3b964a (Add testing with merge-ort merge strategy, 2021-03-20) For reference - here's the original UBSAN commit that implemented this check, it sounds like this behaviour isn't actually likely to cause any issues (but we might as well fix it regardless): https://reviews.llvm.org/D67122 UBSAN output from t3404 or t5601: merge-ort.c:2669:43: runtime error: applying zero offset to null pointer #0 0x78bb53 in write_tree merge-ort.c:2669:43 #1 0x7856c9 in process_entries merge-ort.c:3303:2 #2 0x782317 in merge_ort_nonrecursive_internal merge-ort.c:3744:2 #3 0x77feef in merge_incore_nonrecursive merge-ort.c:3853:2 #4 0x6f6a5c in do_recursive_merge sequencer.c:640:3 #5 0x6f6a5c in do_pick_commit sequencer.c:2221:9 #6 0x6ef055 in single_pick sequencer.c:4814:9 #7 0x6ef055 in sequencer_pick_revisions sequencer.c:4867:10 #8 0x4fb392 in run_sequencer revert.c:225:9 #9 0x4fa5b0 in cmd_revert revert.c:235:8 #10 0x42abd7 in run_builtin git.c:453:11 #11 0x429531 in handle_builtin git.c:704:3 #12 0x4282fb in run_argv git.c:771:4 #13 0x4282fb in cmd_main git.c:902:19 #14 0x524b63 in main common-main.c:52:11 #15 0x7fc2ca340349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) #16 0x4072b9 in _start start.S:120 SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior merge-ort.c:2669:43 in Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Reviewed-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 14, 2021
limit_list() iterates over the original revs->commits list, and consumes many of its entries via pop_commit. However we might stop iterating over the list early (e.g. if we realise that the rest of the list is uninteresting). If we do stop iterating early, list will be pointing to the unconsumed portion of revs->commits - and we need to free this list to avoid a leak. (revs->commits itself will be an invalid pointer: it will have been free'd during the first pop_commit.) However the list pointer is later reused to iterate over our new list, but only for the limiting_can_increase_treesame() branch. We therefore need to introduce a new variable for that branch - and while we're here we can rename the original list to original_list as that makes its purpose more obvious. This leak was found while running t0090. It's not likely to be very impactful, but it can happen quite early during some checkout invocations, and hence seems to be worth fixing: Direct leak of 16 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a85d in malloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x9ac084 in do_xmalloc wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0x9ac05a in xmalloc wrapper.c:62:9 #3 0x7175d6 in commit_list_insert commit.c:540:33 #4 0x71800f in commit_list_insert_by_date commit.c:604:9 #5 0x8f8d2e in process_parents revision.c:1128:5 #6 0x8f2f2c in limit_list revision.c:1418:7 #7 0x8f210e in prepare_revision_walk revision.c:3577:7 #8 0x514170 in orphaned_commit_warning builtin/checkout.c:1185:6 #9 0x512f05 in switch_branches builtin/checkout.c:1250:3 #10 0x50f8de in checkout_branch builtin/checkout.c:1646:9 #11 0x50ba12 in checkout_main builtin/checkout.c:2003:9 #12 0x5086c0 in cmd_checkout builtin/checkout.c:2055:8 #13 0x4cd91d in run_builtin git.c:467:11 #14 0x4cb5f3 in handle_builtin git.c:719:3 #15 0x4ccf47 in run_argv git.c:808:4 #16 0x4caf49 in cmd_main git.c:939:19 #17 0x69dc0e in main common-main.c:52:11 #18 0x7faaabd0e349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Indirect leak of 48 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a85d in malloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x9ac084 in do_xmalloc wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0x9ac05a in xmalloc wrapper.c:62:9 #3 0x717de6 in commit_list_append commit.c:1609:35 #4 0x8f1f9b in prepare_revision_walk revision.c:3554:12 #5 0x514170 in orphaned_commit_warning builtin/checkout.c:1185:6 #6 0x512f05 in switch_branches builtin/checkout.c:1250:3 #7 0x50f8de in checkout_branch builtin/checkout.c:1646:9 #8 0x50ba12 in checkout_main builtin/checkout.c:2003:9 #9 0x5086c0 in cmd_checkout builtin/checkout.c:2055:8 #10 0x4cd91d in run_builtin git.c:467:11 #11 0x4cb5f3 in handle_builtin git.c:719:3 #12 0x4ccf47 in run_argv git.c:808:4 #13 0x4caf49 in cmd_main git.c:939:19 #14 0x69dc0e in main common-main.c:52:11 #15 0x7faaabd0e349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 14, 2021
rev.prune_data is populated (in multiple functions) via copy_pathspec, and therefore needs to be cleared after running the diff in those functions. rev(_info).pending is populated indirectly via setup_revisions, and also needs to be cleared once diffing is done. These leaks were found while running t0008 or t0021. The rev.prune_data leaks are small (80B) but noisy, hence I won't bother including their logs - the rev.pending leaks are bigger, and can happen early in the course of other commands, and therefore possibly more valuable to fix - see example log from a rebase below: Direct leak of 2048 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49ab79 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0x9ac2a6 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0x83da03 in add_object_array_with_path object.c:337:3 #3 0x8f5d8a in add_pending_object_with_path revision.c:329:2 #4 0x8ea50b in add_pending_object_with_mode revision.c:336:2 #5 0x8ea4fd in add_pending_object revision.c:342:2 #6 0x8ea610 in add_head_to_pending revision.c:354:2 #7 0x9b55f5 in has_uncommitted_changes wt-status.c:2474:2 #8 0x9b58c4 in require_clean_work_tree wt-status.c:2553:6 #9 0x606bcc in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1970:6 #10 0x4cd91d in run_builtin git.c:467:11 #11 0x4cb5f3 in handle_builtin git.c:719:3 #12 0x4ccf47 in run_argv git.c:808:4 #13 0x4caf49 in cmd_main git.c:939:19 #14 0x69dc0e in main common-main.c:52:11 #15 0x7f2d18909349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Indirect leak of 5 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x486834 in strdup ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:452:3 #1 0x9ac048 in xstrdup wrapper.c:29:14 #2 0x83da8d in add_object_array_with_path object.c:349:17 #3 0x8f5d8a in add_pending_object_with_path revision.c:329:2 #4 0x8ea50b in add_pending_object_with_mode revision.c:336:2 #5 0x8ea4fd in add_pending_object revision.c:342:2 #6 0x8ea610 in add_head_to_pending revision.c:354:2 #7 0x9b55f5 in has_uncommitted_changes wt-status.c:2474:2 #8 0x9b58c4 in require_clean_work_tree wt-status.c:2553:6 #9 0x606bcc in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1970:6 #10 0x4cd91d in run_builtin git.c:467:11 #11 0x4cb5f3 in handle_builtin git.c:719:3 #12 0x4ccf47 in run_argv git.c:808:4 #13 0x4caf49 in cmd_main git.c:939:19 #14 0x69dc0e in main common-main.c:52:11 #15 0x7f2d18909349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 2053 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 14, 2021
real_ref was previously populated by dwim_ref(), which allocates new memory. We need to make sure to free real_ref when discarding it. (real_ref is already being freed at the end of create_branch() - but if we discard it early then it will leak.) This fixes the following leak found while running t0002-t0099: Direct leak of 5 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x486954 in strdup /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:452:3 #1 0xdd6484 in xstrdup wrapper.c:29:14 #2 0xc0f658 in expand_ref refs.c:671:12 #3 0xc0ecf1 in repo_dwim_ref refs.c:644:22 #4 0x8b1184 in dwim_ref ./refs.h:162:9 #5 0x8b0b02 in create_branch branch.c:284:10 #6 0x550cbb in update_refs_for_switch builtin/checkout.c:1046:4 #7 0x54e275 in switch_branches builtin/checkout.c:1274:2 #8 0x548828 in checkout_branch builtin/checkout.c:1668:9 #9 0x541306 in checkout_main builtin/checkout.c:2025:9 #10 0x5395fa in cmd_checkout builtin/checkout.c:2077:8 #11 0x4d02a8 in run_builtin git.c:467:11 #12 0x4cbfe9 in handle_builtin git.c:719:3 #13 0x4cf04f in run_argv git.c:808:4 #14 0x4cb85a in cmd_main git.c:939:19 #15 0x820cf6 in main common-main.c:52:11 #16 0x7f30bd9dd349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 14, 2021
parse_pathspec() allocates new memory into pathspec, therefore we need to free it when we're done. An UNLEAK would probably be just as good here - but clear_pathspec() is not much more work so we might as well use it. check_ignore() is either called once directly from cmd_check_ignore() (in which case the leak really doesnt matter), or it can be called multiple times in a loop from check_ignore_stdin_paths(), in which case we're potentially leaking multiple times - but even in this scenario the leak is so small as to have no real consequence. Found while running t0008: Direct leak of 112 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a85d in malloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x9aca44 in do_xmalloc wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0x9aca1a in xmalloc wrapper.c:62:9 #3 0x873c17 in parse_pathspec pathspec.c:582:2 #4 0x503eb8 in check_ignore builtin/check-ignore.c:90:2 #5 0x5038af in cmd_check_ignore builtin/check-ignore.c:190:17 #6 0x4cd91d in run_builtin git.c:467:11 #7 0x4cb5f3 in handle_builtin git.c:719:3 #8 0x4ccf47 in run_argv git.c:808:4 #9 0x4caf49 in cmd_main git.c:939:19 #10 0x69e43e in main common-main.c:52:11 #11 0x7f18bb0dd349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Indirect leak of 65 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49ab79 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0x9acc46 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0x93baed in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:98:2 #3 0x93d696 in strbuf_vaddf strbuf.c:392:3 #4 0x9400c6 in xstrvfmt strbuf.c:979:2 #5 0x940253 in xstrfmt strbuf.c:989:8 #6 0x92b72a in prefix_path_gently setup.c:115:15 #7 0x87442d in init_pathspec_item pathspec.c:439:11 #8 0x873cef in parse_pathspec pathspec.c:589:3 #9 0x503eb8 in check_ignore builtin/check-ignore.c:90:2 #10 0x5038af in cmd_check_ignore builtin/check-ignore.c:190:17 #11 0x4cd91d in run_builtin git.c:467:11 #12 0x4cb5f3 in handle_builtin git.c:719:3 #13 0x4ccf47 in run_argv git.c:808:4 #14 0x4caf49 in cmd_main git.c:939:19 #15 0x69e43e in main common-main.c:52:11 #16 0x7f18bb0dd349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Indirect leak of 2 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x486834 in strdup ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:452:3 #1 0x9ac9e8 in xstrdup wrapper.c:29:14 #2 0x874542 in init_pathspec_item pathspec.c:468:20 #3 0x873cef in parse_pathspec pathspec.c:589:3 #4 0x503eb8 in check_ignore builtin/check-ignore.c:90:2 #5 0x5038af in cmd_check_ignore builtin/check-ignore.c:190:17 #6 0x4cd91d in run_builtin git.c:467:11 #7 0x4cb5f3 in handle_builtin git.c:719:3 #8 0x4ccf47 in run_argv git.c:808:4 #9 0x4caf49 in cmd_main git.c:939:19 #10 0x69e43e in main common-main.c:52:11 #11 0x7f18bb0dd349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 179 byte(s) leaked in 3 allocation(s). Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 14, 2021
add_pending_object() populates rev.pending, we need to take care of clearing it once we're done. This code is run close to the end of a checkout, therefore this leak seems like it would have very little impact. See also LSAN output from t0020 below: Direct leak of 2048 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49ab79 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0x9acc46 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0x83e3a3 in add_object_array_with_path object.c:337:3 #3 0x8f672a in add_pending_object_with_path revision.c:329:2 #4 0x8eaeab in add_pending_object_with_mode revision.c:336:2 #5 0x8eae9d in add_pending_object revision.c:342:2 #6 0x5154a0 in show_local_changes builtin/checkout.c:602:2 #7 0x513b00 in merge_working_tree builtin/checkout.c:979:3 #8 0x512cb3 in switch_branches builtin/checkout.c:1242:9 #9 0x50f8de in checkout_branch builtin/checkout.c:1646:9 #10 0x50ba12 in checkout_main builtin/checkout.c:2003:9 #11 0x5086c0 in cmd_checkout builtin/checkout.c:2055:8 #12 0x4cd91d in run_builtin git.c:467:11 #13 0x4cb5f3 in handle_builtin git.c:719:3 #14 0x4ccf47 in run_argv git.c:808:4 #15 0x4caf49 in cmd_main git.c:939:19 #16 0x69e43e in main common-main.c:52:11 #17 0x7f5dd1d50349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 2048 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 14, 2021
mailinfo.p_hdr_info/s_hdr_info are null-terminated lists of strbuf's, with entries pointing either to NULL or an allocated strbuf. Therefore we need to free those strbuf's (and not just the data they contain) whenever we're done with a given entry. (See handle_header() where those new strbufs are malloc'd.) Once we no longer need the list (and not just its entries) we can switch over to strbuf_list_free() instead of manually iterating over the list, which takes care of those additional details for us. We can only do this in clear_mailinfo() - in handle_commit_message() we are only clearing the array contents but want to reuse the array itself, hence we can't use strbuf_list_free() there. However, strbuf_list_free() cannot handle a NULL input, and the lists we are freeing might be NULL. Therefore we add a NULL check in strbuf_list_free() to make it safe to use with a NULL input (which is a pattern used by some of the other *_free() functions around git). Leak output from t0023: Direct leak of 72 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a85d in malloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x9ac9f4 in do_xmalloc wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0x9ac9ca in xmalloc wrapper.c:62:9 #3 0x7f6cf7 in handle_header mailinfo.c:205:10 #4 0x7f5abf in check_header mailinfo.c:583:4 #5 0x7f5524 in mailinfo mailinfo.c:1197:3 #6 0x4dcc95 in parse_mail builtin/am.c:1167:6 #7 0x4d9070 in am_run builtin/am.c:1732:12 #8 0x4d5b7a in cmd_am builtin/am.c:2398:3 #9 0x4cd91d in run_builtin git.c:467:11 #10 0x4cb5f3 in handle_builtin git.c:719:3 #11 0x4ccf47 in run_argv git.c:808:4 #12 0x4caf49 in cmd_main git.c:939:19 #13 0x69e43e in main common-main.c:52:11 #14 0x7fc1fadfa349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 72 byte(s) leaked in 3 allocation(s). Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 14, 2021
sorting might be a list allocated in ref_default_sorting() (in this case it's a fixed single item list, which has nevertheless been xcalloc'd), or it might be a list allocated in parse_opt_ref_sorting(). In either case we could free these lists - but instead we UNLEAK as we're at the end of cmd_for_each_ref. (There's no existing implementation of clear_ref_sorting(), and writing a loop to free the list seems more trouble than it's worth.) filter.with_commit/no_commit are populated via OPT_CONTAINS/OPT_NO_CONTAINS, both of which create new entries via parse_opt_commits(), and also need to be free'd or UNLEAK'd. Because free_commit_list() already exists, we choose to use that over an UNLEAK. LSAN output from t0041: Direct leak of 16 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a9d2 in calloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154:3 #1 0x9ac252 in xcalloc wrapper.c:140:8 #2 0x8a4a55 in ref_default_sorting ref-filter.c:2486:32 #3 0x56c6b1 in cmd_for_each_ref builtin/for-each-ref.c:72:13 #4 0x4cd91d in run_builtin git.c:467:11 #5 0x4cb5f3 in handle_builtin git.c:719:3 #6 0x4ccf47 in run_argv git.c:808:4 #7 0x4caf49 in cmd_main git.c:939:19 #8 0x69dabe in main common-main.c:52:11 #9 0x7f2bdc570349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Direct leak of 16 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a85d in malloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x9abf54 in do_xmalloc wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0x9abf2a in xmalloc wrapper.c:62:9 #3 0x717486 in commit_list_insert commit.c:540:33 #4 0x8644cf in parse_opt_commits parse-options-cb.c:98:2 #5 0x869bb5 in get_value parse-options.c:181:11 #6 0x8677dc in parse_long_opt parse-options.c:378:10 #7 0x8659bd in parse_options_step parse-options.c:817:11 #8 0x867fcd in parse_options parse-options.c:870:10 #9 0x56c62b in cmd_for_each_ref builtin/for-each-ref.c:59:2 #10 0x4cd91d in run_builtin git.c:467:11 #11 0x4cb5f3 in handle_builtin git.c:719:3 #12 0x4ccf47 in run_argv git.c:808:4 #13 0x4caf49 in cmd_main git.c:939:19 #14 0x69dabe in main common-main.c:52:11 #15 0x7f2bdc570349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 14, 2021
parse_pathspec() populates pathspec, hence we need to clear it once it's no longer needed. seen is xcalloc'd within the same function and likewise needs to be freed once its no longer needed. cmd_rm() has multiple early returns, therefore we need to clear or free as soon as this data is no longer needed, as opposed to doing a cleanup at the end. LSAN output from t0020: Direct leak of 112 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a85d in malloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x9ac0a4 in do_xmalloc wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0x9ac07a in xmalloc wrapper.c:62:9 #3 0x873277 in parse_pathspec pathspec.c:582:2 #4 0x646ffa in cmd_rm builtin/rm.c:266:2 #5 0x4cd91d in run_builtin git.c:467:11 #6 0x4cb5f3 in handle_builtin git.c:719:3 #7 0x4ccf47 in run_argv git.c:808:4 #8 0x4caf49 in cmd_main git.c:939:19 #9 0x69dc0e in main common-main.c:52:11 #10 0x7f948825b349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Indirect leak of 65 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49ab79 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0x9ac2a6 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0x93b14d in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:98:2 #3 0x93ccf6 in strbuf_vaddf strbuf.c:392:3 #4 0x93f726 in xstrvfmt strbuf.c:979:2 #5 0x93f8b3 in xstrfmt strbuf.c:989:8 #6 0x92ad8a in prefix_path_gently setup.c:115:15 #7 0x873a8d in init_pathspec_item pathspec.c:439:11 #8 0x87334f in parse_pathspec pathspec.c:589:3 #9 0x646ffa in cmd_rm builtin/rm.c:266:2 #10 0x4cd91d in run_builtin git.c:467:11 #11 0x4cb5f3 in handle_builtin git.c:719:3 #12 0x4ccf47 in run_argv git.c:808:4 #13 0x4caf49 in cmd_main git.c:939:19 #14 0x69dc0e in main common-main.c:52:11 #15 0x7f948825b349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Indirect leak of 15 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x486834 in strdup ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:452:3 #1 0x9ac048 in xstrdup wrapper.c:29:14 #2 0x873ba2 in init_pathspec_item pathspec.c:468:20 #3 0x87334f in parse_pathspec pathspec.c:589:3 #4 0x646ffa in cmd_rm builtin/rm.c:266:2 #5 0x4cd91d in run_builtin git.c:467:11 #6 0x4cb5f3 in handle_builtin git.c:719:3 #7 0x4ccf47 in run_argv git.c:808:4 #8 0x4caf49 in cmd_main git.c:939:19 #9 0x69dc0e in main common-main.c:52:11 #10 0x7f948825b349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Direct leak of 1 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a9d2 in calloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154:3 #1 0x9ac392 in xcalloc wrapper.c:140:8 #2 0x647108 in cmd_rm builtin/rm.c:294:9 #3 0x4cd91d in run_builtin git.c:467:11 #4 0x4cb5f3 in handle_builtin git.c:719:3 #5 0x4ccf47 in run_argv git.c:808:4 #6 0x4caf49 in cmd_main git.c:939:19 #7 0x69dbfe in main common-main.c:52:11 #8 0x7f4fac1b0349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 12, 2021
ibuf can be reused for multiple iterations of the loop. Specifically: deflate() overwrites s.avail_in to show how much of the input buffer has not been processed yet - and sometimes leaves 'avail_in > 0', in which case ibuf will be processed again during the loop's subsequent iteration. But if we declare ibuf within the loop, then (in theory) we get a new (and uninitialised) buffer for every iteration. In practice, my compiler seems to resue the same buffer - meaning that this code does work - but it doesn't seem safe to rely on this behaviour. MSAN correctly catches this issue - as soon as we hit the 's.avail_in > 0' condition, we end up reading from what seems to be uninitialised memory. Therefore, we move ibuf out of the loop, making this reuse safe. See MSAN output from t1050-large below - the interesting part is the ibuf creation at the end, although there's a lot of indirection before we reach the read from unitialised memory: ==11294==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value #0 0x7f75db58fb1c in crc32_little crc32.c:283:9 #1 0x7f75db58d5b3 in crc32_z crc32.c:220:20 #2 0x7f75db59668c in crc32 crc32.c:242:12 #3 0x8c94f8 in hashwrite csum-file.c:101:15 #4 0x825faf in stream_to_pack bulk-checkin.c:154:5 #5 0x82467b in deflate_to_pack bulk-checkin.c:225:8 #6 0x823ff1 in index_bulk_checkin bulk-checkin.c:264:15 #7 0xa7cff2 in index_stream object-file.c:2234:9 #8 0xa7bff7 in index_fd object-file.c:2256:9 #9 0xa7d22d in index_path object-file.c:2274:7 #10 0xb3c8c9 in add_to_index read-cache.c:802:7 #11 0xb3e039 in add_file_to_index read-cache.c:835:9 #12 0x4a99c3 in add_files add.c:458:7 #13 0x4a7276 in cmd_add add.c:670:18 #14 0x4a1e76 in run_builtin git.c:461:11 #15 0x49e1e7 in handle_builtin git.c:714:3 #16 0x4a0c08 in run_argv git.c:781:4 #17 0x49d5a8 in cmd_main git.c:912:19 #18 0x7974da in main common-main.c:52:11 #19 0x7f75da66f349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) #20 0x421bd9 in _start start.S:120 Uninitialized value was stored to memory at #0 0x7f75db58fa6b in crc32_little crc32.c:283:9 #1 0x7f75db58d5b3 in crc32_z crc32.c:220:20 #2 0x7f75db59668c in crc32 crc32.c:242:12 #3 0x8c94f8 in hashwrite csum-file.c:101:15 #4 0x825faf in stream_to_pack bulk-checkin.c:154:5 #5 0x82467b in deflate_to_pack bulk-checkin.c:225:8 #6 0x823ff1 in index_bulk_checkin bulk-checkin.c:264:15 #7 0xa7cff2 in index_stream object-file.c:2234:9 #8 0xa7bff7 in index_fd object-file.c:2256:9 #9 0xa7d22d in index_path object-file.c:2274:7 #10 0xb3c8c9 in add_to_index read-cache.c:802:7 #11 0xb3e039 in add_file_to_index read-cache.c:835:9 #12 0x4a99c3 in add_files add.c:458:7 #13 0x4a7276 in cmd_add add.c:670:18 #14 0x4a1e76 in run_builtin git.c:461:11 #15 0x49e1e7 in handle_builtin git.c:714:3 #16 0x4a0c08 in run_argv git.c:781:4 #17 0x49d5a8 in cmd_main git.c:912:19 #18 0x7974da in main common-main.c:52:11 #19 0x7f75da66f349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Uninitialized value was stored to memory at #0 0x447eb9 in __msan_memcpy msan_interceptors.cpp:1558:3 #1 0x7f75db5c2011 in flush_pending deflate.c:746:5 #2 0x7f75db5cafa0 in deflate_stored deflate.c:1815:9 #3 0x7f75db5bb7d2 in deflate deflate.c:1005:34 #4 0xd80b7f in git_deflate zlib.c:244:12 #5 0x825dff in stream_to_pack bulk-checkin.c:140:12 #6 0x82467b in deflate_to_pack bulk-checkin.c:225:8 #7 0x823ff1 in index_bulk_checkin bulk-checkin.c:264:15 #8 0xa7cff2 in index_stream object-file.c:2234:9 #9 0xa7bff7 in index_fd object-file.c:2256:9 #10 0xa7d22d in index_path object-file.c:2274:7 #11 0xb3c8c9 in add_to_index read-cache.c:802:7 #12 0xb3e039 in add_file_to_index read-cache.c:835:9 #13 0x4a99c3 in add_files add.c:458:7 #14 0x4a7276 in cmd_add add.c:670:18 #15 0x4a1e76 in run_builtin git.c:461:11 #16 0x49e1e7 in handle_builtin git.c:714:3 #17 0x4a0c08 in run_argv git.c:781:4 #18 0x49d5a8 in cmd_main git.c:912:19 #19 0x7974da in main common-main.c:52:11 Uninitialized value was stored to memory at #0 0x447eb9 in __msan_memcpy msan_interceptors.cpp:1558:3 #1 0x7f75db644241 in _tr_stored_block trees.c:873:5 #2 0x7f75db5cad7c in deflate_stored deflate.c:1813:9 #3 0x7f75db5bb7d2 in deflate deflate.c:1005:34 #4 0xd80b7f in git_deflate zlib.c:244:12 #5 0x825dff in stream_to_pack bulk-checkin.c:140:12 #6 0x82467b in deflate_to_pack bulk-checkin.c:225:8 #7 0x823ff1 in index_bulk_checkin bulk-checkin.c:264:15 #8 0xa7cff2 in index_stream object-file.c:2234:9 #9 0xa7bff7 in index_fd object-file.c:2256:9 #10 0xa7d22d in index_path object-file.c:2274:7 #11 0xb3c8c9 in add_to_index read-cache.c:802:7 #12 0xb3e039 in add_file_to_index read-cache.c:835:9 #13 0x4a99c3 in add_files add.c:458:7 #14 0x4a7276 in cmd_add add.c:670:18 #15 0x4a1e76 in run_builtin git.c:461:11 #16 0x49e1e7 in handle_builtin git.c:714:3 #17 0x4a0c08 in run_argv git.c:781:4 #18 0x49d5a8 in cmd_main git.c:912:19 #19 0x7974da in main common-main.c:52:11 Uninitialized value was stored to memory at #0 0x447eb9 in __msan_memcpy msan_interceptors.cpp:1558:3 #1 0x7f75db5c8fcf in deflate_stored deflate.c:1783:9 #2 0x7f75db5bb7d2 in deflate deflate.c:1005:34 #3 0xd80b7f in git_deflate zlib.c:244:12 #4 0x825dff in stream_to_pack bulk-checkin.c:140:12 #5 0x82467b in deflate_to_pack bulk-checkin.c:225:8 #6 0x823ff1 in index_bulk_checkin bulk-checkin.c:264:15 #7 0xa7cff2 in index_stream object-file.c:2234:9 #8 0xa7bff7 in index_fd object-file.c:2256:9 #9 0xa7d22d in index_path object-file.c:2274:7 #10 0xb3c8c9 in add_to_index read-cache.c:802:7 #11 0xb3e039 in add_file_to_index read-cache.c:835:9 #12 0x4a99c3 in add_files add.c:458:7 #13 0x4a7276 in cmd_add add.c:670:18 #14 0x4a1e76 in run_builtin git.c:461:11 #15 0x49e1e7 in handle_builtin git.c:714:3 #16 0x4a0c08 in run_argv git.c:781:4 #17 0x49d5a8 in cmd_main git.c:912:19 #18 0x7974da in main common-main.c:52:11 #19 0x7f75da66f349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Uninitialized value was stored to memory at #0 0x447eb9 in __msan_memcpy msan_interceptors.cpp:1558:3 #1 0x7f75db5ea545 in read_buf deflate.c:1181:5 #2 0x7f75db5c97f7 in deflate_stored deflate.c:1791:9 #3 0x7f75db5bb7d2 in deflate deflate.c:1005:34 #4 0xd80b7f in git_deflate zlib.c:244:12 #5 0x825dff in stream_to_pack bulk-checkin.c:140:12 #6 0x82467b in deflate_to_pack bulk-checkin.c:225:8 #7 0x823ff1 in index_bulk_checkin bulk-checkin.c:264:15 #8 0xa7cff2 in index_stream object-file.c:2234:9 #9 0xa7bff7 in index_fd object-file.c:2256:9 #10 0xa7d22d in index_path object-file.c:2274:7 #11 0xb3c8c9 in add_to_index read-cache.c:802:7 #12 0xb3e039 in add_file_to_index read-cache.c:835:9 #13 0x4a99c3 in add_files add.c:458:7 #14 0x4a7276 in cmd_add add.c:670:18 #15 0x4a1e76 in run_builtin git.c:461:11 #16 0x49e1e7 in handle_builtin git.c:714:3 #17 0x4a0c08 in run_argv git.c:781:4 #18 0x49d5a8 in cmd_main git.c:912:19 #19 0x7974da in main common-main.c:52:11 Uninitialized value was created by an allocation of 'ibuf' in the stack frame of function 'stream_to_pack' #0 0x825710 in stream_to_pack bulk-checkin.c:101 SUMMARY: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value crc32.c:283:9 in crc32_little Exiting Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <andrzej@ahunt.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 12, 2021
cache_entry contains an object_id, and compare_ce_content() would include that field when calling memcmp on a subset of the cache_entry. Depending on which hashing algorithm is being used, only part of object_id.hash is actually being used, therefore including it in a memcmp() is incorrect. Instead we choose to exclude the object_id when calling memcmp(), and call oideq() separately. This issue was found when running t1700-split-index with MSAN, see MSAN output below (on my machine, offset 76 corresponds to 4 bytes after the start of object_id.hash). Uninitialized bytes in MemcmpInterceptorCommon at offset 76 inside [0x7f60e7c00118, 92) ==27914==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value #0 0x4524ee in memcmp /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/msan/../sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:873:10 #1 0xc867ae in compare_ce_content /home/ahunt/git/git/split-index.c:208:8 #2 0xc859fb in prepare_to_write_split_index /home/ahunt/git/git/split-index.c:336:9 #3 0xb4bbca in write_split_index /home/ahunt/git/git/read-cache.c:3107:2 #4 0xb42b4d in write_locked_index /home/ahunt/git/git/read-cache.c:3295:8 #5 0x638058 in try_merge_strategy /home/ahunt/git/git/builtin/merge.c:758:7 #6 0x63057f in cmd_merge /home/ahunt/git/git/builtin/merge.c:1663:9 #7 0x4a1e76 in run_builtin /home/ahunt/git/git/git.c:461:11 #8 0x49e1e7 in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/git/git/git.c:714:3 #9 0x4a0c08 in run_argv /home/ahunt/git/git/git.c:781:4 #10 0x49d5a8 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/git/git/git.c:912:19 #11 0x7974da in main /home/ahunt/git/git/common-main.c:52:11 #12 0x7f60e928e349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) #13 0x421bd9 in _start /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/glibc-2.26/csu/../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:120 Uninitialized value was stored to memory at #0 0x447eb9 in __msan_memcpy /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/msan/msan_interceptors.cpp:1558:3 #1 0xb4d1e6 in dup_cache_entry /home/ahunt/git/git/read-cache.c:3457:2 #2 0xd214fa in add_entry /home/ahunt/git/git/unpack-trees.c:215:18 #3 0xd1fae0 in keep_entry /home/ahunt/git/git/unpack-trees.c:2276:2 #4 0xd1ff9e in twoway_merge /home/ahunt/git/git/unpack-trees.c:2504:11 #5 0xd27028 in call_unpack_fn /home/ahunt/git/git/unpack-trees.c:593:12 #6 0xd2443d in unpack_nondirectories /home/ahunt/git/git/unpack-trees.c:1106:12 #7 0xd19435 in unpack_callback /home/ahunt/git/git/unpack-trees.c:1306:6 #8 0xd0d7ff in traverse_trees /home/ahunt/git/git/tree-walk.c:532:17 #9 0xd1773a in unpack_trees /home/ahunt/git/git/unpack-trees.c:1683:9 #10 0xdc6370 in checkout /home/ahunt/git/git/merge-ort.c:3590:8 #11 0xdc51c3 in merge_switch_to_result /home/ahunt/git/git/merge-ort.c:3728:7 #12 0xa195a9 in merge_ort_recursive /home/ahunt/git/git/merge-ort-wrappers.c:58:2 #13 0x637fff in try_merge_strategy /home/ahunt/git/git/builtin/merge.c:751:12 #14 0x63057f in cmd_merge /home/ahunt/git/git/builtin/merge.c:1663:9 #15 0x4a1e76 in run_builtin /home/ahunt/git/git/git.c:461:11 #16 0x49e1e7 in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/git/git/git.c:714:3 #17 0x4a0c08 in run_argv /home/ahunt/git/git/git.c:781:4 #18 0x49d5a8 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/git/git/git.c:912:19 #19 0x7974da in main /home/ahunt/git/git/common-main.c:52:11 Uninitialized value was created by a heap allocation #0 0x44e73d in malloc /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/msan/msan_interceptors.cpp:901:3 #1 0xd592f6 in do_xmalloc /home/ahunt/git/git/wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0xd59248 in xmalloc /home/ahunt/git/git/wrapper.c:62:9 #3 0xa17088 in mem_pool_alloc_block /home/ahunt/git/git/mem-pool.c:22:6 #4 0xa16f78 in mem_pool_init /home/ahunt/git/git/mem-pool.c:44:3 #5 0xb481b8 in load_all_cache_entries /home/ahunt/git/git/read-cache.c #6 0xb44d40 in do_read_index /home/ahunt/git/git/read-cache.c:2298:17 #7 0xb48a1b in read_index_from /home/ahunt/git/git/read-cache.c:2389:8 #8 0xbd5a0b in repo_read_index /home/ahunt/git/git/repository.c:276:8 #9 0xb4bcaf in repo_read_index_unmerged /home/ahunt/git/git/read-cache.c:3326:2 #10 0x62ed26 in cmd_merge /home/ahunt/git/git/builtin/merge.c:1362:6 #11 0x4a1e76 in run_builtin /home/ahunt/git/git/git.c:461:11 #12 0x49e1e7 in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/git/git/git.c:714:3 #13 0x4a0c08 in run_argv /home/ahunt/git/git/git.c:781:4 #14 0x49d5a8 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/git/git/git.c:912:19 #15 0x7974da in main /home/ahunt/git/git/common-main.c:52:11 #16 0x7f60e928e349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) SUMMARY: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/msan/../sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:873:10 in memcmp Exiting Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <andrzej@ahunt.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 10, 2021
origin starts off pointing to somewhere within line, which is owned by the caller. Later we might allocate a new string using xmemdupz() or xstrfmt(). To avoid leaking these new strings, we introduce a to_free pointer - which allows us to safely free the newly allocated string when we're done (we cannot just free origin directly as it might still be pointing to line). LSAN output from t0090: Direct leak of 8 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a82d in malloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0xa71f49 in do_xmalloc wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0xa720b0 in do_xmallocz wrapper.c:75:8 #3 0xa720b0 in xmallocz wrapper.c:83:9 #4 0xa720b0 in xmemdupz wrapper.c:99:16 #5 0x8092ba in handle_line fmt-merge-msg.c:187:23 #6 0x8092ba in fmt_merge_msg fmt-merge-msg.c:666:7 #7 0x5ce2e6 in prepare_merge_message builtin/merge.c:1119:2 #8 0x5ce2e6 in collect_parents builtin/merge.c:1215:3 #9 0x5c9c1e in cmd_merge builtin/merge.c:1454:16 #10 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #11 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #12 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #13 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #14 0x6b3fad in main common-main.c:52:11 #15 0x7fb929620349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 8 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <andrzej@ahunt.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 10, 2021
old_dir/new_dir are free()'d at the end of update_dir_rename_counts, however if we return early we'll never free those strings. Therefore we should move all new allocations after the possible early return, avoiding a leak. This seems like a fairly recent leak, that started happening since the early-return was added in: 1ad69eb (diffcore-rename: compute dir_rename_counts in stages, 2021-02-27) LSAN output from t0022: Direct leak of 7 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x486804 in strdup ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:452:3 #1 0xa71e48 in xstrdup wrapper.c:29:14 #2 0x7db9c7 in update_dir_rename_counts diffcore-rename.c:464:12 #3 0x7db6ae in find_renames diffcore-rename.c:1062:3 #4 0x7d76c3 in diffcore_rename_extended diffcore-rename.c:1472:18 #5 0x7b4cfc in diffcore_std diff.c:6705:4 #6 0x855e46 in log_tree_diff_flush log-tree.c:846:2 #7 0x856574 in log_tree_diff log-tree.c:955:3 #8 0x856574 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:986:10 #9 0x9a9c67 in print_commit_summary sequencer.c:1329:7 #10 0x52e623 in cmd_commit builtin/commit.c:1862:3 #11 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #12 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #13 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #14 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #15 0x6b3f3d in main common-main.c:52:11 #16 0x7fe397c7a349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Direct leak of 7 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x486804 in strdup ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:452:3 #1 0xa71e48 in xstrdup wrapper.c:29:14 #2 0x7db9bc in update_dir_rename_counts diffcore-rename.c:463:12 #3 0x7db6ae in find_renames diffcore-rename.c:1062:3 #4 0x7d76c3 in diffcore_rename_extended diffcore-rename.c:1472:18 #5 0x7b4cfc in diffcore_std diff.c:6705:4 #6 0x855e46 in log_tree_diff_flush log-tree.c:846:2 #7 0x856574 in log_tree_diff log-tree.c:955:3 #8 0x856574 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:986:10 #9 0x9a9c67 in print_commit_summary sequencer.c:1329:7 #10 0x52e623 in cmd_commit builtin/commit.c:1862:3 #11 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #12 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #13 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #14 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #15 0x6b3f3d in main common-main.c:52:11 #16 0x7fe397c7a349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 14 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <andrzej@ahunt.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 10, 2021
repo_diff_setup() calls through to diff.c's static prep_parse_options(), which in turn allocates a new array into diff_opts.parseopts. diff_setup_done() is responsible for freeing that array, and has the benefit of verifying diff_opts too - hence we add a call to diff_setup_done() to avoid leaking parseopts. Output from the leak as found while running t0090 with LSAN: Direct leak of 7120 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a82d in malloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0xa8bf89 in do_xmalloc wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0x7a7bae in prep_parse_options diff.c:5636:2 #3 0x7a7bae in repo_diff_setup diff.c:4611:2 #4 0x93716c in repo_index_has_changes read-cache.c:2518:3 #5 0x872233 in unclean merge-ort-wrappers.c:12:14 #6 0x872233 in merge_ort_recursive merge-ort-wrappers.c:53:6 #7 0x5d5b11 in try_merge_strategy builtin/merge.c:752:12 #8 0x5d0b6b in cmd_merge builtin/merge.c:1666:9 #9 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #10 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #11 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #12 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #13 0x6bdc2d in main common-main.c:52:11 #14 0x7f551eb51349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 7120 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s) Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <andrzej@ahunt.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 10, 2021
apply_multi_file_filter and async_query_available_blobs both query subprocess output using subprocess_read_status, which writes data into the identically named filter_status strbuf. We add a strbuf_release to avoid leaking their contents. Leak output seen when running t0021 with LSAN: Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0xa8c2b5 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0x9ff99d in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:98:2 #3 0x9ff99d in strbuf_addbuf strbuf.c:304:2 #4 0xa101d6 in subprocess_read_status sub-process.c:45:5 #5 0x77793c in apply_multi_file_filter convert.c:886:8 #6 0x77793c in apply_filter convert.c:1042:10 #7 0x77a0b5 in convert_to_git_filter_fd convert.c:1492:7 #8 0x8b48cd in index_stream_convert_blob object-file.c:2156:2 #9 0x8b48cd in index_fd object-file.c:2248:9 #10 0x597411 in hash_fd builtin/hash-object.c:43:9 #11 0x596be1 in hash_object builtin/hash-object.c:59:2 #12 0x596be1 in cmd_hash_object builtin/hash-object.c:153:3 #13 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #14 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #15 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #16 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #17 0x6bdc2d in main common-main.c:52:11 #18 0x7f42acf79349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 24 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). Direct leak of 120 byte(s) in 5 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0xa8c295 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0x9ff97d in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:98:2 #3 0x9ff97d in strbuf_addbuf strbuf.c:304:2 #4 0xa101b6 in subprocess_read_status sub-process.c:45:5 #5 0x775c73 in async_query_available_blobs convert.c:960:8 #6 0x80029d in finish_delayed_checkout entry.c:183:9 #7 0xa65d1e in check_updates unpack-trees.c:493:10 #8 0xa5f469 in unpack_trees unpack-trees.c:1747:8 #9 0x525971 in checkout builtin/clone.c:815:6 #10 0x525971 in cmd_clone builtin/clone.c:1409:8 #11 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #12 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #13 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #14 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #15 0x6bdc2d in main common-main.c:52:11 #16 0x7fa253fce349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 120 byte(s) leaked in 5 allocation(s). Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <andrzej@ahunt.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 10, 2021
These leaks all happen at the end of cmd_mv, hence don't matter in any way. But we still fix the easy ones and squash the rest to get us closer to being able to run tests without leaks. LSAN output from t0050: Direct leak of 384 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0xa8c015 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0xa0a7e1 in add_entry string-list.c:44:2 #3 0xa0a7e1 in string_list_insert string-list.c:58:14 #4 0x5dac03 in cmd_mv builtin/mv.c:248:4 #5 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #6 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #7 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #8 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #9 0x6bd9ad in main common-main.c:52:11 #10 0x7fbfeffc4349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Direct leak of 16 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a82d in malloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0xa8bd09 in do_xmalloc wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0x5dbc34 in internal_prefix_pathspec builtin/mv.c:32:2 #3 0x5da575 in cmd_mv builtin/mv.c:158:14 #4 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #5 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #6 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #7 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #8 0x6bd9ad in main common-main.c:52:11 #9 0x7fbfeffc4349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Direct leak of 16 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a82d in malloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0xa8bd09 in do_xmalloc wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0x5dbc34 in internal_prefix_pathspec builtin/mv.c:32:2 #3 0x5da4e4 in cmd_mv builtin/mv.c:148:11 #4 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #5 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #6 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #7 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #8 0x6bd9ad in main common-main.c:52:11 #9 0x7fbfeffc4349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Direct leak of 8 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a9a2 in calloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154:3 #1 0xa8c119 in xcalloc wrapper.c:140:8 #2 0x5da585 in cmd_mv builtin/mv.c:159:22 #3 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #4 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #5 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #6 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #7 0x6bd9ad in main common-main.c:52:11 #8 0x7fbfeffc4349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a9a2 in calloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154:3 #1 0xa8c119 in xcalloc wrapper.c:140:8 #2 0x5da4f8 in cmd_mv builtin/mv.c:149:10 #3 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #4 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #5 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #6 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #7 0x6bd9ad in main common-main.c:52:11 #8 0x7fbfeffc4349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Indirect leak of 65 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0xa8c015 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0xa00226 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:98:2 #3 0xa00226 in strbuf_vaddf strbuf.c:394:3 #4 0xa065c7 in xstrvfmt strbuf.c:981:2 #5 0xa065c7 in xstrfmt strbuf.c:991:8 #6 0x9e7ce7 in prefix_path_gently setup.c:115:15 #7 0x9e7fa6 in prefix_path setup.c:128:12 #8 0x5dbdbf in internal_prefix_pathspec builtin/mv.c:55:23 #9 0x5da575 in cmd_mv builtin/mv.c:158:14 #10 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #11 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #12 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #13 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #14 0x6bd9ad in main common-main.c:52:11 #15 0x7fbfeffc4349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Indirect leak of 65 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0xa8c015 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0xa00226 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:98:2 #3 0xa00226 in strbuf_vaddf strbuf.c:394:3 #4 0xa065c7 in xstrvfmt strbuf.c:981:2 #5 0xa065c7 in xstrfmt strbuf.c:991:8 #6 0x9e7ce7 in prefix_path_gently setup.c:115:15 #7 0x9e7fa6 in prefix_path setup.c:128:12 #8 0x5dbdbf in internal_prefix_pathspec builtin/mv.c:55:23 #9 0x5da4e4 in cmd_mv builtin/mv.c:148:11 #10 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #11 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #12 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #13 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #14 0x6bd9ad in main common-main.c:52:11 #15 0x7fbfeffc4349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 558 byte(s) leaked in 7 allocation(s). Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <andrzej@ahunt.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 7, 2021
In a sparse index it is possible for the tree that is being verified to be freed while it is being verified. This happens when the index is sparse but the cache tree is not and index_name_pos() looks up a path from the cache tree that is a descendant of a sparse index entry. That triggers a call to ensure_full_index() which frees the cache tree that is being verified. Carrying on trying to verify the tree after this results in a use-after-free bug. Instead restart the verification if a sparse index is converted to a full index. This bug is triggered by a call to reset_head() in "git rebase --apply". Thanks to René Scharfe and Derick Stolee for their help analyzing the problem. ==74345==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x606000001b20 at pc 0x557cbe82d3a2 bp 0x7ffdfee08090 sp 0x7ffdfee08080 READ of size 4 at 0x606000001b20 thread T0 #0 0x557cbe82d3a1 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:863 #1 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #2 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #3 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #4 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910 #5 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250 #6 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87 #7 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #8 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #10 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #12 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #13 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) #14 0x557cbe5bcb8d in _start (/home/phil/src/git/git+0x1b9b8d) 0x606000001b20 is located 0 bytes inside of 56-byte region [0x606000001b20,0x606000001b58) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fdd4bacff19 in __interceptor_free /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:127 #1 0x557cbe82af60 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:35 #2 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #3 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #4 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #5 0x557cbeb2557a in ensure_full_index /home/phil/src/git/sparse-index.c:310 #6 0x557cbea45c4a in index_name_stage_pos /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:588 #7 0x557cbe82ce37 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:850 #8 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #9 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #10 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #11 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910 #12 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250 #13 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87 #14 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #15 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #16 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #17 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #18 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #19 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #20 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fdd4bad0459 in __interceptor_calloc /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x557cbebc1807 in xcalloc /home/phil/src/git/wrapper.c:140 #2 0x557cbe82b7d8 in cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:17 #3 0x557cbe82b7d8 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:763 #4 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764 #5 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764 #6 0x557cbe8304e1 in prime_cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:779 #7 0x557cbeab7fa7 in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:85 #8 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #10 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #12 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #13 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #14 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 7, 2021
In a sparse index it is possible for the tree that is being verified to be freed while it is being verified. This happens when the index is sparse but the cache tree is not and index_name_pos() looks up a path from the cache tree that is a descendant of a sparse index entry. That triggers a call to ensure_full_index() which frees the cache tree that is being verified. Carrying on trying to verify the tree after this results in a use-after-free bug. Instead restart the verification if a sparse index is converted to a full index. This bug is triggered by a call to reset_head() in "git rebase --apply". Thanks to René Scharfe and Derrick Stolee for their help analyzing the problem. ==74345==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x606000001b20 at pc 0x557cbe82d3a2 bp 0x7ffdfee08090 sp 0x7ffdfee08080 READ of size 4 at 0x606000001b20 thread T0 #0 0x557cbe82d3a1 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:863 #1 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #2 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #3 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #4 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910 #5 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250 #6 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87 #7 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #8 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #10 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #12 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #13 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) #14 0x557cbe5bcb8d in _start (/home/phil/src/git/git+0x1b9b8d) 0x606000001b20 is located 0 bytes inside of 56-byte region [0x606000001b20,0x606000001b58) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fdd4bacff19 in __interceptor_free /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:127 #1 0x557cbe82af60 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:35 #2 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #3 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #4 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #5 0x557cbeb2557a in ensure_full_index /home/phil/src/git/sparse-index.c:310 #6 0x557cbea45c4a in index_name_stage_pos /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:588 #7 0x557cbe82ce37 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:850 #8 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #9 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #10 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #11 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910 #12 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250 #13 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87 #14 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #15 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #16 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #17 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #18 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #19 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #20 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fdd4bad0459 in __interceptor_calloc /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x557cbebc1807 in xcalloc /home/phil/src/git/wrapper.c:140 #2 0x557cbe82b7d8 in cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:17 #3 0x557cbe82b7d8 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:763 #4 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764 #5 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764 #6 0x557cbe8304e1 in prime_cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:779 #7 0x557cbeab7fa7 in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:85 #8 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #10 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #12 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #13 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #14 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2021
In a sparse index it is possible for the tree that is being verified to be freed while it is being verified. This happens when the index is sparse but the cache tree is not and index_name_pos() looks up a path from the cache tree that is a descendant of a sparse index entry. That triggers a call to ensure_full_index() which frees the cache tree that is being verified. Carrying on trying to verify the tree after this results in a use-after-free bug. Instead restart the verification if a sparse index is converted to a full index. This bug is triggered by a call to reset_head() in "git rebase --apply". Thanks to René Scharfe and Derrick Stolee for their help analyzing the problem. ==74345==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x606000001b20 at pc 0x557cbe82d3a2 bp 0x7ffdfee08090 sp 0x7ffdfee08080 READ of size 4 at 0x606000001b20 thread T0 #0 0x557cbe82d3a1 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:863 #1 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #2 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #3 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #4 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910 #5 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250 #6 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87 #7 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #8 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #10 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #12 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #13 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) #14 0x557cbe5bcb8d in _start (/home/phil/src/git/git+0x1b9b8d) 0x606000001b20 is located 0 bytes inside of 56-byte region [0x606000001b20,0x606000001b58) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fdd4bacff19 in __interceptor_free /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:127 #1 0x557cbe82af60 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:35 #2 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #3 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #4 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #5 0x557cbeb2557a in ensure_full_index /home/phil/src/git/sparse-index.c:310 #6 0x557cbea45c4a in index_name_stage_pos /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:588 #7 0x557cbe82ce37 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:850 #8 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #9 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #10 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #11 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910 #12 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250 #13 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87 #14 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #15 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #16 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #17 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #18 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #19 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #20 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fdd4bad0459 in __interceptor_calloc /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x557cbebc1807 in xcalloc /home/phil/src/git/wrapper.c:140 #2 0x557cbe82b7d8 in cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:17 #3 0x557cbe82b7d8 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:763 #4 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764 #5 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764 #6 0x557cbe8304e1 in prime_cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:779 #7 0x557cbeab7fa7 in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:85 #8 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #10 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #12 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #13 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #14 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 2, 2021
When I was playing around with trace2 data and creating flamegraphs, I tried a `git fetch` call to see how the `git-remote-https` command would show up. What I didn't expect was an `ensure_full_index()` region! It turns out that `git fetch` and `git pull` need to check the index for a `.gitmodules` file to see if it should recurse into any submodules. Here is the stack trace from a debugger: ``` #0 ensure_full_index (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at sparse-index.c:404 #1 0x000055555571a979 in do_read_index (istate=istate@entry=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=path@entry=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", must_exist=must_exist@entry=0) at read-cache.c:2386 #2 0x000055555571eb7d in do_read_index (must_exist=0, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at hash.h:244 #3 read_index_from (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", gitdir=0x555555ad7b30 ".git") at read-cache.c:2426 #4 0x000055555573f4c2 in repo_read_index (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at repository.c:286 #5 0x00005555556f14d0 in get_oid_with_context_1 (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", flags=flags@entry=0, prefix=prefix@entry=0x0, oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00, oc=oc@entry=0x7fffffffda70) at object-name.c:1850 #6 0x00005555556f1f53 in get_oid_with_context (oc=0x7fffffffda70, oid=0x7fffffffdb00, flags=0, str=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at object-name.c:1947 #7 repo_get_oid (r=r@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00) at object-name.c:1603 #8 0x000055555577330f in config_from_gitmodules (fn=fn@entry=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>, repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, data=data@entry=0x7fffffffdb60) at submodule-config.c:650 #9 0x000055555577462d in config_from_gitmodules (data=0x7fffffffdb60, repo=<optimized out>, fn=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>) at submodule-config.c:638 #10 fetch_config_from_gitmodules (max_children=<optimized out>, recurse_submodules=<optimized out>) at submodule-config.c:800 #11 0x00005555555b9e41 in cmd_fetch (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe090, prefix=0x0) at builtin/fetch.c:1999 #12 0x0000555555573ff6 in run_builtin (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>, p=<optimized out>) at git.c:528 #13 handle_builtin (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:785 #14 0x000055555557528c in run_argv (argv=0x7fffffffddf0, argcp=0x7fffffffddfc) at git.c:857 #15 cmd_main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:993 #16 0x0000555555573ac8 in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe088) at common-main.c:52 ``` The operations these commands use are guarded by items such as `index_name_pos()` and others. Since the `.gitmodules` file is always at root, we would not need to expand, anyway.
derrickstolee added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 8, 2021
When I was playing around with trace2 data and creating flamegraphs, I tried a `git fetch` call to see how the `git-remote-https` command would show up. What I didn't expect was an `ensure_full_index()` region! It turns out that `git fetch` and `git pull` need to check the index for a `.gitmodules` file to see if it should recurse into any submodules. Here is the stack trace from a debugger: ``` #0 ensure_full_index (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at sparse-index.c:404 #1 0x000055555571a979 in do_read_index (istate=istate@entry=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=path@entry=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", must_exist=must_exist@entry=0) at read-cache.c:2386 #2 0x000055555571eb7d in do_read_index (must_exist=0, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at hash.h:244 #3 read_index_from (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", gitdir=0x555555ad7b30 ".git") at read-cache.c:2426 #4 0x000055555573f4c2 in repo_read_index (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at repository.c:286 #5 0x00005555556f14d0 in get_oid_with_context_1 (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", flags=flags@entry=0, prefix=prefix@entry=0x0, oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00, oc=oc@entry=0x7fffffffda70) at object-name.c:1850 #6 0x00005555556f1f53 in get_oid_with_context (oc=0x7fffffffda70, oid=0x7fffffffdb00, flags=0, str=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at object-name.c:1947 #7 repo_get_oid (r=r@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00) at object-name.c:1603 #8 0x000055555577330f in config_from_gitmodules (fn=fn@entry=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>, repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, data=data@entry=0x7fffffffdb60) at submodule-config.c:650 #9 0x000055555577462d in config_from_gitmodules (data=0x7fffffffdb60, repo=<optimized out>, fn=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>) at submodule-config.c:638 #10 fetch_config_from_gitmodules (max_children=<optimized out>, recurse_submodules=<optimized out>) at submodule-config.c:800 #11 0x00005555555b9e41 in cmd_fetch (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe090, prefix=0x0) at builtin/fetch.c:1999 #12 0x0000555555573ff6 in run_builtin (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>, p=<optimized out>) at git.c:528 #13 handle_builtin (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:785 #14 0x000055555557528c in run_argv (argv=0x7fffffffddf0, argcp=0x7fffffffddfc) at git.c:857 #15 cmd_main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:993 #16 0x0000555555573ac8 in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe088) at common-main.c:52 ``` The operations these commands use are guarded by items such as `index_name_pos()` and others. Since the `.gitmodules` file is always at root, we would not need to expand, anyway.
derrickstolee added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 10, 2021
When I was playing around with trace2 data and creating flamegraphs, I tried a `git fetch` call to see how the `git-remote-https` command would show up. What I didn't expect was an `ensure_full_index()` region! It turns out that `git fetch` and `git pull` need to check the index for a `.gitmodules` file to see if it should recurse into any submodules. Here is the stack trace from a debugger: ``` #0 ensure_full_index (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at sparse-index.c:404 #1 0x000055555571a979 in do_read_index (istate=istate@entry=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=path@entry=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", must_exist=must_exist@entry=0) at read-cache.c:2386 #2 0x000055555571eb7d in do_read_index (must_exist=0, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at hash.h:244 #3 read_index_from (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", gitdir=0x555555ad7b30 ".git") at read-cache.c:2426 #4 0x000055555573f4c2 in repo_read_index (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at repository.c:286 #5 0x00005555556f14d0 in get_oid_with_context_1 (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", flags=flags@entry=0, prefix=prefix@entry=0x0, oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00, oc=oc@entry=0x7fffffffda70) at object-name.c:1850 #6 0x00005555556f1f53 in get_oid_with_context (oc=0x7fffffffda70, oid=0x7fffffffdb00, flags=0, str=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at object-name.c:1947 #7 repo_get_oid (r=r@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00) at object-name.c:1603 #8 0x000055555577330f in config_from_gitmodules (fn=fn@entry=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>, repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, data=data@entry=0x7fffffffdb60) at submodule-config.c:650 #9 0x000055555577462d in config_from_gitmodules (data=0x7fffffffdb60, repo=<optimized out>, fn=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>) at submodule-config.c:638 #10 fetch_config_from_gitmodules (max_children=<optimized out>, recurse_submodules=<optimized out>) at submodule-config.c:800 #11 0x00005555555b9e41 in cmd_fetch (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe090, prefix=0x0) at builtin/fetch.c:1999 #12 0x0000555555573ff6 in run_builtin (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>, p=<optimized out>) at git.c:528 #13 handle_builtin (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:785 #14 0x000055555557528c in run_argv (argv=0x7fffffffddf0, argcp=0x7fffffffddfc) at git.c:857 #15 cmd_main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:993 #16 0x0000555555573ac8 in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe088) at common-main.c:52 ``` The operations these commands use are guarded by items such as `index_name_pos()` and others. Since the `.gitmodules` file is always at root, we would not need to expand, anyway.
derrickstolee added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 16, 2021
When I was playing around with trace2 data and creating flamegraphs, I tried a `git fetch` call to see how the `git-remote-https` command would show up. What I didn't expect was an `ensure_full_index()` region! It turns out that `git fetch` and `git pull` need to check the index for a `.gitmodules` file to see if it should recurse into any submodules. Here is the stack trace from a debugger: ``` #0 ensure_full_index (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at sparse-index.c:404 #1 0x000055555571a979 in do_read_index (istate=istate@entry=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=path@entry=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", must_exist=must_exist@entry=0) at read-cache.c:2386 #2 0x000055555571eb7d in do_read_index (must_exist=0, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at hash.h:244 #3 read_index_from (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", gitdir=0x555555ad7b30 ".git") at read-cache.c:2426 #4 0x000055555573f4c2 in repo_read_index (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at repository.c:286 #5 0x00005555556f14d0 in get_oid_with_context_1 (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", flags=flags@entry=0, prefix=prefix@entry=0x0, oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00, oc=oc@entry=0x7fffffffda70) at object-name.c:1850 #6 0x00005555556f1f53 in get_oid_with_context (oc=0x7fffffffda70, oid=0x7fffffffdb00, flags=0, str=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at object-name.c:1947 #7 repo_get_oid (r=r@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00) at object-name.c:1603 #8 0x000055555577330f in config_from_gitmodules (fn=fn@entry=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>, repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, data=data@entry=0x7fffffffdb60) at submodule-config.c:650 #9 0x000055555577462d in config_from_gitmodules (data=0x7fffffffdb60, repo=<optimized out>, fn=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>) at submodule-config.c:638 #10 fetch_config_from_gitmodules (max_children=<optimized out>, recurse_submodules=<optimized out>) at submodule-config.c:800 #11 0x00005555555b9e41 in cmd_fetch (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe090, prefix=0x0) at builtin/fetch.c:1999 #12 0x0000555555573ff6 in run_builtin (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>, p=<optimized out>) at git.c:528 #13 handle_builtin (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:785 #14 0x000055555557528c in run_argv (argv=0x7fffffffddf0, argcp=0x7fffffffddfc) at git.c:857 #15 cmd_main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:993 #16 0x0000555555573ac8 in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe088) at common-main.c:52 ``` The operations these commands use are guarded by items such as `index_name_pos()` and others. Since the `.gitmodules` file is always at root, we would not need to expand, anyway.
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2023
There is an out-of-bounds read possible when parsing gitattributes that have an attribute that is 2^31+1 bytes long. This is caused due to an integer overflow when we assign the result of strlen(3P) to an `int`, where we use the wrapped-around value in a subsequent call to memcpy(3P). The following code reproduces the issue: blob=$(perl -e 'print "a" x 2147483649 . " attr"' | git hash-object -w --stdin) git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes git check-attr --all file AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==8451==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7f93efa00800 (pc 0x7f94f1f8f082 bp 0x7ffddb59b3a0 sp 0x7ffddb59ab28 T0) ==8451==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7f94f1f8f082 (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x176082) #1 0x7f94f2047d9c in __interceptor_strspn /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:752 #2 0x560e190f7f26 in parse_attr_line attr.c:375 #3 0x560e190f9663 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #4 0x560e190f9ddd in read_attr_from_index attr.c:769 #5 0x560e190f9f14 in read_attr attr.c:797 #6 0x560e190fa24e in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:867 #7 0x560e190fa4a5 in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:902 #8 0x560e190fb5dc in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1097 #9 0x560e190fb93f in git_all_attrs attr.c:1128 #10 0x560e18e6136e in check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:67 #11 0x560e18e61c12 in cmd_check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:183 #12 0x560e18e15993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x560e18e16397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x560e18e16b2b in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x560e18e17991 in cmd_main git.c:926 #16 0x560e190ae2bd in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7f94f1e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #18 0x7f94f1e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #19 0x560e18e110e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x176082) ==8451==ABORTING Fix this bug by converting the variable to a `size_t` instead. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2023
It is possible to trigger an integer overflow when parsing attribute names when there are more than 2^31 of them for a single pattern. This can either lead to us dying due to trying to request too many bytes: blob=$(perl -e 'print "f" . " a=" x 2147483649' | git hash-object -w --stdin) git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes git attr-check --all file ================================================================= ==1022==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: requested allocation size 0xfffffff800000032 (0xfffffff800001038 after adjustments for alignment, red zones etc.) exceeds maximum supported size of 0x10000000000 (thread T0) #0 0x7fd3efabf411 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77 #1 0x5563a0a1e3d3 in xcalloc wrapper.c:150 #2 0x5563a058d005 in parse_attr_line attr.c:384 #3 0x5563a058e661 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #4 0x5563a058eddb in read_attr_from_index attr.c:769 #5 0x5563a058ef12 in read_attr attr.c:797 #6 0x5563a058f24c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:867 #7 0x5563a058f4a3 in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:902 #8 0x5563a05905da in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1097 #9 0x5563a059093d in git_all_attrs attr.c:1128 #10 0x5563a02f636e in check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:67 #11 0x5563a02f6c12 in cmd_check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:183 #12 0x5563a02aa993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x5563a02ab397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x5563a02abb2b in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x5563a02ac991 in cmd_main git.c:926 #16 0x5563a05432bd in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7fd3ef82228f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) ==1022==HINT: if you don't care about these errors you may set allocator_may_return_null=1 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: allocation-size-too-big /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77 in __interceptor_calloc ==1022==ABORTING Or, much worse, it can lead to an out-of-bounds write because we underallocate and then memcpy(3P) into an array: perl -e ' print "A " . "\rh="x2000000000; print "\rh="x2000000000; print "\rh="x294967294 . "\n" ' >.gitattributes git add .gitattributes git commit -am "evil attributes" $ git clone --quiet /path/to/repo ================================================================= ==15062==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000002550 at pc 0x5555559884d5 bp 0x7fffffffbc60 sp 0x7fffffffbc58 WRITE of size 8 at 0x602000002550 thread T0 #0 0x5555559884d4 in parse_attr_line attr.c:393 #1 0x5555559884d4 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #2 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:784 #3 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:747 #4 0x555555988a1d in read_attr attr.c:800 #5 0x555555989b0c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:882 #6 0x555555989b0c in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:917 #7 0x555555989b0c in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1112 #8 0x55555598b141 in git_check_attr attr.c:1126 #9 0x555555a13004 in convert_attrs convert.c:1311 #10 0x555555a95e04 in checkout_entry_ca entry.c:553 #11 0x555555d58bf6 in checkout_entry entry.h:42 #12 0x555555d58bf6 in check_updates unpack-trees.c:480 #13 0x555555d5eb55 in unpack_trees unpack-trees.c:2040 #14 0x555555785ab7 in checkout builtin/clone.c:724 #15 0x555555785ab7 in cmd_clone builtin/clone.c:1384 #16 0x55555572443c in run_builtin git.c:466 #17 0x55555572443c in handle_builtin git.c:721 #18 0x555555727872 in run_argv git.c:788 #19 0x555555727872 in cmd_main git.c:926 #20 0x555555721fa0 in main common-main.c:57 #21 0x7ffff73f1d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #22 0x555555723f39 in _start (git+0x1cff39) 0x602000002552 is located 0 bytes to the right of 2-byte region [0x602000002550,0x602000002552) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7ffff768c037 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x555555d7fff7 in xcalloc wrapper.c:150 #2 0x55555598815f in parse_attr_line attr.c:384 #3 0x55555598815f in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #4 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:784 #5 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:747 #6 0x555555988a1d in read_attr attr.c:800 #7 0x555555989b0c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:882 #8 0x555555989b0c in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:917 #9 0x555555989b0c in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1112 #10 0x55555598b141 in git_check_attr attr.c:1126 #11 0x555555a13004 in convert_attrs convert.c:1311 #12 0x555555a95e04 in checkout_entry_ca entry.c:553 #13 0x555555d58bf6 in checkout_entry entry.h:42 #14 0x555555d58bf6 in check_updates unpack-trees.c:480 #15 0x555555d5eb55 in unpack_trees unpack-trees.c:2040 #16 0x555555785ab7 in checkout builtin/clone.c:724 #17 0x555555785ab7 in cmd_clone builtin/clone.c:1384 #18 0x55555572443c in run_builtin git.c:466 #19 0x55555572443c in handle_builtin git.c:721 #20 0x555555727872 in run_argv git.c:788 #21 0x555555727872 in cmd_main git.c:926 #22 0x555555721fa0 in main common-main.c:57 #23 0x7ffff73f1d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow attr.c:393 in parse_attr_line Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff8450: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 00 07 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 0x0c047fff8460: fa fa 02 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa 0x0c047fff8470: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa 0x0c047fff8480: fa fa 07 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 02 0x0c047fff8490: fa fa 00 03 fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 03 =>0x0c047fff84a0: fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 02 fa fa[02]fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==15062==ABORTING Fix this bug by using `size_t` instead to count the number of attributes so that this value cannot reasonably overflow without running out of memory before already. Reported-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2023
When using a padding specifier in the pretty format passed to git-log(1) we need to calculate the string length in several places. These string lengths are stored in `int`s though, which means that these can easily overflow when the input lengths exceeds 2GB. This can ultimately lead to an out-of-bounds write when these are used in a call to memcpy(3P): ==8340==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f1ec62f97fe at pc 0x7f2127e5f427 bp 0x7ffd3bd63de0 sp 0x7ffd3bd63588 WRITE of size 1 at 0x7f1ec62f97fe thread T0 #0 0x7f2127e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 #1 0x5628e96aa605 in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1762 #2 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #3 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #4 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #5 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #6 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #7 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #8 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #9 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #10 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #11 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #12 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #13 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #14 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #15 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57 #16 0x7f2127c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #17 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #18 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x7f1ec62f97fe is located 2 bytes to the left of 4831838265-byte region [0x7f1ec62f9800,0x7f1fe62f9839) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f2127ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x5628e98774d4 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x5628e97cb01c in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x5628e97ccd42 in strbuf_addchars strbuf.c:327 #4 0x5628e96aa55c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1761 #5 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #6 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #7 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #8 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #9 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #10 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #11 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #12 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #13 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #14 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #15 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #16 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #17 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #18 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57 #19 0x7f2127c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #20 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #21 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0fe458c572a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x0fe458c572f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa] 0x0fe458c57300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57310: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57320: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57330: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57340: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==8340==ABORTING The pretty format can also be used in `git archive` operations via the `export-subst` attribute. So this is what in our opinion makes this a critical issue in the context of Git forges which allow to download an archive of user supplied Git repositories. Fix this vulnerability by using `size_t` instead of `int` to track the string lengths. Add tests which detect this vulnerability when Git is compiled with the address sanitizer. Reported-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com> Original-patch-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com> Modified-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttalorr.com> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2023
With the `%>>(<N>)` pretty formatter, you can ask git-log(1) et al to steal spaces. To do so we need to look ahead of the next token to see whether there are spaces there. This loop takes into account ANSI sequences that end with an `m`, and if it finds any it will skip them until it finds the first space. While doing so it does not take into account the buffer's limits though and easily does an out-of-bounds read. Add a test that hits this behaviour. While we don't have an easy way to verify this, the test causes the following failure when run with `SANITIZE=address`: ==37941==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000000baf at pc 0x55ba6f88e0d0 bp 0x7ffc84c50d20 sp 0x7ffc84c50d10 READ of size 1 at 0x603000000baf thread T0 #0 0x55ba6f88e0cf in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1712 #1 0x55ba6f88e7b4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #2 0x55ba6f9b1ae4 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #3 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #4 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #5 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #6 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #7 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #8 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #9 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #10 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #11 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #12 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788 #13 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #14 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57 #15 0x7f2d08c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #16 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #17 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x603000000baf is located 1 bytes to the left of 24-byte region [0x603000000bb0,0x603000000bc8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f2d08ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x55ba6fa5b494 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x55ba6f9aefdc in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x55ba6f9b0a06 in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298 #4 0x55ba6f9b1a25 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418 #5 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #6 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #7 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #8 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #9 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #10 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #11 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #12 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #16 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7f2d08c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #18 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #19 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow pretty.c:1712 in format_and_pad_commit Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff8120: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8130: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8140: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa 0x0c067fff8150: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8160: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa =>0x0c067fff8170: fd fd fd fa fa[fa]00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa 0x0c067fff8180: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8190: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Luckily enough, this would only cause us to copy the out-of-bounds data into the formatted commit in case we really had an ANSI sequence preceding our buffer. So this bug likely has no security consequences. Fix it regardless by not traversing past the buffer's start. Reported-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Reported-by: Eric Sesterhenn <eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2023
An out-of-bounds read can be triggered when parsing an incomplete padding format string passed via `--pretty=format` or in Git archives when files are marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute. This bug exists since we have introduced support for truncating output via the `trunc` keyword a7f01c6 (pretty: support truncating in %>, %< and %><, 2013-04-19). Before this commit, we used to find the end of the formatting string by using strchr(3P). This function returns a `NULL` pointer in case the character in question wasn't found. The subsequent check whether any character was found thus simply checked the returned pointer. After the commit we switched to strcspn(3P) though, which only returns the offset to the first found character or to the trailing NUL byte. As the end pointer is now computed by adding the offset to the start pointer it won't be `NULL` anymore, and as a consequence the check doesn't do anything anymore. The out-of-bounds data that is being read can in fact end up in the formatted string. As a consequence, it is possible to leak memory contents either by calling git-log(1) or via git-archive(1) when any of the archived files is marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute. ==10888==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000000398 at pc 0x7f0356047cb2 bp 0x7fff3ffb95d0 sp 0x7fff3ffb8d78 READ of size 1 at 0x602000000398 thread T0 #0 0x7f0356047cb1 in __interceptor_strchrnul /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725 #1 0x563b7cec9a43 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:417 #2 0x563b7cda7060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #3 0x563b7cda8d0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #4 0x563b7cca04c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #5 0x563b7cca36ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #6 0x563b7c927ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #7 0x563b7c92835b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #8 0x563b7c92b1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57 #14 0x7f0355e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x602000000398 is located 0 bytes to the right of 8-byte region [0x602000000390,0x602000000398) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f0356072faa in __interceptor_strdup /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 #1 0x563b7cf7317c in xstrdup wrapper.c:39 #2 0x563b7cd9a06a in save_user_format pretty.c:40 #3 0x563b7cd9b3e5 in get_commit_format pretty.c:173 #4 0x563b7ce54ea0 in handle_revision_opt revision.c:2456 #5 0x563b7ce597c9 in setup_revisions revision.c:2850 #6 0x563b7c9269e0 in cmd_log_init_finish builtin/log.c:269 #7 0x563b7c927362 in cmd_log_init builtin/log.c:348 #8 0x563b7c92b193 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:882 #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57 #14 0x7f0355e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725 in __interceptor_strchrnul Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff8020: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8030: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8040: fa fa 00 07 fa fa 03 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 0x0c047fff8050: fa fa 00 01 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 01 0x0c047fff8060: fa fa 00 06 fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa 05 fa =>0x0c047fff8070: fa fa 00[fa]fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8080: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa 0x0c047fff8090: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==10888==ABORTING Fix this bug by checking whether `end` points at the trailing NUL byte. Add a test which catches this out-of-bounds read and which demonstrates that we used to write out-of-bounds data into the formatted message. Reported-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de> Original-patch-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2023
The return type of both `utf8_strwidth()` and `utf8_strnwidth()` is `int`, but we operate on string lengths which are typically of type `size_t`. This means that when the string is longer than `INT_MAX`, we will overflow and thus return a negative result. This can lead to an out-of-bounds write with `--pretty=format:%<1)%B` and a commit message that is 2^31+1 bytes long: ================================================================= ==26009==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000001168 at pc 0x7f95c4e5f427 bp 0x7ffd8541c900 sp 0x7ffd8541c0a8 WRITE of size 2147483649 at 0x603000001168 thread T0 #0 0x7f95c4e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 #1 0x5612bbb1068c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1763 #2 0x5612bbb1087a in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #3 0x5612bbc33bab in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #4 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #5 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #6 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #7 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #8 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #9 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #10 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #11 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #12 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #13 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788 #14 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #15 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57 #16 0x7f95c4c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #17 0x7f95c4c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #18 0x5612bb5680e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x603000001168 is located 0 bytes to the right of 24-byte region [0x603000001150,0x603000001168) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f95c4ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x5612bbcdd556 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x5612bbc310a3 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x5612bbc32acd in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298 #4 0x5612bbc33aec in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418 #5 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #6 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #7 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #8 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #9 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #10 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #11 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #12 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #16 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7f95c4c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff81d0: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa 0x0c067fff81e0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff81f0: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8200: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa 0x0c067fff8210: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd =>0x0c067fff8220: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 00[fa]fa fa 0x0c067fff8230: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8240: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8250: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8260: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8270: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==26009==ABORTING Now the proper fix for this would be to convert both functions to return an `size_t` instead of an `int`. But given that this commit may be part of a security release, let's instead do the minimal viable fix and die in case we see an overflow. Add a test that would have previously caused us to crash. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 27, 2023
When t5583-push-branches.sh was originally introduced via 425b4d7 (push: introduce '--branches' option, 2023-05-06), it was not leak-free. In fact, the test did not even run correctly until 022fbb6 (t5583: fix shebang line, 2023-05-12), but after applying that patch, we see a failure at t5583.8: ==2529087==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 384 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb536330986 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98 #1 0x55e07606cbf9 in xrealloc wrapper.c:140 #2 0x55e075fb6cb3 in prio_queue_put prio-queue.c:42 #3 0x55e075ec81cb in get_reachable_subset commit-reach.c:917 #4 0x55e075fe9cce in add_missing_tags remote.c:1518 #5 0x55e075fea1e4 in match_push_refs remote.c:1665 #6 0x55e076050a8e in transport_push transport.c:1378 #7 0x55e075e2eb74 in push_with_options builtin/push.c:401 #8 0x55e075e2edb0 in do_push builtin/push.c:458 #9 0x55e075e2ff7a in cmd_push builtin/push.c:702 #10 0x55e075d8aaf0 in run_builtin git.c:452 #11 0x55e075d8af08 in handle_builtin git.c:706 #12 0x55e075d8b12c in run_argv git.c:770 #13 0x55e075d8b6a0 in cmd_main git.c:905 #14 0x55e075e81f07 in main common-main.c:60 #15 0x7fb5360ab6c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #16 0x7fb5360ab784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #17 0x55e075d88f40 in _start (git+0x1ff40) (BuildId: 38ad998b85a535e786129979443630d025ec2453) SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 384 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). This leak was addressed independently via 68b5117 (commit-reach: fix memory leak in get_reachable_subset(), 2023-06-03), which makes t5583 leak-free. But t5583 was not in the tree when 68b5117 was written, and the two only met after the latter was merged back in via 693bde4 (Merge branch 'mh/commit-reach-get-reachable-plug-leak', 2023-06-20). At that point, t5583 was leak-free. Let's mark it as such accordingly. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com> Acked-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 3, 2024
Memory sanitizer (msan) is detecting a use of an uninitialized variable (`size`) in `read_attr_from_index`: ==2268==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value #0 0x5651f3416504 in read_attr_from_index git/attr.c:868:11 #1 0x5651f3415530 in read_attr git/attr.c #2 0x5651f3413d74 in bootstrap_attr_stack git/attr.c:968:6 #3 0x5651f3413d74 in prepare_attr_stack git/attr.c:1004:2 #4 0x5651f3413d74 in collect_some_attrs git/attr.c:1199:2 #5 0x5651f3413144 in git_check_attr git/attr.c:1345:2 #6 0x5651f34728da in convert_attrs git/convert.c:1320:2 #7 0x5651f3473425 in would_convert_to_git_filter_fd git/convert.c:1373:2 #8 0x5651f357a35e in index_fd git/object-file.c:2630:34 #9 0x5651f357aa15 in index_path git/object-file.c:2657:7 #10 0x5651f35db9d9 in add_to_index git/read-cache.c:766:7 #11 0x5651f35dc170 in add_file_to_index git/read-cache.c:799:9 #12 0x5651f321f9b2 in add_files git/builtin/add.c:346:7 #13 0x5651f321f9b2 in cmd_add git/builtin/add.c:565:18 #14 0x5651f321d327 in run_builtin git/git.c:474:11 #15 0x5651f321bc9e in handle_builtin git/git.c:729:3 #16 0x5651f321a792 in run_argv git/git.c:793:4 #17 0x5651f321a792 in cmd_main git/git.c:928:19 #18 0x5651f33dde1f in main git/common-main.c:62:11 The issue exists because `size` is an output parameter from `read_blob_data_from_index`, but it's only modified if `read_blob_data_from_index` returns non-NULL. The read of `size` when calling `read_attr_from_buf` unconditionally may read from an uninitialized value. `read_attr_from_buf` checks that `buf` is non-NULL before reading from `size`, but by then it's already too late: the uninitialized read will have happened already. Furthermore, there's no guarantee that the compiler won't reorder things so that it checks `size` before checking `!buf`. Make the call to `read_attr_from_buf` conditional on `buf` being non-NULL, ensuring that `size` is not read if it's never set. Signed-off-by: Kyle Lippincott <spectral@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 5, 2024
It was recently reported that concurrent reads and writes may cause the reftable backend to segfault. The root cause of this is that we do not properly keep track of reftable readers across reloads. Suppose that you have a reftable iterator and then decide to reload the stack while iterating through the iterator. When the stack has been rewritten since we have created the iterator, then we would end up discarding a subset of readers that may still be in use by the iterator. The consequence is that we now try to reference deallocated memory, which of course segfaults. One way to trigger this is in t5616, where some background maintenance jobs have been leaking from one test into another. This leads to stack traces like the following one: + git -c protocol.version=0 -C pc1 fetch --filter=blob:limit=29999 --refetch origin AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==657994==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7fa0f0ec6089 (pc 0x55f23e52ddf9 bp 0x7ffe7bfa1700 sp 0x7ffe7bfa1700 T0) ==657994==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x55f23e52ddf9 in get_var_int reftable/record.c:29 #1 0x55f23e53295e in reftable_decode_keylen reftable/record.c:170 #2 0x55f23e532cc0 in reftable_decode_key reftable/record.c:194 #3 0x55f23e54e72e in block_iter_next reftable/block.c:398 #4 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next_in_block reftable/reader.c:240 #5 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next reftable/reader.c:355 #6 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next reftable/reader.c:339 #7 0x55f23e551283 in merged_iter_advance_subiter reftable/merged.c:69 #8 0x55f23e55169e in merged_iter_next_entry reftable/merged.c:123 #9 0x55f23e55169e in merged_iter_next_void reftable/merged.c:172 #10 0x55f23e537625 in reftable_iterator_next_ref reftable/generic.c:175 #11 0x55f23e2cf9c6 in reftable_ref_iterator_advance refs/reftable-backend.c:464 #12 0x55f23e2d996e in ref_iterator_advance refs/iterator.c:13 #13 0x55f23e2d996e in do_for_each_ref_iterator refs/iterator.c:452 #14 0x55f23dca6767 in get_ref_map builtin/fetch.c:623 #15 0x55f23dca6767 in do_fetch builtin/fetch.c:1659 #16 0x55f23dca6767 in fetch_one builtin/fetch.c:2133 #17 0x55f23dca6767 in cmd_fetch builtin/fetch.c:2432 #18 0x55f23dba7764 in run_builtin git.c:484 #19 0x55f23dba7764 in handle_builtin git.c:741 #20 0x55f23dbab61e in run_argv git.c:805 #21 0x55f23dbab61e in cmd_main git.c:1000 #22 0x55f23dba4781 in main common-main.c:64 #23 0x7fa0f063fc89 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #24 0x7fa0f063fd44 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #25 0x55f23dba6ad0 in _start (git+0xadfad0) (BuildId: 803b2b7f59beb03d7849fb8294a8e2145dd4aa27) While it is somewhat awkward that the maintenance processes survive tests in the first place, it is totally expected that reftables should work alright with concurrent writers. Seemingly they don't. The only underlying resource that we need to care about in this context is the reftable reader, which is responsible for reading a single table from disk. These readers get discarded immediately (unless reused) when calling `reftable_stack_reload()`, which is wrong. We can only close them once we know that there are no iterators using them anymore. Prepare for a fix by converting the reftable readers to be refcounted. Reported-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 9, 2024
An internal customer reported a segfault when running `git sparse-checkout set` with the `index.sparse` config enabled. I was unable to reproduce it locally, but with their help we debugged into the failing process and discovered the following stacktrace: ``` #0 0x00007ff6318fb7b0 in rehash (map=0x3dfb00d0440, newsize=1048576) at hashmap.c:125 #1 0x00007ff6318fbc66 in hashmap_add (map=0x3dfb00d0440, entry=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at hashmap.c:247 #2 0x00007ff631937a70 in hash_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:122 #3 0x00007ff631938a2f in add_name_hash (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:638 #4 0x00007ff631a064de in set_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, nr=8291, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at sparse-index.c:255 #5 0x00007ff631a06692 in add_path_to_index (oid=0x5ff130, base=0x5ff580, path=0x3dfb4b725da "<redacted>", mode=33188, context=0x5ff570) at sparse-index.c:307 #6 0x00007ff631a3b48c in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41f60, base=0x5ff580, depth=2, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:46 #7 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41e80, base=0x5ff580, depth=1, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 #8 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41ac8, base=0x5ff580, depth=0, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 #9 0x00007ff631a06a95 in expand_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, pl=0x0) at sparse-index.c:422 #10 0x00007ff631a06cbd in ensure_full_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100) at sparse-index.c:456 #11 0x00007ff631990d08 in index_name_stage_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21, stage=0, search_mode=EXPAND_SPARSE) at read-cache.c:556 #12 0x00007ff631990d6c in index_name_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21) at read-cache.c:566 #13 0x00007ff63180dbb5 in sanitize_paths (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0, skip_checks=0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:756 #14 0x00007ff63180de50 in sparse_checkout_set (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:860 #15 0x00007ff63180e6c5 in cmd_sparse_checkout (argc=186, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:1063 #16 0x00007ff6317234cb in run_builtin (p=0x7ff631ad9b38 <commands+2808>, argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:548 #17 0x00007ff6317239c0 in handle_builtin (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:808 #18 0x00007ff631723c7d in run_argv (argcp=0x5ffdd0, argv=0x5ffd78) at git.c:877 #19 0x00007ff6317241d1 in cmd_main (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:1017 #20 0x00007ff631838b60 in main (argc=190, argv=0x3dfb0030000) at common-main.c:64 ``` The very bottom of the stack being the `rehash()` method from `hashmap.c` as called within the `name-hash` API made me look at where these hashmaps were being used in the sparse index logic. These were being copied across indexes, which seems dangerous. Indeed, clearing these hashmaps and setting them as not initialized fixes the segfault. The second commit is a response to a test failure that happens in `t1092-sparse-checkout-compatibility.sh` where `git stash pop` starts to fail because the underlying `git checkout-index` process fails due to colliding files. Passing the `-f` flag appears to work, but it's unclear why this name-hash change causes that change in behavior.
dscho added a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 10, 2024
An internal customer reported a segfault when running `git sparse-checkout set` with the `index.sparse` config enabled. I was unable to reproduce it locally, but with their help we debugged into the failing process and discovered the following stacktrace: ``` #0 0x00007ff6318fb7b0 in rehash (map=0x3dfb00d0440, newsize=1048576) at hashmap.c:125 #1 0x00007ff6318fbc66 in hashmap_add (map=0x3dfb00d0440, entry=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at hashmap.c:247 #2 0x00007ff631937a70 in hash_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:122 #3 0x00007ff631938a2f in add_name_hash (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:638 #4 0x00007ff631a064de in set_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, nr=8291, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at sparse-index.c:255 #5 0x00007ff631a06692 in add_path_to_index (oid=0x5ff130, base=0x5ff580, path=0x3dfb4b725da "<redacted>", mode=33188, context=0x5ff570) at sparse-index.c:307 #6 0x00007ff631a3b48c in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41f60, base=0x5ff580, depth=2, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:46 #7 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41e80, base=0x5ff580, depth=1, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 #8 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41ac8, base=0x5ff580, depth=0, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 #9 0x00007ff631a06a95 in expand_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, pl=0x0) at sparse-index.c:422 #10 0x00007ff631a06cbd in ensure_full_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100) at sparse-index.c:456 #11 0x00007ff631990d08 in index_name_stage_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21, stage=0, search_mode=EXPAND_SPARSE) at read-cache.c:556 #12 0x00007ff631990d6c in index_name_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21) at read-cache.c:566 #13 0x00007ff63180dbb5 in sanitize_paths (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0, skip_checks=0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:756 #14 0x00007ff63180de50 in sparse_checkout_set (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:860 #15 0x00007ff63180e6c5 in cmd_sparse_checkout (argc=186, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:1063 #16 0x00007ff6317234cb in run_builtin (p=0x7ff631ad9b38 <commands+2808>, argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:548 #17 0x00007ff6317239c0 in handle_builtin (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:808 #18 0x00007ff631723c7d in run_argv (argcp=0x5ffdd0, argv=0x5ffd78) at git.c:877 #19 0x00007ff6317241d1 in cmd_main (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:1017 #20 0x00007ff631838b60 in main (argc=190, argv=0x3dfb0030000) at common-main.c:64 ``` The very bottom of the stack being the `rehash()` method from `hashmap.c` as called within the `name-hash` API made me look at where these hashmaps were being used in the sparse index logic. These were being copied across indexes, which seems dangerous. Indeed, clearing these hashmaps and setting them as not initialized fixes the segfault. The second commit is a response to a test failure that happens in `t1092-sparse-checkout-compatibility.sh` where `git stash pop` starts to fail because the underlying `git checkout-index` process fails due to colliding files. Passing the `-f` flag appears to work, but it's unclear why this name-hash change causes that change in behavior.
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 6, 2025
This one is a little bit more curious. In t6112, we have a test that exercises the `git rev-list --filter` option with invalid filters. We execute git-rev-list(1) via `test_must_fail`, which means that we check for leaks even though Git exits with an error code. This causes the following leak: Direct leak of 27 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x5555555e6946 in realloc.part.0 lsan_interceptors.cpp.o #1 0x5555558fb4b6 in xrealloc wrapper.c:137:8 #2 0x5555558b6e06 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:112:2 #3 0x5555558b7550 in strbuf_add strbuf.c:311:2 #4 0x5555557c1a88 in strbuf_addstr strbuf.h:310:2 #5 0x5555557c1d4c in parse_list_objects_filter list-objects-filter-options.c:261:3 #6 0x555555885ead in handle_revision_pseudo_opt revision.c:2899:3 #7 0x555555884e20 in setup_revisions revision.c:3014:11 #8 0x5555556c4b42 in cmd_rev_list builtin/rev-list.c:588:9 #9 0x5555555ec5e3 in run_builtin git.c:483:11 #10 0x5555555eb1e4 in handle_builtin git.c:749:13 #11 0x5555555ec001 in run_argv git.c:819:4 #12 0x5555555eaf94 in cmd_main git.c:954:19 #13 0x5555556fd569 in main common-main.c:64:11 #14 0x7ffff7ca714d in __libc_start_call_main (.../lib/libc.so.6+0x2a14d) #15 0x7ffff7ca7208 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (.../libc.so.6+0x2a208) #16 0x5555555ad064 in _start (git+0x59064) This leak is valid, as we call `die()` and do not clean up the memory at all. But what's curious is that this is the only leak reported, because we don't clean up any other allocated memory, either, and I have no idea why the leak sanitizer treats this buffer specially. In any case, we can work around the leak by shuffling things around a bit. Instead of calling `gently_parse_list_objects_filter()` and dying after we have modified the filter spec, we simply do so beforehand. Like this we don't allocate the buffer in the error case, which makes the reported leak go away. It's not pretty, but it manages to make t6112 leak free. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 6, 2025
In 1b9e9be (csum-file.c: use unsafe SHA-1 implementation when available, 2024-09-26) we have converted our `struct hashfile` to use the unsafe SHA1 backend, which results in a significant speedup. One needs to be careful with how to use that structure now though because callers need to consistently use either the safe or unsafe variants of SHA1, as otherwise one can easily trigger corruption. As it turns out, we have one inconsistent usage in our tree because we directly initialize `struct hashfile_checkpoint::ctx` with the safe variant of SHA1, but end up writing to that context with the unsafe ones. This went unnoticed so far because our CI systems do not exercise different hash functions for these two backends, and consequently safe and unsafe variants are equivalent. But when using SHA1DC as safe and OpenSSL as unsafe backend this leads to a crash an t1050: ++ git -c core.compression=0 add large1 AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==1367==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000040 (pc 0x7ffff7a01a99 bp 0x507000000db0 sp 0x7fffffff5690 T0) ==1367==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==1367==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x7ffff7a01a99 in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) #1 0x555555ddde56 in openssl_SHA1_Clone ../sha1/openssl.h:40:2 #2 0x555555dce2fc in git_hash_sha1_clone_unsafe ../object-file.c:123:2 #3 0x555555c2d5f8 in hashfile_checkpoint ../csum-file.c:211:2 #4 0x555555b9905d in deflate_blob_to_pack ../bulk-checkin.c:286:4 #5 0x555555b98ae9 in index_blob_bulk_checkin ../bulk-checkin.c:362:15 #6 0x555555ddab62 in index_blob_stream ../object-file.c:2756:9 #7 0x555555dda420 in index_fd ../object-file.c:2778:9 #8 0x555555ddad76 in index_path ../object-file.c:2796:7 #9 0x555555e947f3 in add_to_index ../read-cache.c:771:7 #10 0x555555e954a4 in add_file_to_index ../read-cache.c:804:9 #11 0x5555558b5c39 in add_files ../builtin/add.c:355:7 #12 0x5555558b412e in cmd_add ../builtin/add.c:578:18 #13 0x555555b1f493 in run_builtin ../git.c:480:11 #14 0x555555b1bfef in handle_builtin ../git.c:740:9 #15 0x555555b1e6f4 in run_argv ../git.c:807:4 #16 0x555555b1b87a in cmd_main ../git.c:947:19 #17 0x5555561649e6 in main ../common-main.c:64:11 #18 0x7ffff742a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4) #19 0x7ffff742a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4) #20 0x555555772c84 in _start (git+0x21ec84) ==1367==Register values: rax = 0x0000511000001080 rbx = 0x0000000000000000 rcx = 0x000000000000000c rdx = 0x0000000000000000 rdi = 0x0000000000000000 rsi = 0x0000507000000db0 rbp = 0x0000507000000db0 rsp = 0x00007fffffff5690 r8 = 0x0000000000000000 r9 = 0x0000000000000000 r10 = 0x0000000000000000 r11 = 0x00007ffff7a01a30 r12 = 0x0000000000000000 r13 = 0x00007fffffff6b38 r14 = 0x00007ffff7ffd000 r15 = 0x00005555563b9910 AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex ==1367==ABORTING ./test-lib.sh: line 1023: 1367 Aborted git $config add large1 error: last command exited with $?=134 not ok 4 - add with -c core.compression=0 Fix the issue by using the unsafe variant instead. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 6, 2025
Same as with the preceding commit, git-fast-import(1) is using the safe variant to initialize a hashfile checkpoint. This leads to a segfault when passing the checkpoint into the hashfile subsystem because it would use the unsafe variants instead: ++ git --git-dir=R/.git fast-import --big-file-threshold=1 AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==577126==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000040 (pc 0x7ffff7a01a99 bp 0x5070000009c0 sp 0x7fffffff5b30 T0) ==577126==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==577126==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x7ffff7a01a99 in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) #1 0x555555ddde56 in openssl_SHA1_Clone ../sha1/openssl.h:40:2 #2 0x555555dce2fc in git_hash_sha1_clone_unsafe ../object-file.c:123:2 #3 0x555555c2d5f8 in hashfile_checkpoint ../csum-file.c:211:2 #4 0x5555559647d1 in stream_blob ../builtin/fast-import.c:1110:2 #5 0x55555596247b in parse_and_store_blob ../builtin/fast-import.c:2031:3 #6 0x555555967f91 in file_change_m ../builtin/fast-import.c:2408:5 #7 0x55555595d8a2 in parse_new_commit ../builtin/fast-import.c:2768:4 #8 0x55555595bb7a in cmd_fast_import ../builtin/fast-import.c:3614:4 #9 0x555555b1f493 in run_builtin ../git.c:480:11 #10 0x555555b1bfef in handle_builtin ../git.c:740:9 #11 0x555555b1e6f4 in run_argv ../git.c:807:4 #12 0x555555b1b87a in cmd_main ../git.c:947:19 #13 0x5555561649e6 in main ../common-main.c:64:11 #14 0x7ffff742a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4) #15 0x7ffff742a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4) #16 0x555555772c84 in _start (git+0x21ec84) ==577126==Register values: rax = 0x0000511000000cc0 rbx = 0x0000000000000000 rcx = 0x000000000000000c rdx = 0x0000000000000000 rdi = 0x0000000000000000 rsi = 0x00005070000009c0 rbp = 0x00005070000009c0 rsp = 0x00007fffffff5b30 r8 = 0x0000000000000000 r9 = 0x0000000000000000 r10 = 0x0000000000000000 r11 = 0x00007ffff7a01a30 r12 = 0x0000000000000000 r13 = 0x00007fffffff6b60 r14 = 0x00007ffff7ffd000 r15 = 0x00005555563b9910 AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex ==577126==ABORTING ./test-lib.sh: line 1039: 577126 Aborted git --git-dir=R/.git fast-import --big-file-threshold=1 < input error: last command exited with $?=134 not ok 167 - R: blob bigger than threshold The segfault is only exposed in case the unsafe and safe backends are different from one another. Fix the issue by initializing the context with the unsafe SHA1 variant. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 22, 2025
When trying to create a Unix socket in a path that exceeds the maximum socket name length we try to first change the directory into the parent folder before creating the socket to reduce the length of the name. When this fails we error out of `unix_sockaddr_init()` with an error code, which indicates to the caller that the context has not been initialized. Consequently, they don't release that context. This leads to a memory leak: when we have already populated the context with the original directory that we need to chdir(3p) back into, but then the chdir(3p) into the socket's parent directory fails, then we won't release the original directory's path. The leak is exposed by t0301, but only when running tests in a directory hierarchy whose path is long enough to make the socket name length exceed the maximum socket name length: Direct leak of 129 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x5555555e85c6 in realloc.part.0 lsan_interceptors.cpp.o #1 0x55555590e3d6 in xrealloc ../wrapper.c:140:8 #2 0x5555558c8fc6 in strbuf_grow ../strbuf.c:114:2 #3 0x5555558cacab in strbuf_getcwd ../strbuf.c:605:3 #4 0x555555923ff6 in unix_sockaddr_init ../unix-socket.c:65:7 #5 0x555555923e42 in unix_stream_connect ../unix-socket.c:84:6 #6 0x55555562a984 in send_request ../builtin/credential-cache.c:46:11 #7 0x55555562a89e in do_cache ../builtin/credential-cache.c:108:6 #8 0x55555562a655 in cmd_credential_cache ../builtin/credential-cache.c:178:3 #9 0x555555700547 in run_builtin ../git.c:480:11 #10 0x5555556ff0e0 in handle_builtin ../git.c:740:9 #11 0x5555556ffee8 in run_argv ../git.c:807:4 #12 0x5555556fee6b in cmd_main ../git.c:947:19 #13 0x55555593f689 in main ../common-main.c:64:11 #14 0x7ffff7a2a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/h7zcxabfxa7v5xdna45y2hplj31ncf8a-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: 0a855678aa0cb573cecbb2bcc73ab8239ec472d0) #15 0x7ffff7a2a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/h7zcxabfxa7v5xdna45y2hplj31ncf8a-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: 0a855678aa0cb573cecbb2bcc73ab8239ec472d0) #16 0x5555555ad1d4 in _start (git+0x591d4) DEDUP_TOKEN: ___interceptor_realloc.part.0--xrealloc--strbuf_grow--strbuf_getcwd--unix_sockaddr_init--unix_stream_connect--send_request--do_cache--cmd_credential_cache--run_builtin--handle_builtin--run_argv--cmd_main--main--__libc_start_call_main--__libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5--_start SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 129 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). Fix this leak. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 5, 2025
An internal customer reported a segfault when running `git sparse-checkout set` with the `index.sparse` config enabled. I was unable to reproduce it locally, but with their help we debugged into the failing process and discovered the following stacktrace: ``` #0 0x00007ff6318fb7b0 in rehash (map=0x3dfb00d0440, newsize=1048576) at hashmap.c:125 #1 0x00007ff6318fbc66 in hashmap_add (map=0x3dfb00d0440, entry=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at hashmap.c:247 #2 0x00007ff631937a70 in hash_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:122 #3 0x00007ff631938a2f in add_name_hash (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:638 #4 0x00007ff631a064de in set_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, nr=8291, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at sparse-index.c:255 #5 0x00007ff631a06692 in add_path_to_index (oid=0x5ff130, base=0x5ff580, path=0x3dfb4b725da "<redacted>", mode=33188, context=0x5ff570) at sparse-index.c:307 #6 0x00007ff631a3b48c in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41f60, base=0x5ff580, depth=2, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:46 #7 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41e80, base=0x5ff580, depth=1, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 #8 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41ac8, base=0x5ff580, depth=0, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 #9 0x00007ff631a06a95 in expand_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, pl=0x0) at sparse-index.c:422 #10 0x00007ff631a06cbd in ensure_full_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100) at sparse-index.c:456 #11 0x00007ff631990d08 in index_name_stage_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21, stage=0, search_mode=EXPAND_SPARSE) at read-cache.c:556 #12 0x00007ff631990d6c in index_name_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21) at read-cache.c:566 #13 0x00007ff63180dbb5 in sanitize_paths (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0, skip_checks=0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:756 #14 0x00007ff63180de50 in sparse_checkout_set (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:860 #15 0x00007ff63180e6c5 in cmd_sparse_checkout (argc=186, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:1063 #16 0x00007ff6317234cb in run_builtin (p=0x7ff631ad9b38 <commands+2808>, argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:548 #17 0x00007ff6317239c0 in handle_builtin (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:808 #18 0x00007ff631723c7d in run_argv (argcp=0x5ffdd0, argv=0x5ffd78) at git.c:877 #19 0x00007ff6317241d1 in cmd_main (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:1017 #20 0x00007ff631838b60 in main (argc=190, argv=0x3dfb0030000) at common-main.c:64 ``` The very bottom of the stack being the `rehash()` method from `hashmap.c` as called within the `name-hash` API made me look at where these hashmaps were being used in the sparse index logic. These were being copied across indexes, which seems dangerous. Indeed, clearing these hashmaps and setting them as not initialized fixes the segfault. The second commit is a response to a test failure that happens in `t1092-sparse-checkout-compatibility.sh` where `git stash pop` starts to fail because the underlying `git checkout-index` process fails due to colliding files. Passing the `-f` flag appears to work, but it's unclear why this name-hash change causes that change in behavior.
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 15, 2025
find_cfg_ent() allocates a struct reflog_expire_entry_option via FLEX_ALLOC_MEM and inserts it into a linked list in the reflog_expire_options structure. The entries in this list are never freed, resulting in a leak in cmd_reflog_expire and the gc reflog expire maintenance task: Direct leak of 39 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7ff975ee6883 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe6883) #1 0x0000010edada in xcalloc ../wrapper.c:154 #2 0x000000df0898 in find_cfg_ent ../reflog.c:28 #3 0x000000df0898 in reflog_expire_config ../reflog.c:70 #4 0x00000095c451 in configset_iter ../config.c:2116 #5 0x0000006d29e7 in git_config ../config.h:724 #6 0x0000006d29e7 in cmd_reflog_expire ../builtin/reflog.c:205 #7 0x0000006d504c in cmd_reflog ../builtin/reflog.c:419 #8 0x0000007e4054 in run_builtin ../git.c:480 #9 0x0000007e4054 in handle_builtin ../git.c:746 #10 0x0000007e8a35 in run_argv ../git.c:813 #11 0x0000007e8a35 in cmd_main ../git.c:953 #12 0x000000441e8f in main ../common-main.c:9 #13 0x7ff9754115f4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35f4) #14 0x7ff9754116a7 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x36a7) #15 0x000000444184 in _start (/home/jekeller/libexec/git-core/git+0x444184) Close this leak by adding a reflog_clear_expire_config() function which iterates the linked list and frees its elements. Call it upon exit of cmd_reflog_expire() and reflog_expire_condition(). Add a basic test which covers this leak. While at it, cover the functionality from commit commit 3cb22b8 (Per-ref reflog expiry configuration, 2008-06-15). We've had this support for years, but lacked any tests. Co-developed-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.keller@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 2, 2025
An internal customer reported a segfault when running `git sparse-checkout set` with the `index.sparse` config enabled. I was unable to reproduce it locally, but with their help we debugged into the failing process and discovered the following stacktrace: ``` #0 0x00007ff6318fb7b0 in rehash (map=0x3dfb00d0440, newsize=1048576) at hashmap.c:125 #1 0x00007ff6318fbc66 in hashmap_add (map=0x3dfb00d0440, entry=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at hashmap.c:247 #2 0x00007ff631937a70 in hash_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:122 #3 0x00007ff631938a2f in add_name_hash (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:638 #4 0x00007ff631a064de in set_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, nr=8291, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at sparse-index.c:255 #5 0x00007ff631a06692 in add_path_to_index (oid=0x5ff130, base=0x5ff580, path=0x3dfb4b725da "<redacted>", mode=33188, context=0x5ff570) at sparse-index.c:307 #6 0x00007ff631a3b48c in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41f60, base=0x5ff580, depth=2, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:46 #7 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41e80, base=0x5ff580, depth=1, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 #8 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41ac8, base=0x5ff580, depth=0, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 #9 0x00007ff631a06a95 in expand_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, pl=0x0) at sparse-index.c:422 #10 0x00007ff631a06cbd in ensure_full_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100) at sparse-index.c:456 #11 0x00007ff631990d08 in index_name_stage_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21, stage=0, search_mode=EXPAND_SPARSE) at read-cache.c:556 #12 0x00007ff631990d6c in index_name_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21) at read-cache.c:566 #13 0x00007ff63180dbb5 in sanitize_paths (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0, skip_checks=0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:756 #14 0x00007ff63180de50 in sparse_checkout_set (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:860 #15 0x00007ff63180e6c5 in cmd_sparse_checkout (argc=186, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:1063 #16 0x00007ff6317234cb in run_builtin (p=0x7ff631ad9b38 <commands+2808>, argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:548 #17 0x00007ff6317239c0 in handle_builtin (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:808 #18 0x00007ff631723c7d in run_argv (argcp=0x5ffdd0, argv=0x5ffd78) at git.c:877 #19 0x00007ff6317241d1 in cmd_main (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:1017 #20 0x00007ff631838b60 in main (argc=190, argv=0x3dfb0030000) at common-main.c:64 ``` The very bottom of the stack being the `rehash()` method from `hashmap.c` as called within the `name-hash` API made me look at where these hashmaps were being used in the sparse index logic. These were being copied across indexes, which seems dangerous. Indeed, clearing these hashmaps and setting them as not initialized fixes the segfault. The second commit is a response to a test failure that happens in `t1092-sparse-checkout-compatibility.sh` where `git stash pop` starts to fail because the underlying `git checkout-index` process fails due to colliding files. Passing the `-f` flag appears to work, but it's unclear why this name-hash change causes that change in behavior.
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