getrandom is a Rust library for retrieving random data from (operating) system sources.

It is assumed that the system always provides high-quality, cryptographically secure random data, ideally backed by hardware entropy sources. This crate derives its name from the Linux getrandom syscall but is cross-platform, roughly supporting the same set of platforms as Rust's std library.

This is a low-level API. Most users should prefer using a higher-level random-number library like rand.

Add the getrandom dependency to your Cargo.toml file:

[dependencies] getrandom = "0.3"

Then invoke the fill function on a byte buffer to fill it with random data:

fn get_random_u128() -> Result<u128, getrandom::Error> { let mut buf = [0u8; 16]; getrandom::fill(&mut buf)?; Ok(u128::from_ne_bytes(buf)) }

Pull Requests that add support for new targets to getrandom are always welcome.

getrandom also provides optional (opt-in) backends, which allow users to customize the source of randomness based on their specific needs:

Opt-in backends can be enabled using the getrandom_backend configuration flag. The flag can be set either by specifying the rustflags field in .cargo/config.toml:

# It's recommended to set the flag on a per-target basis: [target.wasm32-unknown-unknown] rustflags = ['--cfg', 'getrandom_backend="wasm_js"']

Or by using the RUSTFLAGS environment variable:

RUSTFLAGS='--cfg getrandom_backend="linux_getrandom"' cargo build

Enabling an opt-in backend will replace the backend used by default. Doing this for an incorrect target (e.g. using linux_getrandom while compiling for a Windows target) will result in a compilation error. Be extremely careful while using opt-in backends, as incorrect configuration may result in vulnerable applications or applications that always panic.

Note that using an opt-in backend in a library (e.g. for tests or benchmarks) WILL NOT have any effect on its downstream users.

Currently the linux_raw backend supports only targets with stabilized asm! macro, i.e. arm, aarch64, loongarch64, riscv32, riscv64, s390x, x86, and x86_64.

Note that the raw syscall backend may be slower than backends based on libc::getrandom, e.g. it does not implement vDSO optimizations and on x86 it uses the infamously slow int 0x80 instruction to perform syscall.

This crate fully supports the WASI and Emscripten targets. However, the wasm32-unknown-unknown target (i.e. the target used by wasm-pack) is not automatically supported since, from the target name alone, we cannot deduce which JavaScript interface should be used (or if JavaScript is available at all).

We do not include support for this target in the default configuration because our JS backend (supporting web browsers, web workers and Node.js v19 or later) requires wasm-bindgen, bloating Cargo.lock and potentially breaking builds on non-web WASM platforms.

To enable getrandom's functionality on wasm32-unknown-unknown using the Web Crypto methods described above via wasm-bindgen, enable the wasm_js feature flag. Setting RUSTFLAGS='--cfg getrandom_backend="wasm_js"' is allowed but is no longer required and does nothing (it was required in a prior version of this crate).

WARNING: enabling the wasm_js feature will bloat Cargo.lock on all platforms (where wasm-bindgen is not an existing dependency) and is known to cause build issues on some non-web WASM platforms, even when a different backend is selected via getrandom_backend.

If this crate does not support your target out of the box or you have to use a non-default entropy source, then you can provide a custom implementation. You need to enable the custom backend as described in the opt-in backends section.

Next, you need to define an extern function with the following signature:

use getrandom::Error; #[unsafe(no_mangle)] unsafe extern "Rust" fn __getrandom_v03_custom( dest: *mut u8, len: usize, ) -> Result<(), Error> { todo!() }

This function should, ideally, be defined in the root crate of your project, e.g. in your main.rs. This function MUST be defined only once for your project, i.e. upstream library crates SHOULD NOT define it outside of tests and benchmarks. Improper configuration of this backend may result in linking errors.

The function accepts a pointer to a buffer that should be filled with random data and its length in bytes. Note that the buffer MAY be uninitialized. On success, the function should return Ok(()) and fully fill the input buffer; otherwise, it should return an error value.

While wrapping functions which work with byte slices you should fully initialize the buffer before passing it to the function:

use getrandom::Error; fn my_entropy_source(buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), getrandom::Error> { // ... Ok(()) } #[unsafe(no_mangle)] unsafe extern "Rust" fn __getrandom_v03_custom( dest: *mut u8, len: usize, ) -> Result<(), Error> { let buf = unsafe { // fill the buffer with zeros core::ptr::write_bytes(dest, 0, len); // create mutable byte slice core::slice::from_raw_parts_mut(dest, len) }; my_entropy_source(buf) }

In some rare scenarios, you might be compiling this crate for an unsupported target (e.g. wasm32-unknown-unknown), but this crate's functionality is not actually used by your code. If you are confident that getrandom is not used in your project, but it gets pulled nevertheless by one of your dependencies, then you can enable the unsupported backend, which always returns Err(Error::UNSUPPORTED).

This crate generally supports the same operating system and platform versions that the Rust standard library does. Additional targets may be supported using the opt-in custom backend.

This means that as Rust drops support for old versions of operating systems (such as old Linux kernel versions, Android API levels, etc.) in stable releases, getrandom may create new patch releases that remove support for outdated platform versions.

On Linux targets, the /dev/urandom fallback is present only if either target_env is musl, or target_arch is one of the following: aarch64, arm, powerpc, powerpc64, s390x, x86, x86_64. Other supported targets require kernel versions that support the getrandom system call, so the fallback is not needed.

On Android targets the fallback is present only for the following target_arches: aarch64, arm, x86, x86_64. Other target_arches (e.g. RISC-V) require sufficiently high API levels.

The fallback can be disabled by enabling the linux_getrandom opt-in backend. Note that doing so will bump minimum supported Linux kernel version to 3.17 and Android API level to 23 (Marshmallow).

Sometimes, early in the boot process, the OS has not collected enough entropy to securely seed its RNG. This is especially common on virtual machines, where standard "random" events are hard to come by.

Some operating system interfaces always block until the RNG is securely seeded. This can take anywhere from a few seconds to more than a minute. A few (Linux, NetBSD and Solaris) offer a choice between blocking and getting an error; in these cases, we always choose to block.

On Linux (when the getrandom system call is not available), reading from /dev/urandom never blocks, even when the OS hasn't collected enough entropy yet. To avoid returning low-entropy bytes, we first poll /dev/random and only switch to /dev/urandom once this has succeeded.

On OpenBSD, this kind of entropy accounting isn't available, and on NetBSD, blocking on it is discouraged. On these platforms, nonblocking interfaces are used, even when reliable entropy may not be available. On the platforms where it is used, the reliability of entropy accounting itself isn't free from controversy. This library provides randomness sourced according to the platform's best practices, but each platform has its own limits on the grade of randomness it can promise in environments with few sources of entropy.

On ESP-IDF, if esp_fill_random is used before enabling WiFi, BT, or the voltage noise entropy source (SAR ADC), the Hardware RNG will only be seeded via RC_FAST_CLK. This can occur during early boot unless bootloader_random_enable() is called. For more information see the ESP-IDF RNG Docs or the RNG section of the ESP32 Technical Reference Manual.

We always prioritize failure over returning known insecure "random" bytes. Generally, on supported platforms, failure is highly unlikely, though not impossible. If an error does occur, it is likely that it will occur on every call to getrandom. Therefore, after the first successful call, one can be reasonably confident that no errors will occur.

We strive to eliminate all potential panics from our backend implementations. In other words, when compiled with optimizations enabled, the generated binary code for getrandom functions should not contain any panic branches. Even if the platform misbehaves and returns an unexpected result, our code should correctly handle it and return an error, e.g. Error::UNEXPECTED.

If your code uses fill_uninit and you enable MemorySanitizer (i.e. -Zsanitizer=memory), we will automatically handle unpoisoning of the destination buffer filled by fill_uninit.

You can run sanitizer tests for your crate dependent on getrandom like this:

RUSTFLAGS="-Zsanitizer=memory" cargo test -Zbuild-std --target=x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu

This crate requires Rust 1.85 or later.

The getrandom library is distributed under either of

• Apache License, Version 2.0
• MIT license

at your option.

Unless you explicitly state otherwise, any contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in the work by you, as defined in the Apache-2.0 license, shall be dual licensed as above, without any additional terms or conditions.