Stratechery Plus Update

  • The YouTube Tip of the Google Spear

    Listen to this post:

    Action is happening up-and-down the LLM stack: Nvidia is making deals with Intel, OpenAI is making deals with Oracle, and Nvidia and OpenAI are making deals with each other. Nine years after Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang hand-delivered the first Nvidia DGX-1 AI computer to OpenAI, the chip giant is investing up to $100 billion in the AI lab, which OpenAI will, of course, spend on Nvidia AI systems.

    This ouroboros of a deal certainly does feel a bit frothy, but there is a certain logic to it: Nvidia is uniquely dominant in AI thanks to the company’s multi-year investment in not just superior chips but also an entire ecosystem from networking to software, and has the cash flow and stock price befitting its position in the AI value chain. Doing a deal like this at this point in time not only secures the company’s largest customer — and rumored ASIC maker — but also gives Nvidia equity upside beyond the number of chips it can manufacture. More broadly, lots of public investors would like the chance to invest in OpenAI; I don’t think Nvidia’s public market investors are bothered to have now acquired that stake indirectly.

    The interconnectedness of these investments reflects the interconnectedness of the OpenAI and Nvidia stories in particular: Huang may have delivered OpenAI their first AI computer, but it was OpenAI that delivered Nvidia the catalyst for becoming the most valuable company in the world, with the November 2022 launch of ChatGPT. Ever since, the assumption of many in tech has been that the consumer market in particular has been OpenAI’s to lose, or perhaps more accurately, monetize; no company has ever grown faster in terms of users and revenue, and that’s before they had an advertising model!

    And beyond the numbers, have you used ChatGPT? It’s so useful. You can look up information, or format text, and best of all you can code! Of course there are other models like Anthropic’s Claude, which has excelled at coding in particular, but surely the sheer usefulness makes ultimate success inevitable!

    A Brief History of Social Media

    If a lot of those takes sound familiar, it’s because I’ve made some version of most of them; I also, perhaps relatedly, took to Twitter like a fish to water. Just imagine, an app that was the nearly perfect mixture of content I was interested in and people I wanted to hear from, and interact with. Best of all it was text: the efficiency of information acquisition was unmatched, and it was just as easy to say my piece.

    It took me much longer to warm up to Facebook, and, frankly, I never was much of a user; I’ve never been one to image dump episodes of my life, nor have I had much inclination to wade through others’. I wasn’t interested in party photos; I lusted after ideas and arguments, and Twitter — a view shared by much of both tech and media — was much more up my alley.

    Despite that personal predilection, however, and perhaps because of my background in small town Wisconsin and subsequently living abroad, I retained a strong sense of the importance of Facebook. Sure, the people who I was most interested in hearing from and interacting with may have been the types to leave their friends and family for the big city, but for most people, friends and family were the entire point of life generally, and by extension, social media specifically.

    To that end, I was convinced from the beginning that Facebook was going to be a huge deal, and argued so multiple times on Stratechery; social media was ultimately a matter of network effects and scale, and Facebook was clearly on the path to domination, even as much of the Twitterati were convinced the company was the next MySpace. I was similarly bullish about Instagram: no, I wasn’t one to post a lot of personal pictures, but while I personally loved text, most people liked photos.

    What people really liked most of all, however — and not even Facebook saw this coming — was video. TikTok grew into a behemoth with the insight that social media was only ever a stepping stone to personal entertainment, of which video was the pinnacle. There were no network effects of the sort that everyone — including regulators — assumed would lead to eternal Facebook dominance; rather, TikTok realized that Paul Krugman’s infamous dismissal of the Internet actually was somewhat right: most people actually don’t have anything to say that is particularly compelling, which means that limiting the content you see to your social network dramatically decreases the possibility you’ll be entertained every time you open your social networking app. TikTok dispensed with this artificial limitation, simply showing you compelling videos period, no matter where they came from.

    The Giant in Plain Sight

    Of course TikTok wasn’t the first company to figure this out: YouTube was the first video platform, and from the beginning focused on building an algorithm that focused more on giving you videos you were interested in than in showing you what you claimed to want to see.

    YouTube, however, was and probably always has been my biggest blind spot: I’m just not a big video watcher in general, and YouTube seemed like more work than short-form video, which married the most compelling medium with the most addictive delivery method — the feed. Sure, YouTube was a great acquisition for Google — certainly in line with the charge to “organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful” — but I — and Google’s moneymaker, Search — was much more interested in text, and pictures if I must.

    The truth, however, is that YouTube has long been the giant hiding in plain sight: the service is the number one streaming service in the living room — bigger than Netflix — and that’s the company’s 3rd screen after mobile and the PC, where it has no peer. More than that, YouTube is not just the center of culture, but the nurturer of it: the company just announced that it has paid out more than $100 billion to creators over the last four years; given that many creators earn more from brand deals than they do from YouTube ads, that actually understates the size of the YouTube economy. Yes, TikTok is a big deal, but TikTok stars hope to make it on YouTube, where they can actually make a living.

    And yet, YouTube sometimes seems like an afterthought, at least to people like me and others immersed in the text-based Internet. Last week I was in New York for YouTube’s annual “Made on YouTube” event, but the night before I couldn’t remember the name; I turned to Google, natch, and couldn’t figure it out. The reason is that talk about YouTube mostly happens on YouTube; I, and Google itself, still live in a text-based world.

    That is the world that was rocked by ChatGPT, especially Google. The company’s February 2023 introduction of Bard in Paris remains one of the most surreal keynotes I’ve ever watched: most of the content was rehashed, the presenters talked as if they were seeing their slides for the first time, and one of the demos of a phone-based feature neglected to remember to have a phone on hand. This was a company facing a frontal assault on their most obvious and profitable area of dominance — text-based information retrieval — and they were completely flat-footed.

    Google has, in the intervening years, made tremendous strides to come back, including dumping the Bard name in favor of Gemini, itself based on vastly improved underlying models. I’m also impressed by how the company has incorporated AI into search; not only are AI Overviews generally useful, they’re also incredibly fast, and as a bonus have the links I sometimes prefer already at hand. Ironically, however, you could make the case that the biggest impact LLMs have had on Search is giving a federal judge an excuse to let Google continue paying its biggest would-be competitors (like Apple) to simply offer their customers Google instead. The biggest reason to be skeptical of the company’s fortunes in AI is that they had the most to lose; the company is doing an excellent job of minimizing the losses.

    What I would submit, however, is that Google’s most important and most compelling AI announcements actually don’t have anything to do with Search, at least not yet. These announcements start, as you might expect, with Google’s Deep Mind Research Lab; where they hit the real world, however, is on YouTube — and that, like the user-generated streaming service, is a really big deal.

    The DeepMind-to-YouTube Pipeline

    A perfect example of the DeepMind-to-YouTube pipeline was last week’s announcement of Veo 3-based features for making YouTube Shorts. From the company’s blog post:

    We’ve partnered with Google DeepMind to bring a custom version of their most powerful video generation model, Veo 3, to YouTube. Veo 3 Fast is designed to work seamlessly in YouTube Shorts for millions of creators and users, for free. It generates outputs with lower latency at 480p so you can easily create video clips – and for the first time, with sound – from any idea, all from your phone.

    This initial launch will allow you to not only generate videos, but also use one video to animate another (or a photo), stylize your video with a single touch, and add objects. You can also create an entire video — complete with voiceover — from a collection of clips, or convert speech to song. All of these features are a bit silly, but, well, that’s often where genius — or at least virality — comes from.

    Critics, of course, will label this an AI slop machine, and they’ll be right! The vast majority of content created by these tools will be boring and unwatched. That, however, is already the case with YouTube: the service sees 500 hours of content uploaded every minute, and most of that content isn’t interesting to anyone; the magic of YouTube, however, is the algorithm that finds out what is actually compelling and spreads it to an audience that wants exactly that.

    To put it another way, for YouTube AI slop is a strategy credit: given that the service has already mastered organizing overwhelming amounts of content and only surfacing what is good, it, more than anyone else, can handle exponentially more content which, through the sheer force of numbers, will result in an absolute increase of content that is actually compelling.

    That’s not the only strategy credit YouTube has; while the cost of producing AI-generated video will likely be lower than the cost of producing human-generated video, at least in the long run, the latter’s costs are not borne by TikTok or Meta (Facebook and Instagram are basically video platforms at this point). Rather, the brilliance of the user-generated content model is that creators post their content for free! This, however, means that AI-generated video is actually more expensive, at least if it’s made on TikTok or Meta’s servers. YouTube, however, pays its creators, which means that for the service AI-generated video actually has the potential to lower costs in the long run, increasing the incentive to leverage DeepMind’s industry-leading models.

    In short, while everyone immediately saw how AI could be disruptive to Search, AI is very much a sustaining innovation for YouTube: it increases the amount of compelling content in absolute terms, and it does so with better margins, at least in the long run.

    Here’s the million billion trillion dollar question: what is going to matter more in the long run, text or video? Sure, Google would like to dominate everything, but if it had to choose, is it better to dominate video or dominate text? The history of social networking that I documented above suggests that video is, in the long run, much more compelling to many more people.

    To put it another way, the things that people in tech and media are interested in has not historically been aligned with what actually makes for the largest service or makes the most money: people like me, or those reading me, care about text and ideas; the services that matter specialize in videos and entertainment, and to the extent that AI matters for the latter YouTube is primed to be the biggest winner, even as the same people who couldn’t understand why Twitter didn’t measure up to Facebook go ga-ga over text generation and coding capabilities.

    AI Monetization

    The potential impact of AI on YouTube’s fortunes isn’t just about AI-created videos; rather, the most important announcement of last week’s event was the first indicator that AI can massively increase the monetization potential of every video on the streaming service. You might have missed the announcement, because YouTube underplayed it; from their event blog post:

    We’re adding updates to brand deals and Shopping to make brand collaborations easier than ever. We’re accelerating these deals through a new initiative and new product features to make sure those partnerships succeed – like the ability to add a link to a brand’s site in Shorts. And YouTube Shopping is expanding to more markets and merchants and getting help from AI to make tagging easier.

    It’s just half a sentence — “getting help from AI to make tagging easier” — but the implications of those eight words are profound; here’s how YouTube explained the feature:

    We know tagging products can be time-consuming, so to make the experience better for creators, we’re leaning on an AI-powered system to identify the optimal moment a product is mentioned and automatically display the product tag at that time, capturing viewer interest when it’s highest. We’ll also begin testing the ability to automatically identify and tag all eligible products mentioned in your video later this year.

    The creator who demonstrated the feature — that right there is a great example of how YouTube is a different world than the one I and other people in the media inhabit — was very enthusiastic about the reduction in hassle and time-savings that would come from using AI to do a menial task like tagging sponsored products; that sounds like AI at its best, freeing up creative people to do what they do best.

    There’s no reason, however, why auto-tagging can’t become something much greater; in fact, I already explained the implications of this exact technology in explaining why AI made me bullish on Meta:

    This leads to a third medium-term AI-derived benefit that Meta will enjoy: at some point ads will be indistinguishable from content. You can already see the outlines of that given I’ve discussed both generative ads and generative content; they’re the same thing! That image that is personalized to you just might happen to include a sweater or a belt that Meta knows you probably want; simply click-to-buy.

    It’s not just generative content, though: AI can figure out what is in other content, including authentic photos and videos. Suddenly every item in that influencer photo can be labeled and linked — provided the supplier bought into the black box, of course — making not just every piece of generative AI a potential ad, but every piece of content period.

    The market implications of this are profound. One of the oddities of analyzing digital ad platforms is that some of the most important indicators are counterintuitive; I wrote this spring:

    The most optimistic time for Meta’s advertising business is, counter-intuitively, when the price-per-ad is dropping, because that means that impressions are increasing. This means that Meta is creating new long-term revenue opportunities, even as its ads become cost competitive with more of its competitors; it’s also notable that this is the point when previous investor freak-outs have happened.

    When I wrote that I was, as I noted in the introduction, feeling more cautious about Meta’s business, given that Reels is built out and the inventory opportunities of Meta AI were not immediately obvious. I realize now, though, that I was distracted by Meta AI: the real impact of AI is to make everything inventory, which is to say that the price-per-ad on Meta will approach $0 for basically forever. Would-be competitors are finding it difficult enough to compete with Meta’s userbase and resources in a probabilisitic world; to do so with basically zero price umbrella seems all-but-impossible.

    This analysis was spot-on; I just pointed it at the wrong company. This opportunity to leverage AI to make basically every pixel monetizable absolutely exists for Meta; Meta, however, has to actually develop the models and infrastructure to do it at scale. Google is already there; it was the company universally decried for being slow-moving that announced the first version of this feature last week.

    I can’t overstate what a massive opportunity this is: every item in every YouTube video is well on its way to being a monetizable surface. Yes, that may sound dystopian when I put it so baldly, but if you think about it you can see the benefits; I’ve been watching a lot of home improvement videos lately, and it sure would be useful to be able to not just identify but helpfully have a link to buy a lot of the equipment I see, much of which is basically in the background because it’s not the point of the video. It won’t be long until YouTube has that inventory, which it could surface with an affiliate fee link, or make biddable for companies who want to reach primed customers.

    More generally, you can actually envision Google pulling this off: the company may have gotten off to a horrible start in the chatbot era, but the company has pulled itself together and is increasingly bringing its model and infrastructure leadership to bear, even as Meta has had to completely overhaul their AI approach after hitting a wall. I’m sure CEO Mark Zuckerberg will figure it out, but Google — surprise! — is the company actually shipping.

    A Bull’s Journey

    Or, rather, YouTube is. Close readers of Stratechery have been observing — and probably, deservedly, smirking — at this most unexpected evolution:

    That quote is from Paradigm Shifts and the Winner’s Curse, an Article that was mostly about my concerns about Apple and Amazon, and reads:

    And, by the same token, I’m much more appreciative of Google’s amorphous nature and seeming lack of strategy. That makes them hard to analyze — again, I’ve been honest for years about the challenges I find in understanding Mountain View — but the company successfully navigated one paradigm shift, and is doing much better than I originally expected with this one. Larry Page and Sergey Brin famously weren’t particularly interested in business or in running a company; they just wanted to do cool things with computers in a college-like environment like they had at Stanford. That the company, nearly thirty years later, is still doing cool things with computers in a college-like environment may be maddening to analysts like me who want clarity and efficiency; it also may be the key to not just surviving but winning across multiple paradigms.

    Appreciating the benefits of Google being an amorphous blob where no one knows what is going on, least of all leadership, is a big part of my evolution; this Article is the second part: that blob ultimately needs a way to manifest the technology it manages to come up with, and if you were to distill my worries about Google in the age of AI it would be to wonder how the company could become an answer machine — which Page and Brin always wanted — when it risked losing the massive economic benefits that came from empowering users to choose the winners of auctions Google conducted for advertisers.

    That, however, is ultimately the text-based world, and there’s a case to be made that, in the long run, it simply won’t matter as much as the world of video. Again, the company is doing better with Search than I expected, and I’ve always been bullish about the impact of AI on the company’s cloud business; the piece I’ve missed, however, is that Google already has the tip of the spear for its AI excellence to actually go supernova: YouTube, the hidden giant in plain sight, a business that is simultaneously unfathomably large, and also just getting started.


    Get notified about new Articles


  • 2025.38: Meta, YouTube, and Tech Press Attention

    (Photo by Justin Sullivan/Getty Images)

    Welcome back to This Week in Stratechery!

    As a reminder, each week, every Friday, we’re sending out this overview of content in the Stratechery bundle; highlighted links are free for everyone. Additionally, you have complete control over what we send to you. If you don’t want to receive This Week in Stratechery emails (there is no podcast), please uncheck the box in your delivery settings.

    On that note, here were a few of our favorites this week.

    1. Meta, YouTube, and Tech Press Attention. Everyone knows about Meta’s announcement this week: new AR glasses with a display and a Neural Band are not just cool, they’re compelling in the way tech product announcements are always compelling. That’s why I covered it. However, that wasn’t the only tech announcement this week: YouTube had an event of their own, which might have flown under your radar. That, however, is emblematic of YouTube itself: as we discussed on Sharp Tech, in the wake of my interview with YouTube CEO Neal Mohan, it’s as if the biggest and most important media property in the world exists in an alternate reality. — Ben Thompson

    1. Why Oracle is Winning in AI. Ben and I touched Oracle during last week’s Sharp Tech and I was delighted when Monday’s Daily Update dove deeper into story of Oracle’s AI progress and the astounding pop that Oracle’s stock received last week. Oracle’s was late to the cloud, left with little business other than making the most performant cloud database for its existing customers; it turns out that was great preparation for building the ideal AI cloud. More than that, though, Oracle only want to build infrastructure: this makes them the ideal partner for both model companies like Open and Nvidia. — Andrew Sharp

    2. The Bubble Inflection Point. Sticking with Oracle — I never thought I would find enterprise database provider so interesting! — Tuesday’s Daily Update focused on the longterm financial implications of Oracle’s bet, which may mark an inflection point. Consider: as incomprehensible as AI investment numbers have looked over the past few years, all of that money has come out of free cash flow, at least for Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Meta. Oracle is something new: a company that will have to raise debt to finance its datacenter buildout is now taking meaningful share from leaders like Microsoft. Will the big clouds respond with debt-fueled build-outs of their own? That…sounds a lot like a bubble.  AS

    Stratechery Articles and Updates

    Dithering with Ben Thompson and Daring Fireball’s John Gruber

    Asianometry with Jon Yu

    Sharp China with Andrew Sharp and Sinocism’s Bill Bishop

    Greatest of All Talk with Andrew Sharp and WaPo’s Ben Golliver

    Sharp Tech with Andrew Sharp and Ben Thompson

    This week’s Stratechery video is on iPhones 17 and the Sugar Water Trap.


    Get notified about new Articles


  • iPhones 17 and the Sugar Water Trap

    Listen to this post:

    I think the new iPhones are pretty great.

    The base iPhone 17 finally gets some key features from the Pro line, including the 120Hz Promotion display (the lack of which stopped me from buying the most beautiful iPhone ever). The iPhone Air, meanwhile, is a marvel of engineering: transforming the necessary but regretful camera bump into an entire module that houses all of the phone’s compute is Apple at its best, and reminiscent of how the company elevated the necessity of a front camera assembly into the digital island, a genuinely useful user interface component.

    The existence of the iPhone Air, meanwhile, seems to have given the company permission to fully lean into the “Pro” part of the iPhone Pro. I think the return to aluminum is a welcome one (and if the unibody construction is as transformative as it was for MacBooks, the feel of the phone should be a big step up), the “vapor chamber” should alleviate one of the biggest problems with previous Pro models and provide a meaningful boost in performance, and despite focusing on cameras every year for years, the latest module seems like a big step up (and the square sensor in the selfie camera is a brilliant if overdue idea). Oh, and the Air’s price point — $999, the former starting price for the Pro — finally gave Apple the opening to increase the Pro’s price by $100.

    And, I must add, it’s nice to have a retort to everyone complaining about size and weight: if that is what is important to you, get an Air! I’ll take my (truly) all-day battery life and giant screen, thank you very much, and did I mention that the flagship color is Stratechery orange?

    What was weird to me yesterday, however, is that my enthusiasm over Apple’s announcement didn’t seem to be broadly shared. There was lots of moaning and groaning about weight and size (get an iPhone Air!), gripes about the lack of changes year-over-year, and general boredom with the pre-recorded presentation (OK, that’s a fair one, but at least Apple ventured to some other cities instead of endlessly filming in and around San Francisco). This post on Threads captured the sentiment:

    This is honestly very confusing to me: the content of the post is totally contradicted by the image! Just look at the features listed:

    • There is a completely new body material and design
    • There is a new faster chip, with GPUs actually designed for AI workloads (a reminder that Apple’s neural engine was designed for much more basic machine learning algorithms, not LLMs)
    • There is a 50% increase in RAM
    • The front camera sensor has 2x the pixels, and is square
    • The telephoto lense has 4x the pixels, allowing for 8x hardware zoom
    • There is a much larger battery, thanks to the Pro borrowing the Air’s trick of bundling all of the electronics in a larger yet more aesthetically pleasing plateau
    • There is much better cooling, allowing for better sustained performance
    • There is faster charging

    This is a lot more than a 10% difference over last year’s phone! Basically every aspect of the iPhone Pro got better, and did I mention the Stratechery orange?

    I could stop there, playing the part of the analytics nerd, smugly asserting my list of numbers and features to tell everyone that they’re wrong, and, when it comes to the core question of the year-over-year improvement in iPhone hardware, I would be right! I think, however, that the widespread insistence that this was a blah update — even when the reality is otherwise — exposes another kind of truth: people are calling this update boring not because the iPhones 17 aren’t great, but because Apple no longer captures the imagination.

    Apple in the Background

    One of the advantages of living abroad is how you gain a new perspective on your home country; one of the surprises of moving back is running head-on into accumulated gradual changes that most people may not have noticed as they happened, but that you experience all at once.

    To that end, I have, for the last several years, noted how, from a Stratechery perspective, iPhone launches just aren’t nearly as big of a deal as they were when I first started. Back then I would spend weeks before the event predicting what Apple would announce, and would spend weeks afterwards breaking down the implications; now I usually dash off an Update that, in recent years, has been dominated by discussions about price and elasticity and Apple’s transition to being a services company.

    What was shocking to me, however, was actually watching the event in real time: my group chats and X feed acknowledged that the event was happening, but I had the distinct impression that almost no one was paying much attention, which was not at all the case a decade ago. And, particularly when it comes to tech discussion, you can understand why: by far the biggest thing in tech — and on Stratechery — is AI, and Apple simply isn’t a meaningful player.

    Indeed, the most important news they have made has been their announcement that they were significantly delaying major features that they promised (and advertised!) as a part of Apple Intelligence, followed by a string of news and rumors about reorganizations and talent losses, and questions about whether or not they should partner with or acquire AI companies to do what Apple seems incapable of doing themselves. Until those questions are rectified, why should anyone who cares about AI — which is to say basically everyone else in the industry — care about square camera sensors or vapor chambers?

    Apple’s Enviable Position

    I can, if I put my business analyst hat on, make the case that Apple is doing better than ever, and not just in terms of making money. One underdiscussed takeaway from this year’s announcements is that the company, which originally had the iPhone on a two-year refresh cycle in terms of industrial design, before slipping to a three-year cycle (X/XS/11 and 12/13/14) over the last decade, is back to two years: the iPhones 15 and 16 were the same, but the iPhone 17 Pro in particular is completely new, and there is a completely new model in the Air as well. That suggests a company that is gaining vigor, not losing it.

    Meanwhile, there is the aforementioned Services business, which is growing inexorably, thanks both to the continually growing installed base, and the fact that people continue to spend more time on their phones, not less. Yes, a lot of that Services growth comes from Google traffic acquisition cost payments and App Store fees, but those aren’t necessarily a bad thing: the former speaks to Apple’s dominant position in the attention value chain, and the former not only to the company’s hold on payments, but also the massive growth that has happened in new business models like subscriptions.

    Moreover, you can further make the case that the fundamentals that drive those businesses mean that Apple is poised to be a winner in AI, even if Apple Intelligence is delayed: Apple is positioned to be kingmaker — or gatekeeper — to AI companies who need a massive userbase to justify their astronomical investments, and to the extent that subscriptions are a core piece of the AI monetization puzzle is the extent to which the App Store is positioned for even more recurring revenue growth.

    And besides, isn’t it a good thing that Apple is unique amongst its Big Tech peers in having dramatically lower capital expenditures, even as they are making just as much money as ever? Since when did it become a crime to not just maintain but actually grow profit margins, as Apple has for the last several years?

    The Cost of Pure Profit

    Back when I started Stratechery — and back when iPhone launches were the most important days in all of tech — Apple was locked into tooth-and-nail competition with Google for the smartphone space. And, in the midst of that battle, Google made a critical error: for several years in the early 2010s the company forgot that the point of Android was to ensure access to Google services, and started using Google services to differentiate Android in its fight with the iPhone.

    The most famous example was Google Maps, a version of which launched with the iPhone. When it came time to re-up the deal Google wanted too much data and the ability to insert too many ads for Apple’s liking, so the latter launched its own product — which sucked, particularly at the beginning. Over time, however, Apple Maps has become a very competent product, and critically, it’s the default on iPhones. The implication of that is not that Apple won, but rather that Google lost: maps are a critical source of useful data for an advertising company, and Google lost a huge amount of useful signal from its most valuable users.

    The most important outcome of the early smartphone wars, however, particularly the Maps fiasco, was the extent to which both companies determined to not make the same mistake again: Google would ensure that iPhones were a first-class client for its services, and would pay ever more money for the right to be the default for Search in particular. Apple, meanwhile, seemed to get the even better end of the deal: the company would simply not compete with Google, and add those payments directly to its bottom line.

    This, of course, is why Judge Amit Mehta’s decision last week about remedies in the Google Search default placement antitrust case — specifically, the fact that he allowed those payments to continue — was hailed as a victory not just for Google but also Apple, which would see the $20+ billion of pure profit it got from Mountain View continue to flow.

    What I think is under-appreciated, however, is that the old cliché is true: nothing is free. Apple paid a price for those payments, but it’s not one that has shown up on the bottom line, at least not yet. I wrote about Maps last year in Friendly Google and Enemy Remedies and concluded:

    The lesson Google learned was that Apple’s distribution advantages mattered a lot, which by extension meant it was better to be Apple’s friend than its enemy…It has certainly been profitable for Apple, which has seen its high-margin services revenue skyrocket, thanks in part to the ~$20 billion per year of pure profit it gets from Google without needing to make any level of commensurate investment.

    That right there is the cost I’m referring to: the investment Apple might have made in a search engine to compete with Google are not costs that, once spent, are gone forever, like jewels in an iPhone game; rather, the reason it’s called an “investment” is that it pays off in the long run.

    The most immediate potential payoff would have been search ad revenues that Apple might have earned in an alternate timeline where they competed with Google instead of getting paid off by them. This, to be sure, would likely have been less on both the top and especially bottom lines, so skepticism about the attractiveness of this approach is fair.

    There is, however, another sort of payoff that comes from this kind of investment, and that’s the accumulation of knowledge and capabilities inherent in building products. In this case, Apple completely forewent any sort of knowledge or capability accumulation in terms of gathering, reasoning across, and serving large amounts of data; when you put it that way, is it any surprise that the company suddenly finds itself on the back foot when it comes to AI? Apple is suddenly trying to flex muscles that were, by-and-large, unimportant for the company’s core iPhone business because Google took care of it; had the company been competing in search for the last decade — even if they weren’t as good as Google — they would likely at a minimum have a functional Siri!

    This gets at the most amazing paradox of Mehta’s reasoning for not banning Google payments. Mehta wrote:

    If adopted, the remedy would pose a substantial risk of harm to OEMs, carriers, and browser developers…Distributors would be put to an untenable choice: either (1) continue to place Google in default and preferred positions without receiving any revenue or (2) enter distribution agreements with lesser-quality GSEs to ensure that some payments continue. Both options entail serious risk of harm.

    This is certainly true when it comes to small-scale outfits like Mozilla; Mehta, however, was worried about Apple as well. This was the second in Mehta’s list of “significant downstream effects…possibly dire” that might result from banning Google payments:

    Fewer products and less product innovation from Apple. Rem. Tr. at 3831:7-10 (Cue) (stating that the loss of revenue share would “impact [Apple’s] ability at creating new products and new capabilities into the [operating system] itself”). The loss of revenue share “just lets [Apple] do less.” Id. at 3831:19 (Cue).

    This is obviously not true in an absolute sense: Apple made just shy of $100 billion in profit over the last 12 months; losing ~20% of that would hurt, but the company would still have money to spend. Of course, you might make the case that it is true in practice, since investors might not tolerate the loss of margins that ending the Google deal would entail, which might compel management to decrease what it spends on innovation. I tend to think that investors would actually punish Apple more for innovating less, but that’s not the point I’m focused on.

    Rather, what Judge Mehta seems oblivious to is the extent to which his downstream fears already manifested. Apple has had fewer products and less innovation precisely because they have been paid off by Google, and worse, that lack of investment is compounding with the rise of AI.

    The Sugar Water Trap

    Apple took the liberty of opening yesterday’s presentation with a classic Steve Jobs quote:

    "Design is not just what it looks like and feels like. Design is how it works." — Steve Jobs

    Setting aside the wisdom of using that quote when the company is about to launch a controversial new user interface design that critics complain sacrifices legibility for beauty (although, to be honest, I don’t think it looks great either), that wasn’t the Steve Jobs quote this presentation and Apple’s general state of affairs made me think of. What I was thinking of was the question Jobs posed to then PepsiCo President John Sculley when he was recruiting him to be the CEO of Apple in the early 1980s:

    Do you want to sell sugar water for the rest of your life or come with me and change the world?

    iPhones are a great business — one of the best businesses ever, in fact — because Apple managed to marry the malleability of software with the tangibility and monetization potential of hardware. Indeed, the fact that we will always need hardware to access software — including AI — speaks to not just the profitability but also the durability of Apple’s model.

    The problem, however, is that simply staying in their lane, content to be a hardware provider for the delivery of others’ innovation, feels a lot more like Sculley than Jobs. Jobs told Walter Isaacson for his biography:

    My passion has been to build an enduring company where people were motivated to make great products. Everything else was secondary. Sure, it was great to make a profit, because that was what allowed you to make great products. But the products, not the profits, were the motivation. Sculley flipped these priorities to where the goal was to make money. It’s a subtle difference, but it ends up meaning everything: the people you hire, who gets promoted, what you discuss in meetings.

    Apple, to be fair, isn’t selling the same sugar water year-after-year in a zero sum war with other sugar water companies. Their sugar water is getting better, and I think this year’s seasonal concoction is particularly tasty. What is inescapable, however, is that while the company does still make new products — I definitely plan on getting new AirPods Pro 3s! — the company has, in pursuit of easy profits, constrained the space in which it innovates.

    That didn’t matter for a long time: smartphones were the center of innovation, and Apple was consequently the center of the tech universe. Now, however, Apple is increasingly on the periphery, and I think that, more than anything, is what bums people out: no, Apple may not be a sugar water purveyor, but they are farther than they have been in years from changing the world.



    Get notified about new Articles


  • U.S. Intel

    Listen to this post:

    Now that everyone is using ChatGPT, the lazy columnist’s trick of quoting Wikipedia to open an Article is less cliché than it is charming (at least that’s my excuse). Anyhow, here is Wikipedia’s definition of “steelmanning”:

    A steel man argument (or steelmanning) is the opposite of a straw man argument. Steelmanning is the practice of applying the rhetorical principle of charity through addressing the strongest form of the other person’s argument, even if it is not the one they explicitly presented. Creating the strongest form of the opponent’s argument may involve removing flawed assumptions that could be easily refuted or developing the strongest points which counter one’s own position. Developing counters to steel man arguments may produce a stronger argument for one’s own position.

    The beauty of being in the rather lonely position of supporting the U.S. government taking an equity stake in Intel is that I don’t have to steelman the case about it being a bad idea. Scott Lincicome, for example, had a good Twitter thread and Washington Post column explaining why this is a terrible idea; this is the opening of the latter:

    President Donald Trump’s announcement on Friday that the U.S. government will take a 10 percent stake in long-struggling Intel marks a dangerous turn in American industrial policy. Decades of market-oriented principles have been abandoned in favor of unprecedented government ownership of private enterprise. Sold as a pragmatic and fiscally responsible way to shore up national security, the $8.9 billion equity investment marks a troubling departure from the economic policies that made America prosperous and the world’s undisputed technological leader.

    Lincicome lists a number of problems with this transaction, including (but not limited to!):

    • Intel making decisions for political rather than commercial considerations
    • Intel’s board prioritizing government interests over their fiduciary duties
    • Other companies being pressured to purchase Intel products, weakening their long-term position.
    • Disadvantaging the competitive position of other companies
    • Incentivizing the misallocation of private capital

    Lincicome and all of the other critics of this deal are absolutely correct about all of the downsides. The problem with their argument, however, is the lack of steelmanning, in two respects: first, Lincicome’s Twitter thread doesn’t mention “China” or “Taiwan” once (the Washington Post column mentions China, but not in a national security context). Second, Lincicome et al refuse to grapple with the possibility that chips generally, and foundries specifically, really are a unique case.

    The Geopolitical Case

    There is a reason I’ve written so much about chips, and for many years before the AI wave brought the industry to prominence; start with 2020’s Chips and Geopolitics:

    The international status of Taiwan is, as they say, complicated. So, for that matter, are U.S.-China relations. These two things can and do overlap to make entirely new, even more complicated complications.

    Geography is much more straightforward:

    A map of the Pacific

    Taiwan, you will note, is just off the coast of China. South Korea, home to Samsung, which also makes the highest end chips, although mostly for its own use, is just as close. The United States, meanwhile, is on the other side of the Pacific Ocean. There are advanced foundries in Oregon, New Mexico, and Arizona, but they are operated by Intel, and Intel makes chips for its own integrated use cases only.

    The reason this matters is because chips matter for many use cases outside of PCs and servers — Intel’s focus — which is to say that TSMC matters. Nearly every piece of equipment these days, military or otherwise, has a processor inside. Some of these don’t require particularly high performance, and can be manufactured by fabs built years ago all over the U.S. and across the world; others, though, require the most advanced processes, which means they must be manufactured in Taiwan by TSMC.

    This is a big problem if you are a U.S. military planner. Your job is not to figure out if there will ever be a war between the U.S. and China, but to plan for an eventuality you hope never occurs. And in that planning the fact that TSMC’s foundries — and Samsung’s — are within easy reach of Chinese missiles is a major issue.

    The rise of AI makes these realities — and related issues like chip controls — even more pressing. I made the argument earlier this year in AI Promise and Chip Precariousness that the U.S. should be seeking to make China more dependent on both U.S. chip companies and TSMC manufacturing, even as it was doing the opposite. The motivation was to preserve dominance in AI, but this ignored the reality I just laid out: AI depends on chips, and those chips are made next door to China; that means that stopping China could be worse than China succeeding:

    It’s also worth noting that success in stopping China’s AI efforts has its own risks: another reason why China has held off from moving against Taiwan is the knowledge that every year they wait increases their relative advantages in all the real world realities I listed above; that makes it more prudent to wait. The prospect of the U.S. developing the sort of AI that matters in a military context, however, even as China is cut off, changes that calculus: now the prudent course is to move sooner rather than later, particularly if the U.S. is dependent on Taiwan for the chips that make that AI possible.

    Beyond the human calamity that would result from a Chinese attack on Taiwan, there is the economic calamity downstream of not just losing AI chips, but chips of all sorts, including the basic semiconductors that power not just computers but basically everything in the world. And, to that end, it’s worth pointing out that an Intel that succeeds doesn’t fully address our chip dependency on Taiwan. It is, however, a pre-requisite, and any argument about the U.S. government’s involvement with Intel must grapple with this reality.

    Decisions Over Decades

    There was one line in Lincicome’s Article that definitely made me raise my eyebrows (emphasis mine):

    The semiconductor industry, more than most, requires nimble responses to rapidly changing technology and market conditions. Intel already faces significant operational and competitive challenges; it has been a technological laggard for more than a decade as Nvidia, AMD, TSMC and other competitors have raced ahead. Adding a layer of political oversight to Intel’s already-complex turnaround effort is far more likely to hinder than help.

    I get Lincicome’s point, which certainly applies to the technology industry broadly; just look at all of the upheaval that has happened in the two-and-a-half years since ChatGPT launched. I would argue, however, that chips are different: Intel is a technological laggard because of choices made decades ago; it just takes a really long time for the consequences of mistakes to show up.

    Starting a new blog is a bit like a band publishing their debut album: you’re full of takes that you’ve held for years and have been waiting to unleash. In my case, I had been worried about Intel ever since they missed out on mobile, which meant they missed out on the associated volume that came from making chips for every smartphone in the world. Volume is critical when it comes to managing the ever-expanding cost of staying on the leading edge: as the cost of fabs has surged from hundreds of millions to tens of billions of dollars, the only way to fab chips profitably is to have enough volume over which to spread those massive capital expenditures.

    And so, within a month of launching Stratechery, I wrote that Intel needed to become a foundry — i.e. make chips for other companies — if they wanted to remain viable in the long run. And, to be honest, I had been saving up that take for so long that I thought I was too late; after all, I started Stratechery in 2013, six years into the mobile era, and given the massive changes Intel would have to undergo to become a customer service organization, I thought they needed to make that change at least three years earlier.

    And then, for the next eight years, Intel’s stock went up and up, as the company rode the cloud boom that was the yin to the smartphone’s yang. If anyone had read my 2013 Article and sold their Intel shares, or worse, shorted them, they would have lost their shirt!

    In the end, however, my take was correct, even if it was un-investable. First Intel fell behind TSMC, who was powered by massive orders from Apple in particular, and then, on the company’s last earnings call, CEO Lip-Bu Tan admitted the reality of what could have been forecasted when Steve Jobs walked onto that 2007 MacWorld stage:

    Up to and through Intel 18A, we could generate a reasonable return on our investments with only Intel Products. The increase in capital cost at Intel 14A, make it clear that we need both Intel products, and a meaningful external customer to drive acceptable returns on our deployed capital, and I will only invest when I’m confident those returns exist.

    This is the rotten tree sprung from the seed of Intel’s mobile failure: the company could afford to miss out on a massive market for nearly two decades, but when it comes to 14A, the company simply can’t sell enough chips on its own to justify the investment.

    What is worse is the tree that wasn’t planted: the real payoff from Intel building a foundry business in 2010, or 2013 as I recommended, is that they would have been ready for the AI boom. Every hyperscaler is still complaining that demand exceeds supply for AI chips, even as Intel can’t win customers for its newest process that is actually best-suited for AI chips. The company simply has too many other holes in its offering, including the sort of reliability and throughput that is essential to earning customer trust.

    In short, contra Lincicome, Intel’s problem is not short-term decision-making, because Intel is in the business of making chips, and making chips is a decades-long endeavor of building expertise, gaining volume, moving down the learning curve, and doing it all again and again to the tune of tens of billions of dollars a year in capex.

    That, by extension, is why the stakes today are so high. The problem facing the U.S. is not simply the short-term: the real problems will arise in the 2030s and beyond. Semiconductor manufacturing decision-making does not require nimbleness; it requires gravity and the knowledge that abandoning the leading edge entails never regaining it.

    Competing with TSMC

    This also puts to rest one of the traditional objections to government intervention in support of an incumbent: in almost every case that investment crowds out new companies, companies that are, yes, more nimble and more capable of meeting the moment. The reality of semiconductor manufacturing, however, is that the path is far too long and arduous to ever fill the vacuum that Intel’s exit would leave. Actually, though, that last line is not quite right: Intel’s biggest problem is that its market challenges are closer to that mythical startup that will never exist.

    Suppose our mythical startup somehow received hundreds of billions of dollars worth of funding, and somehow moved down the decades-long learning curve that undergirds modern silicon manufacturing: to make the business work our mythical startup would actually need to find customers.

    Our mythical startup, however, doesn’t exist in a vacuum: it exists in the same world as TSMC, the company who has defined the modern pure play foundry. TSMC has put in the years, and they’ve put in the money; TSMC has the unparalleled customer service approach that created the entire fabless chip industry; and, critically, TSMC, just as they did in the mobile era, is aggressively investing to meet the AI moment. If you’re an Nvidia, or an Apple in smartphones, or an AMD or a Qualcomm, why would you take the chance of fabricating your chips anywhere else? Sure, TSMC is raising prices in the face of massive demand, but the overall cost of a chip in a system is still quite small; is it worth risking your entire business to save a few dollars for worse performance with a worse customer experience that costs you time to market and potentially catastrophic product failures?

    We know our mythical startup would face these challenges because they are the exact challenges Intel faces. Intel may need “a meaningful external customer to drive acceptable returns on [its] deployed capital”, but Intel’s needs do not drive the decision-making of those external customers, despite the fact that Intel, while not fully caught up to TSMC, is at least in the ballpark, something no startup could hope to achieve for decades.

    Intel’s Credibility Problem

    These realities are why I argued a year ago that the U.S. government needed to prop up demand for Intel manufacturing, a point I reiterated earlier this year. And, to steelman the argument of those opposed to this deal, there are ways to do that without acquiring part of the company.

    The problem, however, comes back to what Tan said on that earnings call: beyond all of the challenges above, what company is going to go through the trouble of getting their chip working on Intel’s process if it’s possible that the company is going to abandon manufacturing on the next process? It’s a catch-22: Intel needs an external customer to make its foundry viable, but no external customer will go with Intel if there is a possibility that Intel Foundry will not be viable. In other words, the stakes have changed from even earlier this year: Intel doesn’t just need demand, it needs to be able to credibly guarantee would-be customers that it is in manufacturing for the long haul.

    A standalone Intel cannot credibly make this promise. The path of least resistance for Intel has always been to simply give up manufacturing and become another TSMC customer; they already fab some number of their chips with the Taiwanese giant. Such a decision would — after some very difficult write-offs and wind-down operations — change the company into a much higher margin business; yes, the company’s chip designs have fallen behind as well, but at least they would be on the most competitive process, with a lot of their legacy customer base still on their side.

    The problem for the U.S. is that that then means pinning all of the country’s long-term chip fabrication hopes on TSMC and Samsung not just building fabs in the United States, but also building up a credible organization in the U.S. that could withstand the loss of their headquarters and engineering knowhow in their home countries. There have been some important steps in this regard, but at the end of the day it seems reckless for the U.S. to place both its national security and its entire economy in the hands of foreign countries next door to China, allies or not.

    Given all of this, acquiring 10% of Intel, terrible though it may be for all of the reasons Lincicome articulates — and I haven’t even touched on the legality of this move — is I think the least bad option. In fact, you can even make the case that a lot of what Lincicome views as a problem has silver linings:

    • Intel deciding to stay in manufacturing is arguably making a political decision, not a commercial one; however, it is important for the U.S. that Intel stay in manufacturing.
    • Intel prioritizing government interests — which are inherently focused on national security and the long-term viability of U.S. semiconductor manufacturing — over their fiduciary duties could just as easily be framed as valuing the long-term over the short term; had Intel done just that over the last two decades they wouldn’t be in this position.
    • Other companies being pressured to purchase Intel products is exactly what Intel needs to not just be viable in manufacturing, but also to actually get better.
    • If TSMC and Samsung are disadvantaged by not making chips in the U.S., that’s a good thing from the U.S. perspective. Both companies are investing here; the U.S. wants more.
    • Private capital prioritizing U.S. manufacturing is a good thing!

    The single most important reason for the U.S. to own part of Intel, however, is the implicit promise that Intel Foundry is not going anywhere. There simply isn’t a credible way to make that promise without having skin in the game, and that is now the case.

    Steelmanning

    I’ll be honest: there is a very good chance this won’t work. Intel really is a mess: they are actively hostile to customers, no one in the industry trusts them, they prioritize the wrong things even today (i.e. technical innovation with backside power over yields for chips which don’t necessarily have interference issues), and that’s even without getting into the many problems with their business. Moreover, I led with Lincicome’s argument because I agree! Government involvement in private business almost always ends badly.

    At the same time, the China concerns are real, Intel Foundry needs a guarantee of existence to even court customers, and there really is no coming back from an exit. There won’t be a startup to fill Intel’s place. The U.S. will be completely dependent on foreign companies for the most important products on earth, and while everything may seem fine for the next five, ten, or even fifteen years, the seeds of that failure will eventually sprout, just like those 2007 seeds sprouted for Intel over the last couple of years. The only difference is that the repercussions of this failure will be catastrophic not for the U.S.’s leading semiconductor company, but for the U.S. itself.



    Get notified about new Articles


  • Facebook is Dead; Long Live Meta

    Listen to this post:

    I don’t do memes frequently, but I’ve used this one twice:

    The GTA meme about "Here we go again" as applied to Facebook

    Alas, I think I need to retire it. From the Wall Street Journal:

    Meta Platforms posted 22% revenue growth in the second quarter, showing its core ad business remains strong at a time when the company is investing billions of dollars into artificial intelligence. For the first time this year, the company held its top capital-spending projections steady, a move that is sure to ease investor concerns over Chief Executive Mark Zuckerberg’s AI spending spree. Shares rose by more than 11% in after-hours trading.

    The results show the extent to which Meta’s advertising business will continue to pay for its outsize AI ambitions, as well as how the AI tools are contributing to its strength. Sales came in at $47.5 billion, ahead of analyst expectations. Net income for the April-to-June period was $18.3 billion, also ahead of market expectations. Meta also said it expects to post between 17% and 24% revenue growth year-over-year for the current quarter. “The investments it’s making in AI are already paying off in its ads business,” said Jasmine Enberg, principal analyst at research firm eMarketer.

    I’m obviously a bit tardy getting to these earnings, which is something that wouldn’t have happened if Meta had had very bad results the same quarter in which they started very publicly spending hundreds of millions of dollars on talent to overhaul their AI strategy. This stands in marked contrast to the 2021-2022 period, when Meta renamed itself from Facebook in conjunction with unveiling just how much money it was spending/losing on the Metaverse, even as its core business slowed significantly, driving the stock to below $100 and compelling me to write Meta Myths.

    Lessons Learned

    This wasn’t an accident, but rather evidence of a lesson learned; CFO Susan Li explained what that lesson was on an episode of John Collison’s Cheeky Pint podcast:

    Susan Li: It’s pretty standard after earnings calls, where you touch base with some number of your largest investors. Sadly, it is not one-on-one, it’s one of you and many, many people from their teams. And most of the time, they just ask you to clarify things. Obviously, everything is Reg FD compliant, but it mostly takes the form of questions. And in October 2022, for the first time, there were sometimes no questions. I mean, there was a call where basically one of the portfolio managers said, “We actually don’t have any questions for you today. We just want you to hear feedback from us.”

    John Collison: Wow. More of a comment than a question.

    SL: Yes. It was actually very memorable.

    JC: And it was blunt feedback, I presume.

    SL: Yes. And one of the things that really stuck with me from one of those conversations is someone said, “Look, I get that you’re building the future of computing and the next mobile platform and all that, and that is great, and I am glad someone wants to do it and I am rooting for you, but why should I invest in your stock today? Why don’t I just wait for your phone equivalent, your scaled consumer product to come out and invest in you then, and you tell me that that’s going to be years away?”

    And the way that question was framed actually really stuck with me, and is the way that, frankly, now Mark and I think about this. Which is like, great, we’ve got a lot of these bets, and the bets are technologically exciting. People can get excited about them and the vision of the world. But as investors, they’re like, “Cool, why don’t I just wait for your bets to be ready to succeed before I come?” We need people to invest with us along the way. When we think about the financial outlook of the company, a large part of it is not just, okay, cool, you’re building the next massive platform out here in some decades, it’s, why would you hold our shares until then? What do we need to keep delivering in terms of consolidated results?

    The very first words out of Zuckerberg’s mouth on the earnings call stated Meta’s new thinking explicitly:

    We had another strong quarter with more than 3.4 billion people using at least one of our apps each day, and strong engagement across the board. Our business continues to perform very well, which enables us to invest heavily in our AI efforts.

    There have been historical examples of public companies having permission from investors to invest far ahead of profits, most notably Amazon. Matthew Yglesias famously wrote on Slate in 2013:

    Amazon kept up its streak of being awesome this afternoon by announcing a 45 percent year-on-year decline in profits measuring Q4 2012 against Q4 2011. Not because sales went down, mind you. They’re up. Revenue is up. The company’s razor-thin profit margins just got even thinner, and in total the company lost $39 million in 2012.

    The company’s shares are down a bit today, but the company’s stock is taking a much less catastrophic plunge in already-meager profits than Apple, whose stock plunged simply because its Q4 profits increased at an unexpectedly slow rate. That’s because Amazon, as best I can tell, is a charitable organization being run by elements of the investment community for the benefit of consumers. The shareholders put up the equity, and instead of owning a claim on a steady stream of fat profits, they get a claim on a mighty engine of consumer surplus. Amazon sells things to people at prices that seem impossible because it actually is impossible to make money that way. And the competitive pressure of needing to square off against Amazon cuts profit margins at other companies, thus benefiting people who don’t even buy anything from Amazon.

    It’s a truly remarkable American success story. But if you own a competing firm, you should be terrified. Competition is always scary, but competition against a juggernaut that seems to have permission from its shareholders to not turn any profits is really frightening.

    This was obviously incorrect: Amazon was “losing money” (while still having fabulous free cash flow, mind you) because they were investing heavily in the infrastructure that supported The Amazon Tax; for several years now the company’s biggest “problem” has arguably been that they are throwing off more money than they can manage to reinvest, even with their massive buildout of AWS and their logistics network. Critically, however, it is easy to draw a line from those two buildouts in particular to future cash flows, and investors were willing to give Jeff Bezos the benefit of the doubt.

    One of the weird things about Meta, on the other hand, is how the company never seemed to get the benefit of the doubt, at least up until the last couple of years; I wrote in Meta Myths:

    Myspace is, believe it or not, still around; however, it has been irrelevant for so long that I needed to look it up to remember if the name used camel case or not (it doesn’t). It does, though, still seem to loom large in the mind of Meta skeptics certain that the mid-2000’s social network’s fate was predictive for the company that supplanted it.

    There is something about social media that has always made investors intrinsically suspicious of the long-term; given that, Meta’s simultaneous slowdown in growth (mostly driven by ATT), combined with the public shift in focus to the Metaverse, fueled concern that the company was desperately trying to pivot away from a failing business — and losing billions of dollars to do so, with very few tangible results.

    Things are very different now, however, in two regards. First, there is the aforementioned commitment by management to deliver results now, not just promises about the future; second, investor sentiment about Meta really has done a 180: if anything, my impression is that Meta is not just getting the benefit of the doubt, but actually more credit than they deserve.

    AI That Matters

    This is a very good quarter to deliver the updated version of my favorite Meta chart:

    Last quarter I wrote about Meta’s Deteriorating Ad Metrics:

    The first thing to note is the leveling out of impression growth even as Daily Active Person’s growth increased slightly; what this means is that the Reels inventory growth tailwind may be over. That’s always a bearish signal, as I noted a year ago in Meta and Reasonable Doubt

    Secondly, and more concerningly, is that while price-per-ad growth outpaced impression growth, it also decreased quarter-over-quarter. One of the reasons why 2023 was such a good time to own Meta is that a combination of figuring out ATT and expanding Reels inventory meant that both impressions and price-per-ad increased simultaneously; in contrast, it is a lot less attractive when both are decreasing simultaneously…

    The two previous quarters where the growth rates for impressions and price-per-ad simultaneously decreased were 4Q 2016 and 1Q 2019; the positive takeaway is that I’m not actually totally certain what happened in 4Q 2016, and I wasn’t concerned at the time. 1Q 2019 is more interesting, in that I chalked up the issue to increased time spent on Stories cannibalizing Feed at a time when Stories had fewer impressions and worse monetization; to that end, the positive spin on this point is that Meta still has a lot of room to increase Reels monetization.

    This quarter looks much better: impressions increased growth significantly; when that happens you should expect price-per-ad to decline, but notably, the decline was relatively attenuated compared to last quarter. This is a great result that drove the blowout numbers that made investors willing to give Zuckerberg a big fat permission slip for his AI talent splurge.

    What, though, were the drivers of these significantly improved ad fundamentals? Zuckerberg was quick to credit AI:

    On advertising, the strong performance this quarter is largely thanks to AI unlocking greater efficiency and gains across our ads system. This quarter, we expanded our new AI-powered recommendation model for ads to new surfaces and improved its performance by using more signals and a longer context. It’s driven roughly 5% more ad conversions on Instagram and 3% on Facebook.

    I think this credit is fair, particularly in terms of the relative lack of decline in price-per-ad (given the impressions growth). However, what is important to note is that the “AI” Zuckerberg is referring to is not LLMs; Li, to her credit, spent an extensive amount of time in her prepared remarks detailing the AI systems — Andromeda, GEM, and Lattice — that are actually driving these improvements. These are all impressive, to be sure, but the reason I suggested that investor sentiment may have swung too much away from suspicion to gullibility was the way in which I saw a lot of folks conflate Meta’s new SuperIntelligence investments with their great results, as if the former caused the latter; in fact, Zuckerberg clearly stated that they were totally different initiatives:

    I think the trajectory on this stuff is very optimistic. And I think it’s one of the interesting challenges in running a business like this now is there’s just a very high chance, it seems, like the world is going to look pretty different in a few years from now. And on the one hand, there are all these things that we can do, there are improvements to our core products that exist.

    It’s the “improvements to our core products that exist” that drove these results; Zuckerberg now knows — but seemingly still chafes, just a tad — that there is an opportunity cost that must be paid in terms of driving those improvements to get permission to invest in superintelligence. To put it another way, (1) Zuckerberg really wants to focus on the latter, and (2) now knows that the way to get investor permission to do so is to deliver short-term results. That, by extension, makes me think the AI story isn’t the whole story when it comes to Meta’s ads.

    Reels and Dials

    To go back to the chart above, previous drivers of increased impressions growth were meaningful product additions that vastly increased ad inventory; from Meta and Reasonable Doubt:

    There are two-and-a-half inversions of impression and price-per-ad growth rates on this chart:

    • In 2017 Meta saturated the Instagram feed with ads; this led impressions growth to drop and the price-per-ad to increase; then, in 2018, Instagram started to monetize Stories, leading to increased growth in impressions and corresponding decreases in price-per-ad growth.
    • In 2020 Meta saturated Instagram Stories; this once again led impressions growth to drop and the price-per-ad to increase; then, while COVID provided a boost in 2021, 2022 saw a significant increase in Reels monetization, leading to increased growth in impressions and a decrease in price-per-ad growth (which, as noted above, was made more extreme by ATT).
    • Since the middle of last year Meta Impressions growth is once again dropping as Reels becomes saturated; this is leading to an increase in price-per-ad growth (although the lines have not yet crossed).

    The most optimistic time for Meta’s advertising business is, counter-intuitively, when the price-per-ad is dropping, because that means that impressions are increasing. This means that Meta is creating new long-term revenue opportunities, even as its ads become cost competitive with more of its competitors; it’s also notable that this is the point when previous investor freak-outs have happened.

    The problem I saw in that Article is that Meta didn’t have any obvious product improvements on the horizon that would meaningfully increase inventory. Yes, Threads and WhatsApp ads are coming, but they’re still not big revenue drivers. And yet, we got impression growth all the same! Here was the closest thing we got to an explanation from Li in her prepared remarks:

    Impression growth accelerated across all regions due primarily to engagement tailwinds on both Facebook and Instagram and, to a lesser extent, ad load optimizations on Facebook.

    Li also said on the results follow-up call:

    So on your first question about impression growth, the worldwide impression growth acceleration that we saw in Q2 was driven primarily by incremental engagement on video and Feed surfaces, which benefited from a bunch of the ranking optimizations that we made to our content recommendations on Facebook and Instagram, and then to a lesser extent some of the ad load optimizations.

    It turns out I was right last quarter that Meta had a lot of room to increase Reels monetization, but not just because they could target ads better (that was a part of it, as I noted above): rather, it turns out that short-form video is so addictive that Meta can simply drive more engagement — and thus more ad inventory — by pushing more of it. That’s impression driver number one — and the most important one. The second one is even more explicit: Meta simply started showing more ads to people (i.e. “ad load optimization”).

    All of this ties back to where I started, about how Meta learned that you have to give investors short term results to get permission for long term investments. I don’t think it’s a coincidence that, in the same quarter where Meta decided to very publicly up its investment in the speculative “Superintelligence”, users got pushed more Reels and Facebook users in particular got shown more ads. The positive spin on this is that Meta has dials to turn; by the same token, investors who have flipped from intrinsically doubting Meta to intrinsically trusting them should realize that it was the pre-2022 Meta, the one that regularly voiced the importance of not pushing too many ads in order to preserve the user experience, that actually deserved the benefit of the doubt for growth that was purely organic. This last quarter is, to my mind, a bit more pre-determined.

    Social Network R.I.P.

    The link in the previous paragraph is to then-Facebook’s Q3 2016 earnings call; that’s as good a place as any to find one of a bajillion quotes from Zuckerberg about connecting people:

    Over the next 10 years, we’re going to continue to invest in the platforms and technologies that will connect more people and more places and allow everyone in the world to have a voice. We focused our long-term innovation roadmap around three areas: connectivity initiatives that bring more people online; artificial intelligence; and virtual and augmented reality.

    The “artificial intelligence” and “virtual and augmented reality” investments are obviously still there in a major way; what is interesting to note, however, is that the word “connect” — at least in the context of what Zuckerberg repeatedly stated was Facebook’s mission — only appeared once on this earnings call:

    Over the last few months we have begun to see glimpses of our AI systems improving themselves. The improvement is slow for now, but undeniable. Developing superintelligence — which we define as AI that surpasses human intelligence in every way — we think is now in sight.

    Meta’s vision is to bring personal superintelligence to everyone — so that people can direct it towards what they value in their own lives. We believe this has the potential to begin an exciting new era of individual empowerment. A lot has been written about the economic and scientific advances that superintelligence can bring. I am extremely optimistic about this. But I think that if history is a guide, then an even more important role will be how superintelligence empowers people to be more creative, develop culture and communities, connect with each other, and lead more fulfilling lives.

    To build this future, we’ve established Meta Superintelligence Labs, which includes our foundations, product, and FAIR teams, as well as a new lab that is focused on developing the next generation of our models. We’re making good progress towards Llama 4.1 and 4.2 — and in parallel, we’re also working on our next generation of models that will push the frontier in the next year or so.

    Long gone are the days when Meta’s self-identification as a social network led them to miss fundamental shifts in the Internet; this commitment to delivering superintelligence, with the expressed goal of helping people “direct it towards what they value in their own lives” — note the explicit callout of individualism, not community — is the end of a shift that Meta was both late to and has also been undergoing for years.

    And, I would note, it’s that shift that provided the dials I wrote about in the previous section. Pushing people ever more short-form video — with ever more advertisements — is intrinsically isolating and contrary to social interaction (making it easier to share Reels with your chat groups notwithstanding). Indeed, I think this connection is inevitable: I suspect that what companies most strenuously push as their mission is often the most favorable interpretation of their downsides. Apple talks about integration, while their critics argue they control too much; Google talks about capturing knowledge and making it useful, while their critics argue they violate privacy; Meta used to talk about connection, while their critics fretted about the negative effects of peer pressure and falling into the wrong communities, and many investors nervously awaited the next viral social network. Now Meta talks about empowering the individual, even as they justify their investment to investors by pushing users ever deeper into individually-tailored short form video feeds.

    At a minimum, it gives the company a solid legal defense; the company recently wrote in a filing defending itself from the FTC’s charge that it monopolized social networking:

    The evidence decisively demonstrated that Meta – once an online “Facebook” for connecting students – has evolved into a diverse global provider of entertaining and informative content that competes with increasingly similar social apps including TikTok, YouTube, iMessage, and others. Times, technologies, and norms of use change, and the trial evidence proved that Meta has adapted due to competitive pressure in this fast-moving industry. Today, only a fraction of time spent on Meta’s services – 7% on Instagram, 17% on Facebook – involves consuming content from online “friends” (“friend sharing”). A majority of time spent on both apps is watching videos, increasingly short-form videos that are “unconnected” – i.e., not from a friend or followed account – and recommended by AI-powered algorithms Meta developed as a direct competitive response to TikTok’s rise, which stalled Meta’s growth. The FTC now concedes this development “brings Meta into competition with TikTok and YouTube.” That concession means that there is no valid PSNS market, which is the sole market the FTC asserts.

    This is obviously correct; indeed, maybe investors were actually right all along: being a social network wasn’t ultimately sustainable, and the fact that Meta is stronger than ever, with entirely new justifications for being, is the real reason why they deserve the benefit of the doubt.



    Get notified about new Articles


  • Paradigm Shifts and the Winner’s Curse

    Listen to this post:

    It’s fun — and often accurate — to think of tech companies in pairs. Apple and Microsoft defined the PC market; Microsoft and Intel won it. Google and Meta dominate digital advertising; Apple and Google won mobile. That, however, is not the defining pair of the smartphone era, which ran from the introduction of the iPhone in 2007 to the launch of ChatGPT in 2022; rather, the two most important companies of the last two decades of tech were Apple and Amazon, specifically AWS.

    The Apple part is easy: the iPhone market created the smartphone paradigm, from its user interface (touch) to its distribution channel (the App Store), and was richly rewarded with a bit under half of the unit marketshare and a bit under all of the total profits. Google did well to control the rest in terms of the Android operating system, and profit from it all thanks to Google Search, but it was Search that remained their north star; the company’s primary error in the era was the few years they let the tail (Android) wave the dog (Google).

    The AWS part is maybe less obvious, but no less critical — and the timing is notable. Amazon created AWS in 2006, just 10 months before the iPhone unveiling, and the paradigm they created was equally critical to the smartphone era. I explained the link in 2020’s The End of the Beginning:

    This last point gets at why the cloud and mobile, which are often thought of as two distinct paradigm shifts, are very much connected: the cloud meant applications and data could be accessed from anywhere; mobile made the I/O layer available everywhere. The combination of the two make computing continuous.

    A drawing of The Evolution of Computing

    What is notable is that the current environment appears to be the logical endpoint of all of these changes: from batch-processing to continuous computing, from a terminal in a different room to a phone in your pocket, from a tape drive to data centers all over the globe. In this view the personal computer/on-premises server era was simply a stepping stone between two ends of a clearly defined range.

    AWS was not the only public cloud provider, of course — Azure and Google Cloud Platform were both launched in 2008 — but by virtue of being first they both defined the paradigm and also were the the first choice of the universe of applications that ran on smartphones or, more accurately, ran everywhere.

    Smartphone Winners and Losers

    If Apple and AWS were the definers — and thus winners — of the smartphone era, then it was Microsoft and Nokia that were the losers. The reasons for their failure were myriad, but there was one common thread: neither could shake off the overhang of having won their previous paradigm; indeed, both failed in part because they deluded themselves into thinking that their previous domination was an advantage.

    For Microsoft that previous paradigm was the PC and the Windows platform, which the company thought they could extend to mobile; from 2014’s Microsoft’s Mobile Muddle:

    Saying “Microsoft missed mobile” is a bit unfair; Windows Mobile came out way back in 2000, and the whole reason Google bought Android was the fear that Microsoft would dominate mobile the way they dominated the PC era. It turned out, though, that mobile devices, with their focus on touch, simplified interfaces, and ARM foundation, were nothing like PCs. Everyone had to start from scratch, and if starting from scratch, by definition Microsoft didn’t have any sort of built-in advantage. They were simply out-executed.

    It took Microsoft years — and a new CEO — to realize their mistake, up and to the point where they put their enterprise productivity dominance at risk; from 2015’s Redmond and Reality:

    There’s reality, and there’s Redmond, and if one thing marked the last few years of Steve Ballmer’s tenure as the CEO of Microsoft, it was the sense that those were two distinct locales. In reality, Android (plus AOSP in China) and iOS were carving up the world phone market; in Redmond Ballmer doubled-down on the losing Window Phone bet by buying Nokia. In reality Office was losing relevance because of its absence on the mobile platforms that mattered; in Redmond Ballmer personally delayed Office on iOS until the Windows Modern née Metro version was finished. And in reality, all kinds of startups were taking aim at the Microsoft enterprise stack; in Redmond, Microsoft was determined to own it all, just as they had in the PC era.

    It’s fitting that Microsoft and Nokia ended up together; perhaps they were able to jointly go to therapy for success-induced obliviousness of market realities. Nokia dominated the phone market for the decade prior to the iPhone, and even once the iPhone was announced, blithely assumed that they could simply lean on their existing advantages to fend off the Silicon Valley usurper. From 2013’s Blackberry — and Nokia’s — Fundamental Failing:

    Nokia dominated all the parts of this stack you don’t see: they had, and in some respects, still have, the best supply chain and distribution network. In addition, they had high quality hardware that served every segment imaginable. Notably absent in these strengths is the OS and Apps. By 2009, BlackBerry OS and Symbian were clearly obsolete, and their app ecosystems, such as they were, were eclipsed by iOS and then Android. The problem, as I alluded to above, is that while the OS was ultimately under the control of BlackBerry and Nokia, respectively, and thus could be fixed, the efficacy of their ecosystem wasn’t, and wouldn’t be…

    And so, by far the smartest strategic thing either could have done would have been to accept their weakness — they didn’t have an adequate OS or ecosystem — and focus on their strengths…Nokia should have adopted Android-stock, and used their unmatched supply chain and distribution to do to their competitors, well, exactly what Nokia had been doing to their competitors for the last decade (if you think Samsung is running roughshod over everyone today, in 2007 they could only manage 41 million phones compared to Nokia’s 110 million).

    Both BlackBerry and Nokia would have gotten a good OS and thriving ecosystem for free and been able to compete and differentiate themselves on the exact same vectors they had previously. To put it another way, RIM and Nokia had never been successful because of their OS or ecosystem, yet both decided their best response to iOS and Android was to build a new OS! In fact, the strategic superiority of the Android option for RIM and Nokia was even then so obvious that I suspect their core failing was not so much strategic as it was all-too-human: pride. Owning an ecosystem seems much more important than owning services or supply chains, even if building said ecosystem completely devalues what you’re actually good at.

    If the first commonality in Microsoft and Nokia’s failure is the assumption that dominance in one paradigm would seamlessly translate into dominance in the next, then the second was in not making the strategically obvious choice — embracing iOS and Android for Windows, and Android for Nokia — for fear of losing control and long-term relevance. What separates the two companies is that Microsoft, under CEO Satya Nadella, rectified their mistake, while Nokia doubled-down with Windows Phone; that is why Microsoft still matters today — more than ever, in fact — while Nokia phones no longer exist.

    The two companies that stood in constrast to Microsoft and Nokia were Google and Samsung; while their dominance of the non-iPhone market seems obvious in retrospect, it wasn’t at all pre-ordained. What is impressive about both companies is that they had the opposite of pride: both were quite shameless, in fact. From 2013’s Shameless Samsung:

    Every pre-iPhone phone maker is irrelevant, if they even exist, except for Samsung, who is thriving. Samsung the copycat was smart enough to realize they needed to change, and quickly, and so they did.

    Or maybe it wasn’t being smart. Maybe it was simply not caring what anyone else thought about them, their strategy, or their inspiration. Most successful companies, including Apple, including Google, seem remarkably capable of ignoring the naysayers and simply doing what is right for their company. In the case of smartphones, why wouldn’t you copy the iPhone? Nokia refused and look where that got them!

    We, especially in the West, have a powerful sense of justice and fairness when it comes to product features and being first. Business, though, is not fair, even if it is more just than we care to admit.

    Just as Samsung blatantly copied Apple hardware, Android blatantly copied the iOS interface:

    Android as a concept existed pre-iPhone; as a product, not so much

    Plenty of people mocked Google for this shift, but not me: Apple figured out what worked; it would have been foolish to not copy them.

    Foolish like Microsoft and Nokia.

    Apple, Amazon, and AI

    There were striking resemblances in last week’s earnings calls from Apple and Amazon, not just to each other, but to this early smartphone era that I have just recounted. Both companies are facing questions about their AI strategies — Apple for its failure to invest in a large language model of its own, or deeply partner with a model builder, and Amazon for prioritizing its own custom architectures and under-deploying leading edge Nvidia solutions — and both had similar responses:

    It’s Early

    Tim Cook (from a post-earnings all-hands meeting):

    Cook struck an optimistic tone, noting that Apple is typically late to promising new technologies. “We’ve rarely been first,” the executive told staffers. “There was a PC before the Mac; there was a smartphone before the iPhone; there were many tablets before the iPad; there was an MP3 player before iPod.” But Apple invented the “modern” versions of those product categories, he said. “This is how I feel about AI.”

    Andy Jassy:

    The first thing I would say is that I think it is so early right now in AI. If you look at what’s really happening in the space, it’s very top heavy. So you have a small number of very large frontier models that are being trained that spend a lot on computing, a couple of which are being trained on top of AWS and others are being trained elsewhere. And then you also have, I would say, a relatively small number of very large-scale generative AI applications.

    We Will Serve Actual Use Cases

    Tim Cook:

    We see AI as one of the most profound technologies of our lifetime. We are embedding it across our devices and platforms and across the company. We are also significantly growing our investments. Apple has always been about taking the most advanced technologies and making them easy to use and accessible for everyone, and that’s at the heart of our AI strategy. With Apple Intelligence, we’re integrating AI features across our platforms in a way that is deeply personal, private, and seamless, right where users need them.

    Andy Jassy:

    We have a very significant number of enterprises and startups who are running applications on top of AWS’ AI services and but, like the amount of usage and the expansiveness of the use cases and how much people are putting them into production and the number of agents that are going to exist, it’s still just earlier stage than it’s going to be, and so then when you think about what’s going to matter in AI, what are customers going to care about when they’re thinking about what infrastructure use, I think you kind of have to look at the different layers of the stack. And I think…if you look at where the real costs are, they’re going to ultimately be an inference today, so much of the cost in training because customers are really training their models and trying to figure out to get the applications into production.

    Our Chips Are Best

    Tim Cook:

    Apple Silicon is at the heart of all of these experiences, enabling powerful Apple Intelligence features to run directly on device. For more advanced tasks, our servers, also powered by Apple Silicon, deliver even greater capabilities while preserving user privacy through our Private Cloud Compute architecture. We believe our platforms offer the best way for users to experience the full potential of generative AI. Thanks to the exceptional performance of our systems, our users are able to run generative AI models right on their Mac, iPad, and iPhone. We’re excited about the work we’re doing in this space, and it’s incredibly rewarding to see the strong momentum building.

    Andy Jassy:

    At scale, 80% to 90% of the cost will be an inference because you only train periodically, but you’re spinning out predictions and inferences all the time, and so what they’re going to care a lot about is they’re going to care about the compute and the hardware they’re using. We have a very deep partnership with Nvidia and will for as long as I can foresee, but we saw this movie in the CPU space with Intel, where customers are anchoring for better price performance. And so we built just like in the CPU space, where we built our own custom silicon and building Graviton which is about 40% more price performance than the other leading x86 processors, we’ve done the same thing on the custom silicon side in AI with Trainium and our second version of Trainium2…it’s about 30% and 40% better price performance than the other GPU providers out there right now, and we’re already working on our third version of Trainium as well. So I think a lot of the compute and the inference is going to ultimately be run on top of Trainium2.

    We Have the Data

    Tim Cook:

    We’re making good progress on a more personalized Siri, and we do expect to release the features next year, as we had said earlier. Our focus from an AI point of view is on putting AI features across the platform that are deeply personal, private, and seamlessly integrated, and, of course, we’ve done that with more than 20 Apple Intelligence features so far, from Visual Intelligence to Clean Up to Writing Tools and all the rest.

    Andy Jassy:

    People aren’t paying as close attention as they will and making sure that those generative AI applications are operating where the rest of their data and infrastructure. Remember, a lot of generative AI inference is just going to be another building block like compute, storage and database. And so people are going to actually want to run those applications close to where the other applications are running, where their data is. There’s just so many more applications and data running in AWS than anywhere else.

    Both Apple and Amazon’s arguments are very plausible! To summarize each:

    Apple: Large language models are useful, but will be a commodity, and easily accessible on your iPhone; what is the most useful to people, however, is AI that has your private data as context, and only we can provide that. We will provide AI with your data as context at scale and at low cost — both in terms of CapEx and OpEx — by primarily running inference on device. People are also concerned about sharing their personal data with AI companies, so when we need more capabilities we will use our own compute infrastructure, which will run on our own chips, not Nvidia chips.

    Amazon: Large language models are useful, but will be a commodity, and widely available on any cloud. What is the most useful to companies, however, is AI that has your enterprise data as context, and more enterprises are on AWS than anywhere else. We will provide AI with a company’s data as context at scale and at low cost — both in terms of CapEx and OpEx — by primarily running inference on our own AI chips, not Nvidia chips.

    What is notable about both arguments — and again, this doesn’t mean they are wrong! — is how conveniently they align with how the companies operated in the previous era. Apple powered apps with Apple Silicon on the edge with an emphasis on privacy, and Amazon powered apps in the cloud with its own custom architecture focused first and foremost on low costs.

    The AI Paradigm

    The risk both companies are taking is the implicit assumption that AI is not a paradigm shift like mobile was. In Apple’s case, they assume that users want an iPhone first, and will ultimately be satisfied with good-enough local AI; in AWS’s case, they assume that AI is just another primitive like compute or storage that enterprises will tack onto their AWS bill. I wrote after last fall’s re:Invent:

    The emphasis on “choice” in the presentation, first in terms of regular AWS, and then later in terms of AI, is another way to say that the options are, in the end, mere commodities. Sure, the cutting edge for both inference and especially training will be Nvidia, and AWS will offer Nvidia instances (to the extent they fit in AWS’ network), but AWS’s bet is that a necessary component of generative AI being productized is that models fade in importance. Note this bit from Garman leading up to his Bedrock discussion:

    We talked about wanting this set of building blocks that builders could use to invent anything that they could imagine. We also talked about how many of the cases we walked through today, that we’ve redefined how people thought about these as applications change. Now people’s expectations are actually changing for applications again with generative AI, and increasingly my view is generative AI inference is going to be a core building block for every single application. In fact, I think generative AI actually has the potential to transform every single industry, every single company out there, every single workflow out there, every single user experience out there…

    This expansive view of generative AI’s importance — notice how Garman put it on the same level as the compute, storage, and database primitives — emphasizes the importance of it becoming a commodity, with commodity-like concerns about price, performance, and flexibility. In other words, exactly what AWS excels at. To put it another way, AWS’s bet is that AI will be important enough that it won’t, in the end, be special at all, which is very much Amazon’s sweet spot.

    Go back to that illustration from The End of the Beginning: Apple and Amazon are betting that AI is just another primitive in continuous computing that happens everywhere.

    A drawing of The Evolution of Computing

    The most optimistic AI scenarios, however, point to something new:

    A new paradigm of agents and augmentation may lie beyond the cloud and smartphones.

    A better word for “Anywhere” is probably autonomous, but I wanted to stick with the “Where” theme; what I’m talking about, however, is agents: AI doing work without any human involvement at all. The potential productivity gains for companies are obvious: there is a massive price umbrella for inference costs if the end result is that you don’t need to employ a human to do the same work. In this world what matters most is performance, not cost, which means that Amazon’s obsession with costs is missing the point; it’s also a world where the company’s lack of a competitive leading edge model makes it harder for them to compete, particularly when there is another company in the ecosystem — Google — that not only has its own custom chip strategy (TPUs), but also is integrating those chips with its competitive leading edge large language model (Gemini).

    Tim Cook, meanwhile, has talked for years now about his excitement about AR glasses, which fit with the idea of augmentation; Mark Gurman reported in Bloomberg earlier this year:

    Still, all of this is a stepping stone toward Cook’s grand vision, which hasn’t changed in a decade. He wants true augmented reality glasses — lightweight spectacles that a customer could wear all day. The AR element will overlay data and images onto real-world views. Cook has made this idea a top priority for the company and is hell-bent on creating an industry-leading product before Meta can. “Tim cares about nothing else,” says someone with knowledge of the matter. “It’s the only thing he’s really spending his time on from a product development standpoint.”

    Still, it will take many years for true AR glasses to be ready. A variety of technologies need to be perfected, including extraordinarily high-resolution displays, a high-performance chip and a tiny battery that could offer hours of power each day. Apple also needs to figure out applications that make such a device as compelling as the iPhone. And all this has to be available in large quantities at a price that won’t turn off consumers.

    What seems likely to me is that for this product to succeed, Apple will need to figure out generative AI as well; I posited last year that generative AI will undergird future user interfaces in The Gen AI Bridge to the Future. From a section recounting my experience with Meta’s Orion AR glasses:

    This, I think, is the future: the exact UI you need — and nothing more — exactly when you need it, and at no time else. This specific example was, of course, programmed deterministically, but you can imagine a future where the glasses are smart enough to generate UI on the fly based on the context of not just your request, but also your broader surroundings and state.

    This is where you start to see the bridge: what I am describing is an application of generative AI, specifically to on-demand UI interfaces. It’s also an application that you can imagine being useful on devices that already exist. A watch application, for example, would be much more usable if, instead of trying to navigate by touch like a small iPhone, it could simply show you the exact choices you need to make at a specific moment in time. Again, we get hints of that today through deterministic programming, but the ultimate application will be on-demand via generative AI.

    This may sound fanciful, but then again, I wrote in early 2022 that generative AI would be the key to making the metaverse viable:

    In the very long run this points to a metaverse vision that is much less deterministic than your typical video game, yet much richer than what is generated on social media. Imagine environments that are not drawn by artists but rather created by AI: this not only increases the possibilities, but crucially, decreases the costs.

    That may have also sounded fanciful at the time, but it’s already reality: just yesterday Google DeepMind announced Genie 3; from their blog post:

    Today we are announcing Genie 3, a general purpose world model that can generate an unprecedented diversity of interactive environments. Given a text prompt, Genie 3 can generate dynamic worlds that you can navigate in real time at 24 frames per second, retaining consistency for a few minutes at a resolution of 720p.

    […] Achieving a high degree of controllability and real-time interactivity in Genie 3 required significant technical breakthroughs. During the auto-regressive generation of each frame, the model has to take into account the previously generated trajectory that grows with time. For example, if the user is revisiting a location after a minute, the model has to refer back to the relevant information from a minute ago. To achieve real-time interactivity, this computation must happen multiple times per second in response to new user inputs as they arrive…

    Genie 3’s consistency is an emergent capability. Other methods such as NeRFs and Gaussian Splatting also allow consistent navigable 3D environments, but depend on the provision of an explicit 3D representation. By contrast, worlds generated by Genie 3 are far more dynamic and rich because they’re created frame by frame based on the world description and actions by the user.

    We are still far from the metaverse, to be clear, or on-demand interfaces in general, but it’s stunning how much closer we are than a mere three years ago; to that end, betting on current paradigms may make logical sense — particularly if you dominate the current paradigm — but things really are changing with stunning speed. Apple and Amazon’s risk may be much larger than either appreciate.

    Google Appreciation

    Genie 3 is, as I noted, from Google, and thinking about these paradigm shifts — first the shift to mobile, and now the ongoing one to AI — has made me much more appreciative and respectful of Google. I recounted above how the company did what was necessary — including overhauling Android to mimic iOS — to capture its share of the mobile paradigm; as we approach the three year anniversary of ChatGPT, it’s hard to not be impressed at how the company has gone all-in on relevancy with AI.

    This wasn’t a guarantee: two months after ChatGPT, in early 2023, I wrote AI and the Big Five, and expressed my concerns about the company’s potential disruption:

    That, though, ought only increase the concern for Google’s management that generative AI may, in the specific context of search, represent a disruptive innovation instead of a sustaining one. Disruptive innovation is, at least in the beginning, not as good as what already exists; that’s why it is easily dismissed by managers who can avoid thinking about the business model challenges by (correctly!) telling themselves that their current product is better. The problem, of course, is that the disruptive product gets better, even as the incumbent’s product becomes ever more bloated and hard to use — and that certainly sounds a lot like Google Search’s current trajectory.

    I’m not calling the top for Google; I did that previously and was hilariously wrong. Being wrong, though, is more often than not a matter of timing: yes, Google has its cloud and YouTube’s dominance only seems to be increasing, but the outline of Search’s peak seems clear even if it throws off cash and profits for years.

    Meanwhile, I wasn’t worried about Apple and Amazon at all: I saw AI as being a complement for Apple, and predicted that the company would invest heavily in local inference; when it came to Amazon I was concerned that they might suffer from not have an integrated approach a la Google, but predicted that AI would slot in cleanly to their existing cloud business. In other words, exactly what Apple and Amazon’s executives are banking on.

    I wonder, however, if there is a version of this analysis that, were it written in 2007, might have looked like this:

    Nokia will be fine; once they make a modern OS, their existing manufacturing and distribution advantages will carry the day. Microsoft, meanwhile, will mimic the iPhone UI just like they once did the Mac, and then leverage their app advantage to dominate the lower end of the market. It’s Google, which depends on people clicking on links on a big desktop screen, that is in danger.

    I don’t, with the benefit of having actually known myself in 2007, think that would have been my take (and, of course, much of the early years of Stratechery were spent arguing with those who held exactly those types of views). I was, however, a Google skeptic, and I’m humble about that. And, meanwhile, I have that 2023 Article, where, in retrospect, I was quite rooted in the existing paradigm — which favors Apple and Amazon — and skeptical of Google’s ability and willingness to adapt.

    Today I feel differently. To go back to the smartphone paradigm, the best way to have analyzed what would happen to the market would have been to assume that the winners of the previous paradigm would be fundamentally handicapped in the new one, not despite their previous success, but because of it. Nokia and Microsoft pursued the wrong strategies because they thought they had advantages that ultimately didn’t matter in the face of a new paradigm.

    If I take that same analytical approach to AI, and assume that the winners of the previous paradigm will be fundamentally handicapped in the new one, not despite their previous success, but because of it, then I ought to have been alarmed about Apple and Amazon’s prospects from the get-go. I’m not, for the record, ready to declare either of them doomed; I am, however, much more alert to the prospect of them making wrong choices for years, the consequences of which won’t be clear until it’s too late.

    And, by the same token, I’m much more appreciative of Google’s amorphous nature and seeming lack of strategy. That makes them hard to analyze — again, I’ve been honest for years about the challenges I find in understanding Mountain View — but the company successfully navigated one paradigm shift, and is doing much better than I originally expected with this one. Larry Page and Sergey Brin famously weren’t particularly interested in business or in running a company; they just wanted to do cool things with computers in a college-like environment like they had at Stanford. That the company, nearly thirty years later, is still doing cool things with computers in a college-like environment may be maddening to analysts like me who want clarity and efficiency; it also may be the key to not just surviving but winning across multiple paradigms.



    Get notified about new Articles


  • Content and Community

    Listen to this post:

    One of the oldest and most fruitful topics on Stratechery has been the evolution of the content industry, for two reasons: first, it undergirded the very existence of Stratechery itself, which I’ve long viewed not simply as a publication but also as a model for a (then) new content business model.

    Second, I have long thought that what happened to content was a harbinger for what would happen to industries of all types. Content was trivially digitized, which means the forces of digital — particularly zero marginal cost reproduction and distribution — manifested in content industries first, but were by no means limited to them. That meant that if you could understand how the Internet impacted publishing — newspapers, books, magazines, music, movies, etc. — you might have a template for what would happen to other industries as they themselves digitized.

    AI is the apotheosis of this story and, in retrospect, it’s a story the development of which stretches back not just to the creation of the Internet, but hundreds of years prior and the invention of the printing press. Or, if you really want to get crazy, to the evolution of humanity itself.

    The AI Unbundling and Content Commoditization

    In September 2022, two months before the release of ChatGPT, I wrote about The AI Unbundling, and traced the history of communication to those ancient times:

    As much as newspapers may rue the Internet, their own business model — and my paper delivery job — were based on an invention that I believe is the only rival for the Internet’s ultimate impact: the printing press. Those two inventions, though, are only two pieces of the idea propagation value chain. That value chain has five parts:

    The five parts of the idea propagation value chain: creation, substantiation, duplication, distribution, consumption

    The evolution of human communication has been about removing whatever bottleneck is in this value chain. Before humans could write, information could only be conveyed orally; that meant that the creation, vocalization, delivery, and consumption of an idea were all one-and-the-same. Writing, though, unbundled consumption, increasing the number of people who could consume an idea.

    Writing unbundled consumption from the rest of the value chain

    Now the new bottleneck was duplication: to reach more people whatever was written had to be painstakingly duplicated by hand, which dramatically limited what ideas were recorded and preserved. The printing press removed this bottleneck, dramatically increasing the number of ideas that could be economically distributed:

    The new bottleneck was distribution, which is to say this was the new place to make money; thus the aforementioned profitability of newspapers. That bottleneck, though, was removed by the Internet, which made distribution free and available to anyone.

    The Internet unbundled distribution from duplication

    What remains is one final bundle: the creation and substantiation of an idea. To use myself as an example, I have plenty of ideas, and thanks to the Internet, the ability to distribute them around the globe; however, I still need to write them down, just as an artist needs to create an image, or a musician needs to write a song. What is becoming increasingly clear, though, is that this too is a bottleneck that is on the verge of being removed.

    It’s a testament to how rapidly AI has evolved that this observation already feels trite; while I have no idea how to verify these numbers, it seems likely that AI has substantiated more content in the last three years than was substantiated by all of humanity in all of history previously. We have, in other words, reached total content commoditization: the chatbot of your choice will substantiate any content you want on command.

    Copyright and Transformation

    Many publishers are, as you might expect, up in arms about this reality, and have pinned their hopes for survival on the courts and copyright law. After all, the foundation for all of that new content is the content that came before — content that was created by humans.

    The fundamental problem for publishers, however, is that all of this new content is, at least in terms of a textual examination of output, new; in other words, AI companies are soundly winning the first factor of the fair use test, which is whether or not their output is transformative. Judge William Alsup wrote in a lawsuit against Anthropic:

    The purpose and character of using copyrighted works to train LLMs to generate new text was quintessentially transformative. Like any reader aspiring to be a writer, Anthropic’s LLMs trained upon works not to race ahead and replicate or supplant them — but to turn a hard corner and create something different. If this training process reasonably required making copies within the LLM or otherwise, those copies were engaged in a transformative use. The first factor favors fair use for the training copies.

    Judge Vince Chabria wrote a day later in a lawsuit against Meta:

    There is no serious question that Meta’s use of the plaintiffs’ books had a “further purpose” and “different character” than the books — that it was highly transformative. The purpose of Meta’s copying was to train its LLMs, which are innovative tools that can be used to generate diverse text and perform a wide range of functions. Users can ask Llama to edit an email they have written, translate an excerpt from or into a foreign language, write a skit based on a hypothetical scenario, or do any number of other tasks. The purpose of the plaintiffs’ books, by contrast, is to be read for entertainment or education.

    The two judges differed in their view of the fourth factor — the impact that LLMs would have on the market for the copyright holders — but ultimately came to the same conclusion: Judge Alsup said that the purpose of copyright law wasn’t to protect authors from competition for new content, while Judge Chabria said that the authors hadn’t produced evidence of harm.

    In fact, I think that both are making the same point (see my earlier analysis here and here): Judge Chabria clearly wished that he could rule in favor of the authors, but to do so would require proving a negative — sales that didn’t happen because would-be customers used LLMs instead. That’s something that seems impossible to ascertain, which gives credence to Judge Alsup’s more simplistic analogy of an LLM to a human author who learned from the books they read. Yes, AI is of such a different scale as to be another category entirely, but given the un-traceability of sales that didn’t happen, the analogy holds for legal purposes.

    Publishing’s Three Eras

    Still, just because it is impossible to trace specific harm, doesn’t mean harm doesn’t exist. Look no further than the aforementioned history of publishing. To briefly compress hundreds of years of history into three periods:

    Printing Presses and Nation States

    From The Internet and the Third Estate:

    In the Middle Ages the principal organizing entity for Europe was the Catholic Church. Relatedly, the Catholic Church also held a de facto monopoly on the distribution of information: most books were in Latin, copied laboriously by hand by monks. There was some degree of ethnic affinity between various members of the nobility and the commoners on their lands, but underneath the umbrella of the Catholic Church were primarily independent city-states.

    The printing press changed all of this. Suddenly Martin Luther, whose critique of the Catholic Church was strikingly similar to Jan Hus 100 years earlier, was not limited to spreading his beliefs to his local area (Prague in the case of Hus), but could rather see those beliefs spread throughout Europe; the nobility seized the opportunity to interpret the Bible in a way that suited their local interests, gradually shaking off the control of the Catholic Church.

    Meanwhile, the economics of printing books was fundamentally different from the economics of copying by hand. The latter was purely an operational expense: output was strictly determined by the input of labor. The former, though, was mostly a capital expense: first, to construct the printing press, and second, to set the type for a book. The best way to pay for these significant up-front expenses was to produce as many copies of a particular book that could be sold.

    How, then, to maximize the number of copies that could be sold? The answer was to print using the most widely used dialect of a particular language, which in turn incentivized people to adopt that dialect, standardizing language across Europe. That, by extension, deepened the affinities between city-states with shared languages, particularly over decades as a shared culture developed around books and later newspapers. This consolidation occurred at varying rates — England and France several hundred years before Germany and Italy — but in nearly every case the First Estate became not the clergy of the Catholic Church but a national monarch, even as the monarch gave up power to a new kind of meritocratic nobility epitomized by Burke.

    The printing press created culture, which itself became the common substrate for nation-states.

    Copyright and Franchises

    It was nation-states, meanwhile, that made publishing into an incredible money-maker. The most important event in common-law countries was The Statute of Anne in 1710. For the first time the Parliament of Great Britain established the concept of copyright, vested in authors for a limited period of time (14 years, with the possibility of a 14 year renewal); the goal, clearly stated in the preamble, was to incentivize creation:

    Whereas printers, booksellers, and other persons have of late frequently taken the liberty of printing, reprinting, and publishing, or causing to be printed, reprinted, and published, books and other writings, without the consent of the authors or proprietors of such books and writings, to their very great detriment, and too often to the ruin of them and their families: for preventing therefore such practices for the future, and for the encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful books; may it please your Majesty, that it may be enacted, and be it enacted by the Queen’s most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same…

    A quarter of a century later America’s founding fathers would, for similar motivations, and in line with the English tradition that undergirded the United States, put copyright in the Constitution:

    [The Congress shall have power] To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.

    These are noble goals; at the same time, it’s important to keep in mind that copyright is an economic distortion, because it is a government-granted monopoly. That, by extension, meant that there was a lot of money to be made in publishing if you could leverage these monopoly rights to your advantage. To focus on the U.S.:

    • The mid-1800s, led by Benjamin Day and James Gordon Bennett Sr., saw the rise of advertising as a funding source of newspapers, which dramatically decreased the price of an individual copy, expanding reach, which attracted more advertisers.
    • The turn of the century brought nationwide scale to bear, as entrepreneurs like Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst built out nation-wide publishing empires with scaled advertising and reporting.
    • In the mid-20th century Henry Luce and Condé Montrose Nast created and perfected the magazine model, which combined scale on the back-end with segmentation and targeting on the front-end.

    The success of these publishing empires was, in contrast to the first era of publishing, downstream from the existence of nation-states: the fact that the U.S. was a massive market created the conditions for publishing’s golden era and companies that were franchises. That’s Warren Buffett’s term, from a 1991 letter to shareholders:

    An economic franchise arises from a product or service that: (1) is needed or desired; (2) is thought by its customers to have no close substitute and; (3) is not subject to price regulation. The existence of all three conditions will be demonstrated by a company’s ability to regularly price its product or service aggressively and thereby to earn high rates of return on capital. Moreover, franchises can tolerate mis-management. Inept managers may diminish a franchise’s profitability, but they cannot inflict mortal damage.

    In contrast, “a business” earns exceptional profits only if it is the low-cost operator or if supply of its product or service is tight. Tightness in supply usually does not last long. With superior management, a company may maintain its status as a low-cost operator for a much longer time, but even then unceasingly faces the possibility of competitive attack. And a business, unlike a franchise, can be killed by poor management.

    Until recently, media properties possessed the three characteristics of a franchise and consequently could both price aggressively and be managed loosely. Now, however, consumers looking for information and entertainment (their primary interest being the latter) enjoy greatly broadened choices as to where to find them. Unfortunately, demand can’t expand in response to this new supply: 500 million American eyeballs and a 24-hour day are all that’s available. The result is that competition has intensified, markets have fragmented, and the media industry has lost some — though far from all — of its franchise strength.

    Given that Buffett wrote this in 1991, he was far more prescient than he probably realized, because the Internet was about to destroy the whole model.

    The Internet and Aggregators

    The great revelation of the Internet is that copyright wasn’t the only monopoly that mattered to publishers: newspapers in particular benefited from being de facto geographic monopolies as well. The largest newspaper in a particular geographic area attracted the most advertisers, which gave them the most resources to have the best content, further cementing their advantages and the leverage they had on their fixed costs (printing presses, delivery, and reporters). I explained what happened next in 2014’s Economic Power in the Age of Abundance:

    One of the great paradoxes for newspapers today is that their financial prospects are inversely correlated to their addressable market. Even as advertising revenues have fallen off a cliff — adjusted for inflation, ad revenues are at the same level as the 1950s — newspapers are able to reach audiences not just in their hometowns but literally all over the world.

    A drawing of The Internet has Created Unlimited Reach

    The problem for publishers, though, is that the free distribution provided by the Internet is not an exclusive. It’s available to every other newspaper as well. Moreover, it’s also available to publishers of any type, even bloggers like myself.

    A city view of Stratechery's readers in 2014

    To be clear, this is absolutely a boon, particularly for readers, but also for any writer looking to have a broad impact. For your typical newspaper, though, the competitive environment is diametrically opposed to what they are used to: instead of there being a scarce amount of published material, there is an overwhelming abundance. More importantly, this shift in the competitive environment has fundamentally changed just who has economic power.

    In a world defined by scarcity, those who control the scarce resources have the power to set the price for access to those resources. In the case of newspapers, the scarce resource was reader’s attention, and the purchasers were advertiser…The Internet, though, is a world of abundance, and there is a new power that matters: the ability to make sense of that abundance, to index it, to find needles in the proverbial haystack. And that power is held by Google.

    Google was an Aggregator, and publishers — at least those who users visited via a search results page — were a commodity; it was inevitable that money from advertisers in particular would increasingly flow to the former at the expense of the latter.

    There were copyright cases against Google, most notably 2006’s Field v. Google, which held that Google’s usage of snippets of the plaintiff’s content was fair use, and furthermore, that Blake Fields, the author, had implicitly given Google a license to cache his content by not specifying that Google not crawl his website.

    The crucial point to make about this case, however, and Google’s role on the Internet generally, is that Google posting a snippet of content was good for publishers, at least compared to the AI alternative.

    Cloudflare and the AI Content Market

    Go back to the two copyright rulings I referenced above: both judges emphasized that the LLMs in question (Claude and Llama) were not reproducing the copyrighted content they were accused of infringing; rather, they were generating novel new content by predicting tokens. Here’s Judge Alsup on how Anthropic used copyrighted work:

    Each cleaned copy was translated into a “tokenized” copy. Some words were “stemmed” or “lemmatized” into simpler forms (e.g., “studying” to “study”). And, all characters were grouped into short sequences and translated into corresponding number sequences or “tokens” according to an Anthropic-made dictionary. The resulting tokenized copies were then copied repeatedly during training. By one account, this process involved the iterative, trial-and-error discovery of contingent statistical relationships between each word fragment and all other word fragments both within any work and across trillions of word fragments from other copied books, copied websites, and the like.

    Judge Chabria explained how these tokens contribute to the final output:

    LLMs learn to understand language by analyzing relationships among words and punctuation marks in their training data. The units of text — words and punctuation marks — on which LLMs are trained are often referred to as “tokens.” LLMs are trained on an immense amount of text and thereby learn an immense amount about the statistical relationships among words. Based on what they learned from their training data, LLMs can create new text by predicting what words are most likely to come next in sequences. This allows them to generate text responses to basically any user prompt.

    This isn’t just commoditization: it’s deconstruction. To put it another way, publishers were better off when an entity like Google was copying their text; Google summarizing information — which is what happens with LLM-powered AI Search Overviews — is much worse, even if it’s even less of a copyright violation.

    This was a point made to me by Cloudflare CEO Matthew Prince in a conversation we had after I wrote last week about the company’s audacious decision to block AI crawlers on Cloudflare-protected sites by default. What the company is proposing to build is a new model of monetization for publishers; Prince wrote in a blog post:

    We’ll work on a marketplace where content creators and AI companies, large and small, can come together. Traffic was always a poor proxy for value. We think we can do better. Let me explain. Imagine an AI engine like a block of swiss cheese. New, original content that fills one of the holes in the AI engine’s block of cheese is more valuable than repetitive, low-value content that unfortunately dominates much of the web today. We believe that if we can begin to score and value content not on how much traffic it generates, but on how much it furthers knowledge — measured by how much it fills the current holes in AI engines “swiss cheese” — we not only will help AI engines get better faster, but also potentially facilitate a new golden age of high-value content creation. We don’t know all the answers yet, but we’re working with some of the leading economists and computer scientists to figure them out.

    Cloudflare is calling its initial idea pay per crawl:

    Pay per crawl, in private beta, is our first experiment in this area. Pay per crawl integrates with existing web infrastructure, leveraging HTTP status codes and established authentication mechanisms to create a framework for paid content access. Each time an AI crawler requests content, they either present payment intent via request headers for successful access (HTTP response code 200), or receive a 402 Payment Required response with pricing. Cloudflare acts as the Merchant of Record for pay per crawl and also provides the underlying technical infrastructure…

    At its core, pay per crawl begins a technical shift in how content is controlled online. By providing creators with a robust, programmatic mechanism for valuing and controlling their digital assets, we empower them to continue creating the rich, diverse content that makes the Internet invaluable…The true potential of pay per crawl may emerge in an agentic world. What if an agentic paywall could operate entirely programmatically? Imagine asking your favorite deep research program to help you synthesize the latest cancer research or a legal brief, or just help you find the best restaurant in Soho — and then giving that agent a budget to spend to acquire the best and most relevant content. By anchoring our first solution on HTTP response code 402, we enable a future where intelligent agents can programmatically negotiate access to digital resources.

    I think there is value in Cloudflare’s efforts, which are very much inline with what I proposed in May’s The Agentic Web and Original Sin:

    What is possible — not probable, but at least possible — is to in the long run build an entirely new marketplace for content that results in a new win-win-win equilibrium.

    A drawing of A New AI Content Marketplace

    First, the protocol layer should have a mechanism for payments via digital currency, i.e. stablecoins. Second, AI providers like ChatGPT should build an auction mechanism that pays out content sources based on the frequency with which they are cited in AI answers. The result would be a new universe of creators who will be incentivized to produce high quality content that is more likely to be useful to AI, competing in a marketplace a la the open web; indeed, this would be the new open web, but one that operates at even greater scale than the current web given the fact that human attention is a scarce resource, while the number of potential agents is infinite.

    I do think that there is a market to be made in producing content for AI; it seems likely to me, however, that this market will not save existing publishers. Rather, just as Google created an entirely new class of content sites, Amazon and Meta an entirely new class of e-commerce merchants, and Apple and Meta an entirely new class of app builders, AI will create an entirely new class of token creators who explicitly produce content for LLMs. Existing publishers will participate in this market, but won’t be central to it.

    Consider Meta’s market-making as an example. From 2020’s Apple and Facebook:

    This explains why the news about large CPG companies boycotting Facebook is, from a financial perspective, simply not a big deal. Unilever’s $11.8 million in U.S. ad spend, to take one example, is replaced with the same automated efficiency that Facebook’s timeline ensures you never run out of content. Moreover, while Facebook loses some top-line revenue — in an auction-based system, less demand corresponds to lower prices — the companies that are the most likely to take advantage of those lower prices are those that would not exist without Facebook, like the direct-to-consumer companies trying to steal customers from massive conglomerates like Unilever.

    In this way Facebook has a degree of anti-fragility that even Google lacks: so much of its business comes from the long tail of Internet-native companies that are built around Facebook from first principles, that any disruption to traditional advertisers — like the coronavirus crisis or the current boycotts — actually serves to strengthen the Facebook ecosystem at the expense of the TV-centric ecosystem of which these CPG companies are a part.

    In short, Meta advertising made Meta advertisers; along those lines, the extent to which Cloudflare or anyone else manages to create a market for AI content is the extent to which I expect new companies to dominate that market; existing publishers will be too encumbered by their existing audiences and business models — decrepit though it may be — to effectively compete with these new entrants.

    Content-Based Communities

    So, are existing publishers doomed?

    Well, by-and-large yes, but that’s because they have been doomed for a long time. People using AI instead of Google — or Google using AI to provide answers above links — make the long-term outlook for advertising-based publishers worse, but that’s an acceleration of a demise that has been in motion for a long time.

    To that end, the answer for publishers in the age of AI is no different than it was in the age of Aggregators: build a direct connection with readers. This, by extension, means business models that maximize revenue per user, which is to say subscriptions (the business model that undergirds this site, and an increasing number of others).

    What I think is intriguing, however, is the possibility to go back to the future. Once upon a time publishing made countries; the new opportunity for publishing is to make communities. This is something that AI, particularly as it manifests today, is fundamentally unsuited to: all of that content generated by LLMs is individualized; what you ask, and what the AI answers, is distinct from what I ask, and what answers I receive. This is great for getting things done, but it’s useless for creating common ground.

    Stratechery, on the other hand, along with a host of other successful publications, has the potential to be a totem pole around which communities can form. Here is how Wikipedia defines a totem pole:

    The word totem derives from the Algonquian word odoodem [oˈtuːtɛm] meaning “(his) kinship group”. The carvings may symbolize or commemorate ancestors, cultural beliefs that recount familiar legends, clan lineages, or notable events. The poles may also serve as functional architectural features, welcome signs for village visitors, mortuary vessels for the remains of deceased ancestors, or as a means to publicly ridicule someone. They may embody a historical narrative of significance to the people carving and installing the pole. Given the complexity and symbolic meanings of these various carvings, their placement and importance lies in the observer’s knowledge and connection to the meanings of the figures and the culture in which they are embedded. Contrary to common misconception, they are not worshipped or the subject of spiritual practice.

    The digital environment, thanks in part to the economics of targeted advertising, the drive for engagement, and most recently, the mechanisms of token prediction, is customized to the individual; as LLMs consume everything, including advertising-based media — which, by definition, is meant to be mass market — the hunger for something shared is going to increase.

    We already have a great example of this sort of shared experience in sports. Sports, for most people, is itself a form of content: I don’t play football or baseball or basketball or drive an F1 car, but I relish the fact that people around me watch the same games and races that I do, and that that shared experience gives me a reason to congregate and commune with others, and is an ongoing topic of discussion.

    Indeed, this desire for a communal topic of interest is probably a factor in the inescapable reach of politics, particularly what happens in Washington D.C.: of course policies matter, but there is an aspect of politics’ prominence that I suspect is downstream of politics as entertainment, and a sorting mechanism for community.

    In short, there is a need for community, and I think content, whether it be an essay, a podcast, or a video, can be artifacts around which communities can form and sustain themselves, ultimately to the economic benefit of the content creator. There is, admittedly, a lot to figure out in terms of that last piece, but when you remember that content made countries, the potential upside is likely quite large indeed.



    Get notified about new Articles


  • Tech Philosophy and AI Opportunity

    Listen to this post:

    One of the most paradoxical aspects of AI is that while it is hailed as the route to abundance, the most important financial outcomes have been about scarcity. The first and most obvious example has been Nvidia, whose valuation has skyrocketed while demand for its chips continues to outpace supply:

    Another scarce resource that has come to the forefront over the last few months is AI talent; the people who are actually building and scaling the models are suddenly being paid more than professional athletes, and it makes sense:

    • The potential financial upside from “winning” in AI are enormous
    • Outputs are somewhat measurable
    • The work-to-be-done is the same across the various companies bidding for talent

    It’s that last point that is fairly unique in tech history. While great programmers have always been in high demand, and there have been periods of intense competition in specific product spaces, over the past few decades tech companies have been franchises, wherein their market niches have been fairly differentiated: Google and search, Amazon and e-commerce, Meta and social media, Microsoft and business applications, Apple and devices, etc. This reality meant that the company mattered more than any one person, putting a cap on individual contributor salaries.

    AI, at least to this point, is different: in the long run it seems likely that there will be dominant product companies in various niches, but as long as the game is foundational models, then everyone is in fact playing the same game, which elevates the bargaining power of the best players. It follows, then, that the team they play for is the team that pays the most, through some combination of money and mission; by extension, the teams that are destined to lose are the ones who can’t or won’t offer enough of either.

    Apple’s Reluctance

    It’s that last point I’m interested in; I’m not in position to judge the value of any of the players changing teams, but the teams are worth examining. Consider Meta and Apple and the latest free agent signing; from Bloomberg:

    Apple Inc.’s top executive in charge of artificial intelligence models is leaving for Meta Platforms Inc., another setback in the iPhone maker’s struggling AI efforts. Ruoming Pang, a distinguished engineer and manager in charge of the company’s Apple foundation models team, is departing, according to people with knowledge of the matter. Pang, who joined Apple from Alphabet Inc. in 2021, is the latest big hire for Meta’s new superintelligence group, said the people, who declined to be named discussing unannounced personnel moves.

    To secure Pang, Meta offered a package worth tens of millions of dollars per year, the people said. Meta Chief Executive Officer Mark Zuckerberg has been on a hiring spree, bringing on major AI leaders including Scale AI’s Alexandr Wang, startup founder Daniel Gross and former GitHub CEO Nat Friedman with high compensation. Meta has also hired Yuanzhi Li, a researcher from OpenAI, and Anton Bakhtin, who worked on Claude at Anthropic PBC, according to other people with knowledge of the matter. Last month, it hired a slew of other OpenAI researchers. Meta, later on Monday, confirmed it is hiring Pang. Apple, Pang, OpenAI and Anthropic didn’t respond to requests for comment.

    That Apple is losing AI researchers is a surprise only in that they had researchers worth hiring; after all, this is the company who already implicitly signaled its AI reluctance in terms of that other scarce resource: Nvidia chips. Again from Bloomberg:

    Former Chief Financial Officer Luca Maestri’s conservative stance on buying GPUs, the specialized circuits essential to AI, hasn’t aged well either. Under Cook, Apple has used its market dominance and cash hoard to shape global supply chains for everything from semiconductors to the glass for smartphone screens. But demand for GPUs ended up overwhelming supply, and the company’s decision to buy them slowly — which was in line with its usual practice for emerging technologies it isn’t fully sold on — ended up backfiring. Apple watched as rivals such as Amazon and Microsoft Corp. bought much of the world’s supply. Fewer GPUs meant Apple’s AI models were trained all the more slowly. “You can’t magically summon up more GPUs when the competitors have already snapped them all up,” says someone on the AI team.

    It may seem puzzling that the company that in its 2024 fiscal year generated $118 billion in free cash flow would be so cheap, but Apple’s reluctance makes sense from two perspectives.

    First, the potential impact of AI on Apple’s business prospects, at least in the short term, are fairly small: we still need devices on which to access AI, and Apple continues to own the high end of devices (there is, of course, long-term concern about AI obviating the need for a smartphone, or meaningfully differentiating an alternative platform like Android). That significantly reduces the financial motivation for Apple to outspend other companies in terms of both GPUs and researchers.

    Second, AI, at least some of the more fantastical visions painted by companies like Anthropic, is arguably counter to Apple’s entire ethos as a company.

    Tech’s Two Philosophies

    It was AI, at least the pre-LLM version of it, that inspired me in 2018 to write about Tech’s Two Philosophies; one was represented by Google and Facebook (now Meta):

    In Google’s view, computers help you get things done — and save you time — by doing things for you. Duplex was the most impressive example — a computer talking on the phone for you — but the general concept applied to many of Google’s other demonstrations, particularly those predicated on AI: Google Photos will not only sort and tag your photos, but now propose specific edits; Google News will find your news for you, and Maps will find you new restaurants and shops in your neighborhood. And, appropriately enough, the keynote closed with a presentation from Waymo, which will drive you…

    Zuckerberg, as so often seems to be the case with Facebook, comes across as a somewhat more fervent and definitely more creepy version of Google: not only does Facebook want to do things for you, it wants to do things its chief executive explicitly says would not be done otherwise. The Messianic fervor that seems to have overtaken Zuckerberg in the last year, though, simply means that Facebook has adopted a more extreme version of the same philosophy that guides Google: computers doing things for people.

    The other philosophy was represented by Apple and Microsoft:

    Earlier this week, while delivering Microsoft’s Build conference keynote, CEO Satya Nadella struck a very different tone…This is technology’s second philosophy, and it is orthogonal to the other: the expectation is not that the computer does your work for you, but rather that the computer enables you to do your work better and more efficiently. And, with this philosophy, comes a different take on responsibility. Pichai, in the opening of Google’s keynote, acknowledged that “we feel a deep sense of responsibility to get this right”, but inherent in that statement is the centrality of Google generally and the direct culpability of its managers. Nadella, on the other hand, insists that responsibility lies with the tech industry collectively, and all of us who seek to leverage it individually.

    This second philosophy, that computers are an aid to humans, not their replacement, is the older of the two; its greatest proponent — prophet, if you will — was Microsoft’s greatest rival, and his analogy of choice was, coincidentally enough, about transportation as well. Not a car, but a bicycle:

    I remember reading an article when I was about 12 years old, I think it might have been in Scientific American, where they measured the efficiency of locomotion for all these species on planet earth, how many kilocalories did they expand to get from point A to point B, and the condor came in the top of the list, surpassed everything else, and humans came in about a third of the way down the list, which was not such a great showing for the crown of creation.

    But somebody there had the imagination to test the efficiency of a human riding a bicycle, and a human riding a bicycle blew away the condor all the way off the top of the list. And it made a really big impression on me that we humans are tool builders, and that we can fashion tools that amplify these inherent abilities that we have to spectacular magnitudes. And so for me a computer has always been a bicycle of the mind, something that takes us far beyond our inherent abilities. I think we’re just at the early stages of this tool, very early stages, and we’ve come only a very short distance, and it’s still in its formation, but already we’ve seen enormous changes. I think that’s nothing compared to what’s coming in the next 100 years.

    We are approximately forty years on from that clip, and Steve Jobs’ prediction that enormous changes were still to come is obviously prescient: mobile and the Internet have completely transformed the world, and AI is poised to make those impacts look like peanuts. What I’m interested in in the context of this Article, however, is the interplay between business opportunity — or risk — and philosophy. Apple’s position is here:

    In this view the company’s conservatism makes sense: Apple doesn’t quite see the upside of AI for their business (and isn’t overly concerned about the downsides), and its bias towards tools means that AI apps on iPhones are sufficient; Apple might be an increasingly frustrating platform steward, but they are at their core a platform company, and apps on their platform are delivering Apple users AI tools.

    This same framework also explains Meta’s aggressiveness. First, the opportunity is huge, as I documented last fall in Meta’s AI Abundance (and, for good measure, there is risk as well, as time — the ultimate scarcity for an advertising-based business — is spent using AI). Second, Meta’s philosophy is that computers do things for you:

    Given this graph, is it any surprise that Meta hired away Apple’s top AI talent?

    I’m Feeling Lucky

    Another way to think about how companies are approaching AI is through the late Professor Clayton Christensen’s discussion around sustaining versus disruptive innovation. From an Update last month after the news of Meta’s hiring spree first started making waves:

    The other reason to believe in Meta versus Google comes down to the difference between disruptive and sustaining innovations. The late Professor Clayton Christensen described the difference in The Innovator’s Dilemma:

    Most new technologies foster improved product performance. I call these sustaining technologies. Some sustaining technologies can be discontinuous or radical in character, while others are of an incremental nature. What all sustaining technologies have in common is that they improve the performance of established products, along the dimensions of performance that mainstream customers in major markets have historically valued. Most technological advances in a given industry are sustaining in character. An important finding revealed in this book is that rarely have even the most radically difficult sustaining technologies precipitated the failure of leading firms.

    Occasionally, however, disruptive technologies emerge: innovations that result in worse product performance, at least in the near-term. Ironically, in each of the instances studied in this book, it was disruptive technology that precipitated the leading firms’ failure. Disruptive technologies bring to a market a very different value proposition than had been available previously. Generally, disruptive technologies underperform established products in mainstream markets. But they have other features that a few fringe (and generally new) customers value. Products based on disruptive technologies are typically cheaper, simpler, smaller, and, frequently, more convenient to use.

    The question of whether generative AI is a sustaining or disruptive innovation for Google remains uncertain two years after I raised it. Obviously Google has tremendous AI capabilities both in terms of infrastructure and research, and generative AI is a sustaining innovation for its display advertising business and its cloud business; at the same time, the long-term questions around search monetization remain as pertinent as ever.

    Meta, however, does not have a search business to potentially disrupt, and a whole host of ways to leverage generative AI across its business; for Zuckerberg and company I think that AI is absolutely a sustaining technology, which is why it ultimately makes sense to spend whatever is necessary to get the company moving in the right direction.

    The problem with this analysis is the Google part: how do you square the idea that AI is disruptive to Google with the fact that they are investing just has heavily as everyone else, and in fact started far earlier than everyone else? I think the answer goes back to Google’s founding, and the “I’m Feeling Lucky” button:

    While that button is now gone from Google.com, I don’t think it was an accident that it persisted long after it was even usable (instant search results meant that by 2010 you didn’t even have a chance to click it); “I’m Feeling Lucky” was a statement of purpose. From 2016’s Google and the Limits of Strategy:

    In yesterday’s keynote, Google CEO Sundar Pichai, after a recounting of tech history that emphasized the PC-Web-Mobile epochs I described in late 2014, declared that we are moving from a mobile-first world to an AI-first one; that was the context for the introduction of the Google Assistant.

    It was a year prior to the aforementioned iOS 6 that Apple first introduced the idea of an assistant in the guise of Siri; for the first time you could (theoretically) compute by voice. It didn’t work very well at first (arguably it still doesn’t), but the implications for computing generally and Google specifically were profound: voice interaction both expanded where computing could be done, from situations in which you could devote your eyes and hands to your device to effectively everywhere, even as it constrained what you could do. An assistant has to be far more proactive than, for example, a search results page; it’s not enough to present possible answers: rather, an assistant needs to give the right answer.

    This is a welcome shift for Google the technology; from the beginning the search engine has included an “I’m Feeling Lucky” button, so confident was Google founder Larry Page that the search engine could deliver you the exact result you wanted, and while yesterday’s Google Assistant demos were canned, the results, particularly when it came to contextual awareness, were far more impressive than the other assistants on the market. More broadly, few dispute that Google is a clear leader when it comes to the artificial intelligence and machine learning that underlie their assistant.

    The problem — apparent even then — was the conflict with Google’s business model:

    A business, though, is about more than technology, and Google has two significant shortcomings when it comes to assistants in particular. First, as I explained after this year’s Google I/O, the company has a go-to-market gap: assistants are only useful if they are available, which in the case of hundreds of millions of iOS users means downloading and using a separate app (or building the sort of experience that, like Facebook, users will willingly spend extensive amounts of time in).

    Secondly, though, Google has a business-model problem: the “I’m Feeling Lucky” button guaranteed that the search in question would not make Google any money. After all, if a user doesn’t have to choose from search results, said user also doesn’t have the opportunity to click an ad, thus choosing the winner of the competition Google created between its advertisers for user attention. Google Assistant has the exact same problem: where do the ads go?

    What I articulated in that Article was Google’s position on this graph:

    AI is the ultimate manifestation of “I’m Feeling Lucky”; Google has been pursuing AI because that is why Page and Brin started the company in the first place; business models matter, but they aren’t dispositive, and while that may mean short-term difficulties for Google, it is a reason to be optimistic that the company will figure out AI anyways.

    Microsoft, OpenAI, and Anthropic

    Frameworks like this are useful, but not fully explanatory; I think this particular one goes a long way towards contextualizing the actions of Apple, Meta, and Google, but is much more speculative for some other relevant AI players. Consider Microsoft, which I would place here:

    Microsoft doesn’t have any foundational models of note, but has invested heavily in OpenAI; its most important AI product are its various Copilots, which are indeed a bet on the “tool” philosophy. The question, as I laid out last year in Enterprise Philosophy and the First Wave of AI, is whether rank-and-file employees want Microsoft’s tools:1

    Notice, though, how this aligned with the Apple and Microsoft philosophy of building tools: tools are meant to be used, but they take volition to maximize their utility. This, I think, is a challenge when it comes to Copilot usage: even before Copilot came out employees with initiative were figuring out how to use other AI tools to do their work more effectively. The idea of Copilot is that you can have an even better AI tool — thanks to the fact it has integrated the information in the “Microsoft Graph” — and make it widely available to your workforce to make that workforce more productive.

    To put it another way, the real challenge for Copilot is that it is a change management problem: it’s one thing to charge $30/month on a per-seat basis to make an amazing new way to work available to all of your employees; it’s another thing entirely — a much more difficult thing — to get all of your employees to change the way they work in order to benefit from your investment, and to make Copilot Pages the “new artifact for the AI age”, in line with the spreadsheet in the personal computer age.

    This tension explains the anecdotes in this Bloomberg article last month:

    OpenAI’s nascent strength in the enterprise market is giving its partner and biggest investor indigestion. Microsoft salespeople describe being caught flatfooted at a time when they’re under pressure to get Copilot into as many customers’ hands as possible. The behind-the-scenes dogfight is complicating an already fraught relationship between Microsoft and OpenAI…It’s unclear whether OpenAI’s momentum with corporations will continue, but the company recently said it has 3 million paying business users, a 50% jump from just a few months earlier. A Microsoft spokesperson said Copilot is used by 70% of the Fortune 500 and paid users have tripled compared with this time last year…

    This story is based on conversations with more than two dozen customers and salespeople, many of them Microsoft employees. Most of these people asked not to be named in order to speak candidly about the competition between Microsoft and OpenAI. Both companies are essentially pitching the same thing: AI assistants that can handle onerous tasks — researching and writing; analyzing data — potentially letting office workers focus on thornier challenges. Since both chatbots are largely based on the same OpenAI models, Microsoft’s salesforce has struggled to differentiate Copilot from the much better-known ChatGPT, according to people familiar with the situation.

    As long as AI usage relies on employee volition, ChatGPT has the advantage; what is interesting about this observation, however, is that it shows that OpenAI is actually in the same position as Microsoft:

    This, by extension, explains why Anthropic is different; the other leading independent foundational lab is clearly focused on agents, not chatbots, i.e. AI that does stuff for you, instead of a tool. Consider the contrast between Cursor and Claude Code: Cursor is an integrated development environment (IDE) that provides the best possible UI for AI-augmented programming; Claude Code, on the other hand, barely bothers with a UI at all. It runs in the terminal, which people put up with because it is the best at one-shotting outputs; this X thread was illuminating:

    More generally, I wrote in an Update after the release of Claude 4, which was heavily focused on agentic workloads:

    This, by extension, means that Anthropic’s goal is what I wrote about in last fall’s Enterprise Philosophy and the First Wave of AI:

    Computing didn’t start with the personal computer, but rather with the replacement of the back office. Or, to put it in rather more dire terms, the initial value in computing wasn’t created by helping Boomers do their job more efficiently, but rather by replacing entire swathes of them completely…Agents aren’t copilots; they are replacements. They do work in place of humans — think call centers and the like, to start — and they have all of the advantages of software: always available, and scalable up-and-down with demand…

    Benioff isn’t talking about making employees more productive, but rather companies; the verb that applies to employees is “augmented”, which sounds much nicer than “replaced”; the ultimate goal is stated as well: business results. That right there is tech’s third philosophy: improving the bottom line for large enterprises.

    Notice how well this framing applies to the mainframe wave of computing: accounting and ERP software made companies more productive and drove positive business results; the employees that were “augmented” were managers who got far more accurate reports much more quickly, while the employees who used to do that work were replaced. Critically, the decision about whether or not to make this change did not depend on rank-and-file employees changing how they worked, but for executives to decide to take the plunge.

    This strikes me as a very worthwhile goal, at least from a business perspective. OpenAI is busy owning the consumer space, while Google and its best-in-class infrastructure and leading models struggles with product; Anthropic’s task is to build the best agent product in the world, including not just state-of-the-art models but all of the deterministic computing scaffolding that actually makes them replacement-level workers. After all, Anthropic’s API pricing may look expensive relative to Google, but it looks very cheap relative to a human salary.

    That means that Anthropic shares the upper-right quadrant with Meta:

    Again, this is just one framework; there are others. Moreover, the boundaries are fuzzy. OpenAI is working on agentic workloads, for example, and the hyperscalers all benefit from more AI usage, whether user- or agent-driven; Google, meanwhile, is rapidly evolving Search to incorporate generative AI.

    At the same time, to go back to the talent question, I don’t think it’s a surprise that Meta appears to be picking off more researchers from OpenAI than from Anthropic: my suspicion is that to the extent mission is a motivator the more likely an AI researcher is to be enticed by the idea of computers doing everything, instead of merely augmenting humans. And, by extension, the incumbent tool-makers may have no choice but to partner with the true believers.



    1. Microsoft also faces potential negative outcomes if the per-seat licensing model becomes threatened by AI eliminating jobs 


    Get notified about new Articles


  • Checking In on AI and the Big Five

    Listen to this post:

    This is how I opened January 2023’s AI and the Big Five:

    The story of 2022 was the emergence of AI, first with image generation models, including DALL-E, MidJourney, and the open source Stable Diffusion, and then ChatGPT, the first text-generation model to break through in a major way. It seems clear to me that this is a new epoch in technology.

    Sometimes the accuracy of a statement is measured by its banality, and that certainly seems to be the case here: AI is the new epoch, consuming the mindshare of not just Stratechery but also the companies I cover. To that end, two-and-a-half years on, I thought it would be useful to revisit that 2023 analysis and re-evaluate the state of AI’s biggest players, primarily through the lens of the Big Five: Apple, Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon.

    The proximate cause for this reevaluation is the apparent five alarm fire that is happening at Meta: the company’s latest Llama 4 release was disappointing — and in at least one case, deceptive — pushing founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg to go on a major spending spree for talent. From The Wall Street Journal over the weekend:

    Mark Zuckerberg is spending his days firing off emails and WhatsApp messages to the sharpest minds in artificial intelligence in a frenzied effort to play catch-up. He has personally reached out to hundreds of researchers, scientists, infrastructure engineers, product stars and entrepreneurs to try to get them to join a new Superintelligence lab he’s putting together…And Meta’s chief executive isn’t just sending them cold emails. Zuckerberg is also offering hundreds of millions of dollars, sums of money that would make them some of the most expensive hires the tech industry has ever seen. In at least one case, he discussed buying a startup outright.

    While the financial incentives have been mouthwatering, some potential candidates have been hesitant to join Meta Platforms’ efforts because of the challenges that its AI efforts have faced this year, as well as a series of restructures that have left prospects uncertain about who is in charge of what, people familiar with their views said. Meta’s struggles to develop cutting-edge artificial-intelligence technology reached a head in April, when critics accused the company of gaming a leaderboard to make a recently released AI model look better than it was. They also delayed the unveiling of a new, flagship AI model, raising questions about the company’s ability to continue advancing quickly in an industrywide AI arms race…

    For those who have turned him down, Zuckerberg’s stated vision for his new AI superteam was also a concern. He has tasked the team, which will consist of about 50 people, with achieving tremendous advances with AI models, including reaching a point of “superintelligence.” Some found the concept vague or without a specific enough execution plan beyond the hiring blitz, the people said.

    That last paragraph complicates analysis generally. In my January 2023 Article I framed my evaluation through Professor Clay Christensen’s framework of sustaining versus disruptive innovation: was AI complementary to existing business models (i.e. Apple devices are better with AI) or disruptive to them (i.e. AI might be better than Search but monetize worse). A higher level question, however, is if AI simply obsoletes everything, from tech business models to all white collar work to work generally or even to life itself.

    Perhaps it is the smallness of my imagination or my appreciation of the human condition that makes me more optimistic than many about the probability of the most dire of predictions: I think they are quite low. At the same time, I think that those dismissing AI as nothing but hype are missing the boat as well. This is a big deal, even if the changes may end up fitting into the Bill Gates maxim that “We always overestimate the change that will occur in the next two years and underestimate the change that will occur in the next ten.”

    To that end, let’s go back two years to AI and the Big Five, and consider where we might be in eight.

    Apple

    Infrastructure: Minimal
    Model: None
    Partner: OpenAI?
    Data: No public data differentiation, potential private data differentiation
    Distribution: Apple devices
    Core Business: Devices are complementary to current AI use cases
    Scarcity Risk: Could lose differentiation in high-end hardware
    Disruptive/Sustaining: Sustaining
    New Business Potential: Robotics

    Apple has had a dramatic few years marked by the debacle that has been Apple Intelligence: the company has basic on-device LLM capabilities and its own private cloud compute infrastructure, but is nowhere near the cutting edge in terms of either models or products.

    The company’s saving grace, however, is that its core business is not immediately threatened by AI. OpenAI, Claude, etc. are, from a consumer perspective, apps that you use on your iPhone or in a browser; Cursor is an IDE you use on your Mac. Apple’s local LLMs, meanwhile, can potentially differentiate apps built for Apple platforms, and Apple has unique access to consumer data and, by extension, the means to build actually usable and scalable individual semantic indexes over which AI can operate.

    This positioning isn’t a panacea; in April’s Apple and the Ghosts of Companies Past, I analogized Apple’s current position to Microsoft and the Internet: everyone used the Internet on Windows PCs, but it was the Internet that created the conditions for the paradigm that would surpass the PC, which was mobile.

    What Microsoft did that Intel — another company I compared Apple to — did not, was respond to their mobile miss by accepting their loss, building a complementary business (cloud computing), which then positioned them for the AI paradigm. Apple should do something similar: I am very encouraged by the company’s deepening partnership with OpenAI in iOS 26, and the company should double-down on being the best hardware for what appears to be the dominant consumer AI company.

    The way this leads to a Microsoft-like future is by putting the company’s efforts towards building hardware beyond the phone. Yes, OpenAI has acqui-hired Jony Ive and his team of Apple operational geniuses, but Apple should take that as a challenge to provide OpenAI with better hardware and bigger scale than the horizontal services company can build on their own. That should mean a host of AI-powered devices beyond the phone, including the Apple Watch, HomePod, glasses, etc.; in the long run Apple should be heavily investing in robotics and home automation. There is still no one better at consumer hardware than Apple, both in terms of quality and also scalability, and they should double down on that capability.

    The biggest obstacle to this approach is Apple’s core conception of itself as an integrated hardware and software maker; the company’s hardware is traditionally differentiated by the fact it runs Apple’s own software, and, for many years, it was the software that sold the devices. In truth, however, Apple’s differentiation has been shifting from software to hardware for years now, and while Apple’s chips have the potential to offer the best local AI capabilities, those local capabilities will be that much more attractive if they are seamlessly augmented by state-of-the-art cloud AI capabilities.

    If Apple does feel the need to go it alone, then the company needs to make a major acquisition and commit to spending billions of dollars. The best option would be Mistral: the company has a lot of talent (including a large portion of the team that built Meta’s early and well-regarded Llama models), and its open source approach is complementary to Apple’s business. It’s unclear, however, if French and European authorities would allow the current jewel of the European startup ecosystem to be acquired by an American company; regardless, Apple needs to either commit to partnering — and the loss of control that entails — or commit to spending a lot more money than they have to date.

    Google

    Infrastructure: Best
    Model: Good
    Partner: None
    Data: Best
    Distribution: Android devices, Search, GCP
    Core Business: Chatbots are disruptive to Search
    Scarcity Risk: Data feedback loops diminished
    Disruptive/Sustaining: Disruptive
    New Business Potential: Cloud

    Google is in many respects the opposite of Apple: the search company’s last two years have gone better than I anticipated (while Apple’s have gone worse), but their fundamental position and concerns remain mostly unchanged (in Apple’s case, that’s a good thing; for Google it’s a concern).

    Google’s infrastructure is in many respects the best in the world, and by a significant margin. The company is fully integrated from chips to networking to models, and regularly points to that integration as the key to unlocking capabilities like Gemini’s industry-leading context window size; Gemini also has the most attractive pricing of any leading AI model. On the other hand, integration can have downsides: Google’s dependence on its own TPUs means that the company is competing with the Nvidia ecosystem up-and-down the stack; this is good for direct cost savings, but could be incurring hidden costs in terms of tooling and access to innovations.

    Gemini, meanwhile, has rapidly improved, and scores very highly in LLM evaluations. There is some question as to whether or not the various model permutations are over-indexed on those LLM valuations; real world usage of Gemini seems to significantly lag behind OpenAI and Anthropic’s respective models. Where Google is undoubtedly ahead is in adjacent areas like media generation; Veo in particular appears to have no peers when it comes to video generation.

    This speaks to what might be Google’s most important advantage: data. Veo can draw on YouTube video, the scale of which is hard to fathom. Google’s LLMs, meanwhile, benefit not only from Google’s leading position in terms of indexing the web, but also the fact that no website can afford to block Google’s crawler. Google has also spent years collecting other forms of data, like scanning books, archiving research papers, etc.

    Google also has distribution channels, particularly Android: the potential to deliver an integrated device and cloud AI experience is compelling, and is Android’s best chance yet to challenge Apple’s dominance of the high end. Delivering on that integration will be key, however: ChatGPT dominates consumer mindshare to-date, and, as I noted above, Apple can and should differentiate itself as the best devices for using ChatGPT; can Google make its devices better by controlling both the model and the operating system (and access to all of the individual consumer data that entails)? Or, to put it another way, can Google actually make a good product?

    The problem for Google, just as one could foresee two years ago (and even years before then), is the disruptive potential of AI for its core business of Search. The problem with having a near perfect business model — which is what Google had with Search ads where users picked the winner of an auction — is that there is nowhere to go but down. Given that, I think that Google has done well with its focus on AI Search Overviews to make Search better and, at least so far, maintain monetization rates; I also think the company’s development of the Search Funnel to systemically evolve search for AI is a smart approach to tilt AI from being disruptive to sustaining.

    What is much more promising is cloud computing, which is where Google’s infrastructure and model advantages (particularly in terms of pricing) can truly be brought to bear, without the overhand of needing to preserve revenue or reignite sclerotic product capabilities. Google Cloud Platform has been very focused on fitting into multi-cloud workflows, but the big potential in the long run is that Google’s AI capabilities act as gravity for an ever increasing share of enterprise cloud workflows generally.

    Meta

    Infrastructure: Good
    Model: OK
    Partner: None
    Data: Good
    Distribution: Meta apps, Quest devices
    Core Business: AI delivers more individualized content and ads
    Scarcity Risk: Attention diverted to chatbots
    Disruptive/Sustaining: Sustaining
    New Business Potential: Virtual worlds and generative UIs

    Meta’s positioning is somewhere between Apple and Google, but I’ve assumed it was closer to the former; the company may be scuffling more than expected in AI, but its core strategic positioning seems more solid: more individualized content slots into Meta’s distribution channels, and generative ads should enhance Meta’s offering for its long tail advertising base. Generative AI, meanwhile, is very likely the key to Meta realizing a return on its XR investments, both by creating metaverses for VR and UI for AR. I’m on the record as being extremely optimistic about Meta’s AI Abundance.

    There are risks, however. The scarce resource Meta competes for is attention, and LLMs are already consuming huge amounts of it and expanding all the time. There is an argument that this makes chatbots just as much of a problem for Meta as they are for Google: even if Meta gets lots of users using Meta AI, time spent using Meta AI is time not spent consuming formats that are better suited to monetization. The difference is that I think that Meta would do a better job of monetizing those new surfaces: there is no expectation of objectivity or reliability to maintain like there is with search; sometimes being a lowest common denominator interface is an asset.

    That noted, what does seem clear from Zuckerberg’s spending spree is that these risks are probably bigger than I appreciated. While Zuckerberg has demonstrated with the company’s Reality Labs division that he is willling to invest billions of dollars in an uncertain future, the seeming speed and desperation with these AI recruiting efforts strongly suggests that the company’s core business is threatened in ways I didn’t properly appreciate or foresee two years ago. In retrospect, however, that makes sense: the fact that there are so many upside scenarios for Meta with AI by definition means there is a lot of downside embedded in not getting AI right; the core business of a company like Apple, on the other hand, is sufficiently removed from AI that both its upside and downside are more limited, relatively speaking.

    What does concern me is the extent to which Meta seems to lack direction with AI; that was my biggest takeaway from my last interview with Zuckerberg. I felt like I had more ideas for how generative AI could impact the company’s business than Zuckerberg did (Zuckerberg’s comments on the company’s recent earnings call were clearly evolved based on our interview, which took place two days prior); that too fits with the current frenzy. Zuckerberg seems to have belatedly realized not only that the company’s models are falling behind, but that the overall AI effort needs new leadership and new product thinking; thus Alexandr Wang for knowledge on the state of the art, Nat Friedman for team management, and Daniel Gross for product. It’s not totally clear how this team will be organized or function, but what is notable — and impressive, frankly — is the extent to which Zuckerberg is implicitly admitting he has a problem. That’s the sort of humility and bias towards action that Apple could use.

    Microsoft

    Infrastructure: Very Good
    Model: None
    Partner: OpenAI
    Data: Good
    Distribution: Windows, Microsoft 365, Azure
    Core Business: AI drives Azure usage
    Scarcity Risk: Access to leading edge models
    Disruptive/Sustaining: Sustaining for Azure, potentially disruptive for Microsoft 365
    New Business Potential: Agents

    Microsoft’s position seemed unimpeachable in January 2023; this is the entirety of what wrote in AI and the Big Five:

    Microsoft, meanwhile, seems the best placed of all. Like AWS it has a cloud service that sells GPUs; it is also the exclusive cloud provider for OpenAI. Yes, that is incredibly expensive, but given that OpenAI appears to have the inside track to being the AI epoch’s addition to this list of top tech companies, that means that Microsoft is investing in the infrastructure of that epoch.

    Bing, meanwhile, is like the Mac on the eve of the iPhone: yes it contributes a fair bit of revenue, but a fraction of the dominant player, and a relatively immaterial amount in the context of Microsoft as a whole. If incorporating ChatGPT-like results into Bing risks the business model for the opportunity to gain massive market share, that is a bet well worth making.

    The latest report from The Information, meanwhile, is that GPT is eventually coming to Microsoft’s productivity apps. The trick will be to imitate the success of AI-coding tool GitHub Copilot (which is built on GPT), which figured out how to be a help instead of a nuisance (i.e. don’t be Clippy!).

    What is important is that adding on new functionality — perhaps for a fee — fits perfectly with Microsoft’s subscription business model. It is notable that the company once thought of as a poster child for victims of disruption will, in the full recounting, not just be born of disruption, but be well-placed to reach greater heights because of it.

    Microsoft is still well-positioned, but things are a bit more tenuous than what I wrote in that Article:

    • Microsoft’s relationship with OpenAI is increasingly frayed, most recently devolving into OpenAI threats of antitrust complaints if Microsoft doesn’t relinquish its rights to future profits and agree to OpenAI’s proposed for-profit restructuring. My read of the situation is that Microsoft still has most of the leverage in the relationship — thus the threats of government involvement — but only until 2030 when the current deal expires.
    • Bing provided the remarkable Sydney, which Microsoft promptly nerfed; relatedly, Bing appears to have gained little if any ground thanks to its incorporation of AI.
    • GitHub Copilot has been surpassed by startups like Cursor and dedicated offerings from foundation model makers, while the lack of usage and monetization numbers for Microsoft’s other Copilot products are perhaps telling in their absence.
    • The extent that AI replaces knowledge workers is the extent to which the Microsoft 365 franchise, like all subscription-as-a-service businesses, could be disrupted.

    What is critical — and why I am still bullish on Microsoft’s positioning — is the company’s infrastructure and distribution advantages. I already referenced the company’s pivot after missing mobile: the payoff to The End of Windows was that the company was positioned to capitalize on AI when the opportunity presented itself in a way that Intel was not. Microsoft also, by being relatively late, is the most Nvidia-centric of the hyperscalers; Google is deeply invested in TPUs (although they offer Nvidia instances), while Amazon’s infrastructure is optimized for commodity computing (and is doubling down with Trainium).

    Azure, meanwhile, is the exclusive non-OpenAI provider of OpenAI APIs, which not only keeps Microsoft enterprise customers on Azure, but is also a draw in their own right. To that end, I think that Microsoft’s priority in their negotiations with OpenAI should be on securing this advantage for Azure permanently, even if that means giving up many of their rights to OpenAI’s business as a whole.

    The other thing that Microsoft should do is deepen their relationship — and scale of investment — in alternative model providers. It was a good sign that xAI CEO Elon Musk appeared in a pre-recorded video at Microsoft Build; Microsoft should follow that up with an investment in helping ensure that xAI continues to pursue the leading edge of AI models. Microsoft has also made small-scale investments in Mistral and should consider helping fund Llama; these sorts of investments are expensive, but not having access to leading models — or risking total dependency on Sam Altman’s whims — would be even pricier.

    Amazon

    Infrastructure: Good
    Model: Poor
    Partner: Anthropic
    Data: Good
    Distribution: AWS, Alexa
    Core Business: AI drives AWS usage
    Scarcity Risk: Access to leading edge models, chip competitiveness
    Disruptive/Sustaining: Sustaining for AWS, long tail e-commerce recommendations potentially disruptive for Amazon.com
    New Business Potential: Agents, Affiliate revenue from AI recommendations on Amazon.com

    I’ve become much more optimistic about Amazon’s position over the last two years:

    • First, there is the fact that AI is not disruptive for any of Amazon’s businesses; if anything, they all benefit. Increased AWS usage is obvious, but also Amazon.com could be a huge beneficiary of customers using AI for product recommendations (on the other hand, AI could be more effective at finding and driving long tail e-commerce alternatives, or reducing the importance of Amazon.com advertising). AWS is also primarily monetized via usage, not seats; to the extent AWS-based seat-driven SaaS companies are disrupted is the extent to which AWS will probably earn more usage revenue from AI-based disruptors.
    • Second, AWS’s partnership with Anthropic also seems much more stable than Microsoft’s partnership with OpenAI. ChatGPT obviously drives a ton of Azure usage, but it’s also the core reason why OpenAI and Microsoft’s conflict was inevitable; Anthropic’s lack of a strong consumer play means it is much more tenable, if not downright attractive, for them to have a supplier-type of relationship with AWS, up-to-and-including building for AWS’s Trainium architecture. And, in the long run, even the upside Anthropic scenario, where they have a compelling agent enterprise business, is compatible with AWS, which acts as infrastructure for many successful platform companies.
    • Third, AWS’s early investment in Bedrock was an early bet on AI optionality; the company’s investment in Trainium provides similar benefits in terms of the future of AI chips. You could certainly make the case that Amazon was and is behind in terms of core model offerings and chip infrastructure; that exact same case could be spun as Amazon being the best placed to shift as the future AI landscape becomes clearer over time.

    AWS, meanwhile, remains the largest cloud provider by a significant margin, and, at the end of the day, enterprises would prefer to use the AI that is close to their existing data rather than to go through the trouble of a migration. And don’t forget about Alexa: there is, as I expected, precious little evidence of Alexa+ even being available, much less living up to its promise, but there is obviously more potential than ever in voice-controlled devices.

    The Model Makers

    The foundation model makers are obviously critical to AI; while this Article is focused on the Big Tech companies, it’s worth checking in on the status of the makers of the underlying technology:

    OpenAI: I have long viewed OpenAI as the accidental consumer tech company; I think this lens is critical to understanding much of the last two years. A lot of OpenAI’s internal upheaval, for example, may in part stem from conflict with CEO Sam Altman, but it’s also the fact that early OpenAI employees signed up for a science project, not to be the next Facebook.

    I do think that ChatGPT has won the consumer AI space, and is more likely to extend its dominance than to be supplanted. This, by extension, puts OpenAI fundamentally at conflict with any other entity that seeks to own the customer relationship, from Microsoft to Apple. Both companies, however, may have no choice but to make it work: Microsoft, because they’re already in too deep, and Apple, because OpenAI may, sooner rather than later, be the most compelling reason to buy the iPhone (if Apple continues to deepen its integration).

    The big question in my mind is when and if OpenAI figures out an advertising model to supplement its subscription business. While I — and most of you reading this — will gladly pay for AI’s productivity gains, the fact remains that huge swathes of the consumer space likely won’t, and owning that segment not only locks out rivals, but also gives a long-term advantage in terms of revenue and the ability to invest in future models.

    Anthropic: Anthropic may have missed out on the consumer space, but the company’s focus on coding has paid off in a very strong position with developers and a big API revenue stream. This is a riskier position in some respects, since developers and intermediaries like Cursor can easily switch to other models that might one day be better, but Anthropic is seeking to ameliorate that risk with products like Code that can not only be a business in its own right, but also generate critical data for improving the underlying model.

    Anthropic’s reliance on Amazon and its Trainium chips for training is potentially suboptimal; it also could mean meaningful cost savings in the long run. Most importantly, however, Amazon is now a deeply committed partner for Anthropic; as I noted above, this is likely a much stabler situation than Microsoft and OpenAI.

    Anthropic, unlike OpenAI, also benefits from its longer-term business opportunity being more aligned with the AGI dreams of its leading researchers: the latter might not create God, but if they manage to come up with an autonomous agent service along the way there will be a lot of money to be made.

    xAI: I wrote more about xAI’s tenuous position last week; briefly:

    • xAI’s insistence on owning its own infrastructure seems to me to be more of a liability than an asset. Yes, Elon Musk can move more quickly on his own, but spending a lot of money on capital expenditures that aren’t fully utilized because of a lack of customers is an excellent way to lose astronomical amounts of money.
    • xAI is a company that everyone wants to exist as an alternative to keep OpenAI and Anthropic honest, but that doesn’t pay the bills. This is why the company should aggressively seek investment from Microsoft in particular.
    • There is an angle where xAI and Oracle make sense as partners: xAI could use an infrastructure partner, and Oracle could use a differentiated AI offering. The problem is that they could simply exacerbate each others challenges in terms of acquiring customers.

    One of the most harmful things that has happened to xAI is the acquisition of X; that simply makes xAI a less attractive investment for most companies, and an impossible acquisition target for Meta, which is clearly willing to pay for xAI’s talent. What is more interesting is the relationship with Tesla; to the extent that the bitter lesson covers self-driving is the extent that xAI’s infrastructure can, at worst, simply be productively funneled to another Musk company.

    Meta: Here we are full circle with the news of the week. There is a case to be made that Meta is simply wasting money on AI: the company doesn’t have a hyperscaler business, and benefits from AI all the same. Lots of ChatGPT-generated Studio Ghibli pictures, for example, were posted on Meta properties, to Meta’s benefit.

    The problem for Meta — or anyone else who isn’t a model maker — is that the question of LLM-based AI’s ultimate capabilities is still subject to such fierce debate. Zuckerberg needs to hold out the promise of superIntelligence not only to attract talent, but because if such a goal is attainable then whoever can build it won’t want to share; if it turns out that LLM-based AIs are more along the lines of the microprocessor — essential empowering technology, but not a self-contained destroyer of worlds — then that would both be better for Meta’s business and also mean that they wouldn’t need to invest in building their own. Unfortunately for Zuckerberg, waiting-and-seeing means waiting-and-hoping, because if the bet is wrong Meta is MySpace.


    This is also where it’s important to mention the elephant in the room: China. Much of the U.S. approach to China is predicated on the assumption that AI is that destroyer of worlds and therefore it’s worth risking U.S. technological dominance in chips to stop the country’s rise, but that is a view with serious logical flaws. What may end up happening — and DeepSeek pointed in this direction — is that China ends up commoditizing both chips and AI; if that happened it’s Big Tech that would benefit the most (to Nvidia’s detriment), and it wouldn’t be the first time.



    Get notified about new Articles


  • Apple Retreats

    Listen to this post:

    If WWDC’s opening video — which cast Apple executives as characters in the upcoming F1 movie, with Senior Vice President of Software Engineering Craig Federighi in the starring role — was a bit of a fever dream, then the opening of Federighi’s presentation of Apple’s annual software updates had the air of a regretful admission the morning after that mistakes had been made.

    To Federighi and Apple’s credit, there was no attempt to dance around the fact that last year’s WWDC ended up being a fever dream in its own right: Apple promised a litany of AI-enabled features, particularly for Siri, that have not shipped and may never ship. Federighi, after listing the basic and hardly ground-breaking Apple Intelligence features that did ship, admitted right up front:

    As we’ve shared, we’re continuing our work to deliver the features that make Siri even more personal. This work needed more time to reach our high quality bar, and we look forward to sharing more about it in the coming year.

    That’s only two sentences, of course, but the admission was notable and necessary; last year’s WWDC — which garnered high praise, including from yours truly — revealed that Something Is Rotten in the State of Cupertino. That was the title of John Gruber’s Daring Fireball article excoriating Apple for promising something it could not deliver:

    Even with everything Apple overpromised (if not outright lied about) at the WWDC keynote, the initial takeaway from WWDC from the news media was wrongly focused on their partnership with OpenAI. The conventional wisdom coming out of the keynote was that Apple had just announced something called “Apple Intelligence” but it was powered by ChatGPT, when in fact, the story Apple told was that they — Apple — had built an entire system called Apple Intelligence, entirely powered by Apple’s own AI technology, and that it spanned from on-device execution all the way to a new Private Cloud Compute infrastructure they not only owned but are powering with their own custom-designed server hardware based on Apple Silicon chips. And that on top of all that, as a proverbial cherry on top, Apple also was adding an optional integration layer with ChatGPT.

    So, yes, given that the news media gave credit for Apple’s own actual announced achievements to OpenAI, Apple surely would have been given even less credit had they not announced the “more personalized Siri” features. It’s easy to imagine someone in the executive ranks arguing “We need to show something that only Apple can do.” But it turns out they announced something Apple couldn’t do. And now they look so out of their depth, so in over their heads, that not only are they years behind the state-of-the-art in AI, but they don’t even know what they can ship or when. Their headline features from nine months ago not only haven’t shipped but still haven’t even been demonstrated, which I, for one, now presume means they can’t be demonstrated because they don’t work.

    Gruber — my co-host on Dithering — has been writing and podcasting about Apple for over two decades; his podcast is called The Talk Show, and for the last ten years Apple executives have appeared for a live version of his show the week of WWDC. However, this year will be different; Gruber announced on Daring Fireball:1

    Ever since I started doing these live shows from WWDC, I’ve kept the guest(s) secret, until showtime. I’m still doing that this year. But in recent years the guests have seemed a bit predictable: senior executives from Apple. This year I again extended my usual invitation to Apple, but, for the first time since 2015, they declined.

    I think this will make for a fascinating show, but I want to set everyone’s expectations accordingly. I’m invigorated by this. See you at the show, I hope.

    Neither Gruber nor (obviously) Apple said why the invitation was declined, but it was hard to not draw a line to Gruber’s viral article; Marco Arment said Apple was Retreating to Safety:

    Maybe Apple has good reasons. Maybe not. We’ll see what their WWDC PR strategy looks like in a couple of weeks.

    In the absence of any other information, it’s easy to assume that Apple no longer wants its executives to be interviewed in a human, unscripted, unedited context that may contain hard questions, and that Apple no longer feels it necessary to show their appreciation to our community and developers in this way.

    I hope that’s either not the case, or it doesn’t stay the case for long.

    This will be the first WWDC I’m not attending since 2009 (excluding the remote 2020 one, of course). Given my realizations about my relationship with Apple and how they view developers, I’ve decided that it’s best for me to take a break this year, gain some perspective, and decide what my future relationship should look like.

    Maybe Apple’s leaders are doing that, too.

    My biggest takeaway from WWDC is that Arment got it right: Apple is indeed “Retreating to Safety”. Retreating might, however, be exactly the right thing to do.

    Apple’s Retreat to Its Core Competency

    The headline feature of WWDC this year was Liquid Glass, a new unified design language that stretches across its operating systems. I will reserve judgment on Liquid Glass’s aesthetics and usability — Gruber likes it, but I am not one to install developer betas on my devices — but will make three meta observations.

    First, hand-crafted UI overhauls are the polar opposite of the probabilistic world of generative AI. One is about deep consideration and iteration resulting in a finished product; the other is about in-the-moment token prediction resulting in an output that is ephemeral and disposable. Both are important and creative, but the downsides of that creativity — unfamiliarity and edge cases versus hallucination and false confidence — are themselves diametrically opposed.

    Apple’s historical strengths have always been rooted in designing for finality; in my first year of Stratechery I did a SWOT analysis of the big tech companies and said about Apple:

    Apple’s product development process is wonderful for developing finished products, but that same process doesn’t work nearly as well when it comes to building cloud services. Cloud services are never “done”; they are best developed by starting with a minimum viable product and then iterating based on usage. This is precisely opposite of what it takes to design a piece of hardware, and it’s a big reason why Apple struggles so much with cloud services (and why other services companies struggle with products). The canonical example of this, of course, was the MobileMe launch, which was delivered fully-formed and which, when faced with real world usage, crashed-and-burned. Apple’s latest offerings are better, but still suffer from too much internal development time per release. This is a hard problem to fix, because it touches the core of what makes Apple Apple.

    I think it matters whether or not Liquid Glass is good, because it will be a testament about the state of Apple’s strengths; the point for this Article, however, is that WWDC was a retreat to those strengths, away from a technology that is very much inline with Apple’s historical weaknesses.2

    Second, the core premise of the Liquid Glass re-design is leveraging Apple’s integration of hardware and software. This is how Vice President of Human Interface Design Alan Dye introduced Apple’s new design language:

    Now with the powerful advances in our hardware, silicon, and graphics technologies, we have the opportunity to lay the foundation for the next chapter of our software. Today, we’re excited to announce our broadest design update ever. Our goal is a beautiful new design that brings joy and delight to every user experience, one that’s more personal and puts greater focus on your content. All while still feeling instantly familiar. And for the first time, we’re introducing a universal design across our platforms. This unified design language creates a more harmonious experience as he move between products, while maintaining the qualities that make each unique. Inspired by the physicality and richness of visionOS, we challenged ourselves to make make something purely digital, feel natural and alive, from how it looks to how it feels as it dynamically responds to touch.

    To achieve this, we began by rethinking the fundamental elements that make up our software, and it starts with an entirely new expressive material we call Liquid Glass. With the optical qualities of glass, and a fluidity that only Apple can achieve, it transforms depending on your content, or even your context, and brings more clarity to navigation and controls. It beautifully refracts light, and dynamically reacts to your movement with specular highlights. This material brings a new level of vitality to every aspect of your experience, from the smallest elements you interact with, to larger ones, it responds in real time to your content, and your input, creating a more lively experience that we think you’ll find truly delightful. Elements once considered for rectangular displays have been redesigned to fit perfectly concentric with the rounded corners of the hardware. This establishes greater harmony between our software and hardware, while thoughtfully considered groups of controls, free up valuable space for your content. Liquid Glass is translucent and behaves just like glass in the real world. Its color is informed by your content and intelligently adapts between light and dark environments, and as a distinct functional layer that sits above your app, the material dynamically morphs when you need more options, or as you move between views.

    We’ve always cared deeply about every detail of our software design, and it’s these moments of beauty, craft, and joy that bring our products to life. Our new design blurs the lines between hardware and software to create an experience that’s more more delightful than ever, while still familiar and easy to use. Today marks an exciting and beautiful new chapter for our design, one that sets the stage for our next era of our products and how you interact with them every day.

    Sebastiaan De With, in a remarkably prescient post predicting the nature of this new design, emphasized how only Apple could make Liquid Glass:

    A logical next step could be extending physicality to the entirety of the interface. We do not have to go overboard in such treatments, but we can now have the interface inhabit a sense of tactile realism. Philosophically, if I was Apple, I’d describe this as finally having an interface that matches the beautiful material properties of its devices. All the surfaces of your devices have glass screens. This brings an interface of a matching material, giving the user a feeling of the glass itself coming alive…

    The interfaces of computers of the future are often surprisingly easy to imagine. We often think of them and feature them in fiction ahead of their existence: our iPhone resembles a modern Star Trek tricorder; many modern AI applications resemble the devices in sci-fi movies like ‘Her’ and (depressingly) Blade Runner 2049. It’s not surprising, then, that concept interfaces from the likes of Microsoft often feature ‘glass fiction’:

    The actual interface is unfortunately not nearly as inspired with such life and behavioral qualities. The reason is simple: not only is the cool living glass of the video way over the top in some places, but few companies can actually dedicate significant effort towards creating a hardware-to-software integrated rendering pipeline to enable such UI innovations…Only Apple could integrate sub pixel antialiasing and never-interrupted animations on a hardware level to enable the Dynamic Island and gestural multi-tasking; only Apple can integrate two operating systems on two chips on Vision Pro so they can composite the dynamic materials of the VisionOS UI. And, perhaps only Apple can push the state of the art to a new interface that brings the glass of your screen to life.

    De With’s prescience actually gives me great hope for Liquid Glass: the best innovations are obvious to those who understand what is just becoming possible, and Apple’s integration has been and continues to be a meaningful advantage for things like user interfaces.

    Third, Apple CEO Tim Cook has for a long time extended his framing of Apple’s differentiation to be the integration of hardware, software, and services, but while that is certainly true from a financial perspective, I’ve long had a hard time buying that the services component made for better products; as I noted above, Apple’s services have typically been something to be endured, as opposed to a reason to buy their devices, and the Siri debacle has only emphasized that point.

    What is much more compelling — and the fact that Liquid Glass is a design language meant to unify Apple’s devices speaks to this — is the integration of Apple’s devices with each other. Every Apple product you buy is enhanced by the purchase of additional Apple products; to that end, one of the coolest parts of the WWDC presentation was about Continuity, Apple’s brand for features that connect various Apple products:

    Let’s talk about the power of continuity. Continuity helps you work seamlessly across Apple devices, and we’re excited to introduce two new Continuity features. First, we’re bringing Live Activities to Mac. So if you’ve ordered Uber Eats on your iPhone, the Live Activity also appears in the menu bar, and when you click, the app opens in iPhone-mirroring, so you can take action directly on your Mac. We’re also enhancing the calling experience by bringing the Phone app to Mac. You can conveniently access your familiar content, like recents, contacts, and voicemail, synced from iPhone, and easily make a call with just a click. Incoming calls look beautiful on the bigger screen, featuring stunning contact posters of your friends and family, and the Phone app on Mac includes all the great updates we talked about earlier, like hold assist, call screening, and live translation. So that’s what’s new in Continuity.

    These sorts of features aren’t going to change the world; they are, though, features that I can absolutely see making my life better and more convenient on an ongoing basis. And, to the broader point, they are features that only Apple can do.

    More generally, yes, a focus on UI design is a retreat from The Gen AI Bridge to the Future; that future, however, will start from the devices we still use all day every day, and Apple focusing on making those devices better is a retreat that I expect will have a far more positive impact on my life than the company struggling to catch up in AI.

    Apple’s Retreat to Empowering Developers and Partners

    That’s not to say there weren’t some notable AI announcements in Apple’s keynote.

    First, Apple announced the Foundation Models framework:

    This year we’re doing something new, and we think it’s going to be pretty big. We’re opening up access for any app to tap directly into the on-device, large language model at the core of Apple Intelligence, with a new Foundation Models Framework. This gives developers direct access to intelligence that’s powerful, fast, built with privacy, and available even when you’re offline. We think this will ignite a whole new wave of intelligent experiences in the apps you use every day.

    For example, if you’re getting ready for an exam, an app like Kahoot can create a personalized quiz from your notes to make studying more engaging, and because it uses on-device models, this happens without Cloud API costs. Or perhaps you’re camping off-grid, poring over the hikes you downloaded to AllTrails. Just describe what you’re in the mood for, and AllTrails can use our on-device models to suggest the best option. We couldn’t be more excited about how developers can build on Apple Intelligence to bring you new experiences that are smart, available when you’re offline, and that protect your privacy.

    It’s important not to oversell the capabilities of Apple’s on-device AI models: of course developers who want to create something that is competitive with the output of something like ChatGPT will need to use cloud-based AI APIs. That reality, however, applies to Apple as well! Part of the folly of the initial Apple Intelligence approach is that Apple was promising to deliver beyond state-of-the-art capabilities on the cheap, using its users’ processors and power.

    What is compelling about the Foundation Models Framework is how it empowers small developers to experiment with on-device AI for free: an app that wouldn’t have AI at all for cost reasons now can, and if that output isn’t competitive with cloud AI then that’s the developer’s problem, not Apple’s; at the same time, by enabling developers to experiment Apple is the big beneficiary of those that discover how to do something that is only possible if you have an Apple device.

    Second, Apple deepened its reliance on OpenAI, incorporating ChatGPT’s image generation capabilities into Image Playground and adding ChatGPT analysis to Visual Intelligence. There is still no sign of the long-rumored Gemini integration or the ability to switch out ChatGPT for the AI provider of your choice, but the general trend towards relying on partners who are actually good at building AI is a smart move.

    Third, Apple is also incorporating ChatGPT much more deeply into Xcode, its Integrated Development Environment (IDE) for building apps for Apple platforms; developers can also plug in other models using API keys. Xcode still has a long ways to go to catch up to AI-first IDEs like Cursor, but again, partnering with foundational model makers is a far smarter strategy than Apple trying to do everything itself.

    These are, to be sure, obvious moves, but that doesn’t make them any less important, both in terms of Apple’s future, and also with regard to the theme of this Article: Apple’s initial success with the Apple II was because of 3rd-party developers, and developers were critical to making the iPhone a sustainable success. Trusting developers and relying on partners may be a retreat from Apple’s increasing insistence on doing everything itself, but it is very much a welcome one.

    Apple’s [Forced] Retreat to App Store Sanity

    Apple didn’t say much about the App Store in the keynote, but they did announce a new Games app; M.G. Siegler theorized late last month that this may be laying the groundwork for splitting up Games from the rest of the App Store:

    What if this new gaming-focused app – let’s just call it ‘Game Store’ – is not only meant to unify Apple’s gaming-focused efforts, but also to separate them from the App Store itself? Why might Apple do this? Because this would allow them to more easily differentiate between the two and, importantly, give the two independent policies.

    That means that Apple could, say, drop the rate developers have to pay when it comes to revenue share in the App Store, while keeping it the same as it is now in the ‘Game Store’. And that matters because actually, gaming makes up some two-thirds of Apple’s App Store revenue at the moment (between paid downloads and in-app purchases – but it’s predominantly the latter). It’s the actual key to Apple’s model for this segment of the Services business.

    And guess what else is true? In gaming, a 70/30 split is a well-established norm. In fact, it’s where Apple’s own App Store split originates from (by way of iTunes, which also copied the model back in the day)! Yes, there are others who have tried to disrupt this split, notably Epic, but Apple has a much stronger case for a 70/30 split when it comes to gaming than it now does for the overall app ecosystem.

    So hear me out: the ‘Game Store’ keeps the 70/30 model and the ‘App Store’ moves to something more like 85/15 as the standard (matching Apple’s currently convoluted system for small developers with various arbitrary thresholds). Perhaps for smaller developers, Apple even drops it to 90/10.

    Apple did not announce such a shift yesterday, but the infrastructure is now in place to do exactly what I have advocated for years: treat games differently from other apps. Gaming revenue is almost entirely based on zero marginal cost content, and games are more susceptible to abuse and more likely to be used by kids; I don’t mind Apple’s more heavy-handed approach in that case and, as Siegler notes, this level of control is the industry standard for other gaming platforms like consoles. In other words, Apple should retreat from trying to take a cut of everything digital, and instead act like a console maker where appropriate, and a more neutral computer platform for everything else.

    Unfortunately for Apple, keeping console-level control of games may no longer be possible, particularly after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Apple’s request for a stay of Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers’ order lifting anti-steering restrictions on all apps, including games. The functional outcome of Gonzalez Rogers’ order is a retreat by Apple from its overbearing control of app monetization, albeit not one Apple is engaged in willingly.

    Once again, however, a retreat is exactly what Apple needs. The company has gone too far with the App Store, not only embittering developers and losing court cases, but also has put its fundamental differentiation at risk. I warned the company of exactly this in 2021’s Integrated Apple and App Store Risk:

    This is where the nuance I discussed in App Store Arguments becomes much more black-and-white. Yes, Apple created the iPhone and the App Store and, under current U.S. antitrust doctrine, almost certainly has the right to impose whatever taxes it wishes on third parties, including 30% on purchases and the first year of subscriptions, and completely cutting off developers from their customers. Antitrust law, though, while governed by Supreme Court precedent, is not a matter of constitutionality: it stems from laws passed by Congress, and it can be changed by new laws passed by Congress.

    One of the central planks of many of those pushing for new laws in this area are significant limitations on the ability of platforms to offer apps and services, or integrate them in any way that advantages their offerings. In this potential world it’s not simply problematic that Apple charges Spotify 30%, or else forces the music streaming service to hope that users figure out how to subscribe on the web, even as Apple Music has a fully integrated sign-up flow and no 30% tax; it is also illegal to incorporate Apple Music into SharePlay or Shared-with-you or Photos, or in the most extreme versions of these proposed laws, even have Apple Music at all. This limitation would apply to basically every WWDC announcement: say good-bye to Quick Note or SharePlay-as-an-exclusive-service, or any number of Apple’s integrated offerings.

    I think these sorts of limitations would be disappointing as a user — integration really does often lead to better outcomes sooner — and would be a disaster for Apple. The entire company’s differentiation is predicated on integration, including its ability to abuse its App Store position, and it would be a huge misstep if the inability to resist the latter imperiled the former.

    This, more than anything, is why Apple should rethink its approach to the App Store. The deeper the company integrates, the more unfair its arbitrary limits on competing services will be. Isn’t it enough that Spotify will never be as integrated as Apple Music, or that 1Password will not be built-in like Keychain, or that SimpleNote will only ever be in its sandbox while Apple Notes is omnipresent? Apple, by virtue of building the underlying platform, has every advantage in the world when it comes to offering additional apps and services, and the company at its best leverages that advantage to create experiences that users love; in this view demanding 30% and total control of the users of its already diminished competition isn’t simply anticompetitive, it is risking what makes the company unique.

    This is exactly what is happening in Europe: the DMA requires Apple to open up a whole host of capabilities that undergird its integration both on individual devices and especially between devices, and Apple is signalling that it will simply remove those features in the E.U.. That is one way to solve the company’s DMA issues, but the cost is severe: in one of Apple’s largest markets it can’t actually deliver on the differentiation that, earlier in this Article, I was celebrating its retreat to.

    Retreat and Reset

    The biggest part of WWDC — and the biggest part of this Article — was about Liquid Glass, which has drawn some unflattering comparisons to past Microsoft operating system releases:

    Again, I’ll withhold judgment on Liquid Glass until it ships, but there is another Microsoft OS comparison I’ve been thinking about recently: to me last year’s Siri disaster is a lot like Windows 8.

    Windows 8 was an attempt to leverage Microsoft’s large PC install base into a competitive position in touch-based devices, and it did not go well: consumers — particularly enterprises — hated the new UI, and developers weren’t interested in a platform without users. Microsoft was forced to retreat, and eventually came out with Windows 10, which was much more inline with traditional Windows releases.

    What was more important was what was happening behind the scenes at Microsoft. The Windows 8 disaster played a role in Steve Ballmer’s ouster, while the most important accomplishment of Satya Nadella, Ballmer’s successor, was ending Windows’ role as the center of the company’s culture and strategy. To put it another way, Microsoft tried to do something it was fundamentally unsuited to do, was forced to retreat, and eventually found a far better direction with Azure that positioned the company to benefit from AI.

    Apple has clearly missed the boat on cutting edge AI; what I’m open to is the argument that this was a ship the company was never meant to board, at least when it comes to products like ChatGPT. Meanwhile, I’ve long been convinced that Apple has gone too far in its attempt to control everything even tangentially related to its devices; from 2017’s Apple and the Oak Tree:

    Apple has had a special run, thanks to its special ability to start with the user experience and build from there. It is why the company is dominant and will continue to be so for many years. Apple as an entity, though, is not special when it comes to the burden of success: there will be no going back to “Rip. Mix. Burn.” or its modern equivalent.

    In short, Apple is no longer the little reed they were when Jobs could completely change the company’s strategy in mere months; the push towards ever more lock-in, ever more centralization, ever more ongoing monetization of its users — even at the cost of the user experience, if need be — will be impossible to stop, for Tim Cook or anyone else. After all, such moves make Apple strong, until of course they don’t.

    To that end, while I understand why many people were underwhelmed by this WWDC, particularly in comparison to the AI extravaganza that was Google I/O, I think it was one of the more encouraging Apple keynotes in a long time. Apple is a company that went too far in too many areas, and needed to retreat. Focusing on things only Apple can do is a good thing; empowering developers and depending on partners is a good thing; giving even the appearance of thoughtful thinking with regards to the App Store (it’s a low bar!) is a good thing. Of course we want and are excited by tech companies promising the future; what is a prerequisite is delivering in the present, and it’s a sign of progress that Apple retreated to nothing more than that.



    1. Gruber’s show is tonight; there will also be a spatial livestream in Apple Vision Pro

    2. See also 2016’s The Curse of Culture, which is very prescient about Apple’s — and Google’s! — challenges with AI. 


    Get notified about new Articles


  • The Agentic Web and Original Sin

    Listen to this post:

    Ethan Zuckerman wrote in The Atlantic in 2014:

    I have come to believe that advertising is the original sin of the web. The fallen state of our Internet is a direct, if unintentional, consequence of choosing advertising as the default model to support online content and services. Through successive rounds of innovation and investor storytime, we’ve trained Internet users to expect that everything they say and do online will be aggregated into profiles (which they cannot review, challenge, or change) that shape both what ads and what content they see. Outrage over experimental manipulation of these profiles by social networks and dating companies has led to heated debates amongst the technologically savvy, but hasn’t shrunk the user bases of these services, as users now accept that this sort of manipulation is an integral part of the online experience.

    Marc Andreessen, who was there when the web was born, explained in a 2019 podcast why this sin was committed (this quote is lightly edited for clarity):

    One would think the most obvious thing to do would be building in the browser the ability to actually spend money, right? You’ll notice that didn’t happen, and in a lot of ways, we don’t even think it’s unusual that that didn’t happen, because maybe that shouldn’t have happened. I think the original sin was we couldn’t actually build economics, which is to say money, into the core of the internet and so therefore advertising became the primary business model…

    We tried very hard to build payments into the browser. It was not possible…We made a huge mistake. We tried to work with the banks and we tried to work with the credit card companies…it was sort of the classic kind of single point of failure bottleneck, or at least in this case, two points of failure. Visa and MasterCard essentially had a duopoly at the time, and so they were just literally, if they did not want you to be in the switch, they did not want you to be able to do transactions, you just simply weren’t going to do it.

    I think Andreessen is too hard on himself, and I think Zuckerman is too harsh on the model Andreessen created the conditions for. The original web was the human web, and advertising was and is one of the best possible ways to monetize the only scarce resource in digital: human attention. The incentives all align:

    • Users get to access a vastly larger amount of content and services because they are free.
    • Content makers get to reach the largest possible audience because access is free.
    • Advertisers have the opportunity to find customers they would have been never able to reach otherwise.

    Yes, there are the downsides to advertising Zuckerman fretted about, but everything is a trade-off, and the particular set of trade-offs that led to the advertising-centric web were, on balance, a win-win-win that generated an astronomical amount of economic value.

    Moreover, I disagree with Andreessen that we could have ended up with a better system if the banks and credit card companies had been willing to play ball. In fact, over the last thirty years, the credit card companies in particular have — in part thanks to companies like Stripe — gotten their digital acts together, and are integral to a huge amount of web-based commerce, which itself is driven through digital advertising (the largest category of advertising for both Google and Meta). That too is human, in that the biggest outcome of digital advertising is physical products and real-world experiences like travel (digital products like apps and games, meanwhile, are themselves pursuing human attention).

    What was not viable in the 1990s, nor at any time since then, was something like micro-transactions for content. One obvious problem is that the fee structure of credit cards don’t allow for very small transactions; another problem is that the costs to product content are front-loaded, and the potential payoff is both back-loaded and unpredictable, making it impossible to make a living. The biggest problem of all, however, is that micro-transactions are anti-human: forcing a potential content consumer to continually decide on whether or not to pay for a piece of content is alienating, particularly when plenty of alternatives for their scarce attention exist.

    Subscriptions do work at smaller scales, because they are ultimately not about paying for content, but giving money to another human (or human institution); from The Local News Business Model:

    It is very important to clearly define what a subscriptions means. First, it’s not a donation: it is asking a customer to pay money for a product. What, then, is the product? It is not, in fact, any one article (a point that is missed by the misguided focus on micro-transactions). Rather, a subscriber is paying for the regular delivery of well-defined value.

    Each of those words is meaningful:

    • Paying: A subscription is an ongoing commitment to the production of content, not a one-off payment for one piece of content that catches the eye.
    • Regular Delivery: A subscriber does not need to depend on the random discovery of content; said content can be delivered to the subscriber directly, whether that be email, a bookmark, or an app.
    • Well-defined Value: A subscriber needs to know what they are paying for, and it needs to be worth it.

    This last point is at the crux of why many ad-based newspapers will find it all but impossible to switch to a real subscription business model. When asking people to pay, quality matters far more than quantity, and the ratio matters: a publication with 1 valuable article a day about a well-defined topic will more easily earn subscriptions than one with 3 valuable articles and 20 worthless ones covering a variety of subjects. Yet all too many local newspapers, built for an ad-based business model that calls for daily content to wrap around ads, spend their limited resources churning out daily filler even though those ads no longer exist.

    I expect that this model will endure in the age of AI; obviously I’m biased on this point, but in a world of infinite content-on-demand, common content becomes community: if I’m successful this essay will generate a lot of discussion amongst a lot of people precisely because it is both original and widely accessible, funded by an audience that wants me to keep on writing Articles exactly like this.

    The Death of the Ad-Supported Web

    The ad-supported web — particularly text-based sites — is going to fare considerably worse. In fact, the most substantive pushback to my defense of advertising was in my own excerpt: most ad-supported content is already terrible, thanks to the bad incentives both Zuckerman and Andreessen bemoaned, and the impossible economics enabled by zero marginal cost content generation and consumption.

    The center of this world for the last twenty years has been Google.

    Google was at the center of the ad-supported web

    Google in its most idealized form Aggregated content consumers by mastering discovery in this world of abundance, directing users to exactly the site they were looking for, which was monetized through ads that were sold and served by Google. Indeed, this is the great irony in the ads antitrust case in which Google is currently embroiled; Eric Seufert asked on MobileDevMemo:

    I’ve heard arguments that, because Google suppressed competition in open web advertising markets, those markets should flourish when Google’s monopoly is broken. But my sense is that this ignores two realities. First, that consumer engagement has shifted into apps and walled gardens irreversibly. And second, that Google was keeping the open web on life support, and the open web’s demise will be hastened when Google no longer has an incentive to support it. What happens to the open web when its biggest, albeit imperfect, benefactor loses the motivation to sustain it?

    Note Seufert’s two points: walled gardens like social networks are both more attractive to most users and also better for advertisers, and Google might soon lose what little motivation they had left to support the open web. However, that’s not Google’s — and the web’s — only problem. Why go through the hassle of typing a search term and choosing the best link — particularly as search results are polluted by an increasingly overwhelming amount of SEO spam, now augmented by generative AI — when ChatGPT (or Google itself) will simply give you the answer you are looking for?

    In short, every leg of the stool that supported the open web is at best wobbly: users are less likely to go to ad-supported content-based websites, even as the long tail of advertisers might soon lose their conduit to place ads on those websites, leaving said websites even less viable than they are today — and they’re barely hanging on as it is!

    Microsoft and the Open Agentic Web

    This reality is the fly in the ointment of an intriguing set of proposals that Microsoft put forward yesterday at the Build 2025 Developer Conference about “The Open Agentic Web”; here’s CTO Kevin Scott:

    The thing that is super important if you think about what an open-agentic web could be, is you need agents to be able to take actions on your behalf, and one of the really important things about agents being able to take actions on your behalf is they have to be plumbed up to the greater world. So you need protocols, things like MCP and A2A and things that likely are going to be emerging over the coming year that will help connect in an open, reliable, interoperable way the agents that you are writing and agents that are being used so actively now by hundreds of millions of people to be able to go access content, to access services, to take action on behalf of users in fulfilling the tasks that have been delegated to them.

    One aspect of this vision of the agentic web was Microsoft’s commitment to the Model Context Protocol created by Anthropic; Scott told Nilay Patel in an excellent interview in The Verge that while MCP wasn’t exactly what he would have designed from scratch, ubiquity is more important than semantic differences, particularly when you’re trying to create HTTP for AI agents.

    The second part of Scott’s vision was something Microsoft created called NLWeb, a natural language interface for websites that makes them more directly accessible for agents:

    If you think back to the web, we have HTTP, and then we had things that sit on top of HTTP, like HTML mainly, that are opinionated about the payload, and so we’re announcing today NLWeb. The idea behind NLWeb is it is a way for anyone who has a website or an API already to very easily make their website or their API an agentic application. It lets you implement and leverage the full power of large language models to enrich the services and products that you’re already offering, and because every NLWeb endpoint is by default an MCP server, It means that those things that people are offering up via NLWeb will be accessible to any agent that speaks MCP. So you really can think about it a little bit like HTML for the agentic web.

    We have done a bunch of work already with partners who have been really excited and been able to really very quickly get to quick implementations and prototypes using NLWeb. We’ve worked with TripAdvisor, O’Reilly Media, a ton of really great companies that offer important products and services on the internet to add in a web functionality to their sites so that they can have these agentic experiences directly on their sites.

    Scott concluded by re-emphasizing how important it was that the layers of the agentic web be open, and used the evolution of the Internet as his example of why:

    So the last thing that I want to say before handing things back over to Satya is to just sort of press on these two points about why like open is so important here. So you know it is unbelievable what can happen in the world when simple components and simple protocols that are composable with one another are out there, exposed to the full scrutiny and creativity of every developer in the world who wants to participate or who has an idea.

    This thought game that I play with myself all the time is trying to imagine what the web would have looked like if one of the actors in the early development of the web, say the browser manufacturers, had decided that they wanted to vertically integrate and own the entire web. A hundred percent of the web would have been…dictated by the limits of their imagination, and it’s just obvious with 30 years of history that that wouldn’t have been a very interesting web. The web is interesting because millions, tens of millions, hundreds of millions of people are participating to make it into this rich dynamic thing. That’s what we think we need with the agentic web, and that’s what we’re hoping you all can get inspired to go work on a little bit, to riff on, and to use the full extent of your imagination to help make this thing interesting.

    I think that widespread adoption of MCP as a protocol layer and NLWeb as a markup layer sounds excellent; the big hole in Scott’s proposal, however, was pointed out by Patel in that interview:

    That is the piece that on the web right now seems most under threat, the underlying business dynamics of I start a website, I put in a bunch of schema that allows search engines to read my website and surface my content across different distributions. I might add an RSS feed, which is a standardized distribution that everyone uses and agrees on. There’s lots of ways to do this.

    But if I make a website, I open myself up to distribution on different surfaces. What I will get in return for that is not necessarily money — almost in every case, not money. What I’ll get is visitors to my website, and then I’ll monetize them however I choose to: selling a subscription, display ads, whatever it is. That’s broken, right? As more and more of the answers appear directly, particularly in AI-based search products, traffic to websites has generally dropped. We see this over and over again. What’s going to replace that in the agentic era, where we’ve created new schema for agents to come and talk to my website and receive some answers? What’s going to make that worth it?

    Scott in his answer noted that websites would be able to communicate to agents what they wanted to make available and on what terms, along with some vague hand-waving about new advertising models and transactions. The last point is valid: Trip Advisor sells hotel rooms, and O’Reilly sells training courses, and you can see a world where websites based on transactions can not only benefit from exposing themselves to agents, but in fact transact more (and potentially pay an affiliate fee). Patel, however, rightly pressed Scott on the prospects for ad-supported content sites:

    As Google keeps more of the traffic for itself or it thinks differently about training data, all this stuff is changing. The trade here is make your website more agentic, and then MCP as a protocol will allow you to build some new business models on it. The problem, as I see it, is that the traffic to the web is in precipitous decline as Google referrals go into decline. How do you fix that problem so that everyone is incentivized to keep building on the web?

    I don’t know, honestly.

    “The Original Sin” of the Internet lacking native payments was not, in my opinion, a sin at all: advertising supported the human web not because Andreessen failed to make a deal with the credit card companies, but because it was the only business model that made sense.

    No, the real neglect and missed opportunity in terms of payments is happening right now: Microsoft is on to the right idea with its adoption of MCP and introduction of NLWeb, but its proposal, by virtue of not including native payments, isn’t nearly as compelling as it should be. The key difference from the 1990s is that on the agentic web native digital payments are both viable and the best possible way to not only keep the web alive, but also in the process create better and more useful AI.

    Stablecoins and Agentic Micro-transactions

    Start with the viability; from Bloomberg:

    Stablecoin legislation overcame a procedural blockade in the US Senate, marking a major victory for the crypto industry after a group of Democrats dropped their opposition Monday. The industry-backed regulatory bill is now set for debate on the Senate floor with a bipartisan group hoping to pass it as soon as this week, although senators said a final vote could slip until after the Memorial Day recess.

    I know I have driven long-time Stratechery readers a bit batty with my long-running and still-enduring-in-the-face-of-massive-grift-and-seemingly-unending-scandals interest in crypto, but stablecoins are genuinely a big deal. I wrote a brief explainer last fall when Stripe acquired Bridge:

    Stablecoins distill crypto to these most interesting bits. Unlike Bitcoin, stablecoins do not have intrinsic value downstream from a network effect, and unlike Ethereum, they are not set up to execute smart contracts or other applications; rather, their value is right there in the name: they are stable representations of value — usually the U.S. dollar…What remains is a synthetic currency that is digital but scarce, with all of the affordances that allows for, including the ability to move money frictionlessly (thus Collison’s analogy). The analogy I think of is to the Internet itself:

    • Physical goods are scarce, but while you can scale up from hand-delivery, you still have to pay a lot for a delivery service, and if you cross borders you have to deal with customs.
    • Information used to be delivered in person, then via physical media like letters or newspapers, but now it is purely digital and freely distributed and duplicated all over the world; it is abundant.

    Dollars right now are more akin to physical goods than they are to information: you can deliver it by hand, or even via delivery services like ACH or SWIFT, but the need for verification and confirmation flows introduce a ton of friction. Moreover, you can’t actually do anything with dollars at rest, other than watch them deflate. Stablecoins solve these problems: you can transfer them like information, while preserving scarcity, while blockchains provide verification and confirmation that scales from the smallest transactions to the biggest; meanwhile, they also earn a return while at rest thanks to the assets backing them.

    Stablecoins solve several of the micro-transaction problems I listed above, including dramatically lower — or no — fees, and the fact that they are infinitely divisible, and thus can scale to very small amounts. Stablecoins, by virtue of being programmable, are also well-suited to agents; agents, meanwhile, are much more suited to micro-transactions, because they are, in the end, simply software making a decision, unencumbered by the very human feeling of decision paralysis.

    In fact, we already have an excellent example of (deterministic) agents making micro-transactions at scale: the entire digital ads ecosystem! Every time a human loads a webpage, an awe-inspiring amount of computation and communication happens in milliseconds, as an auction is run to fill the inventory on that page with an ad that is likely to appeal to the human. These micro-transactions are only worth fractions of a penny, but the aggregate volume of them drives trillions of dollars worth of value.

    The problem, as both I and Patel noted, is that this ecosystem depends on humans seeing those webpages, not impersonal agents impervious to advertising, which destroys the economics of ad-supported content sites, which, in the long run, dries up the supply of new content for AI. OpenAI and Google in particular are clumsily addressing the supply issue by cutting deals with news providers and user-generated content sites like Reddit; this, however, is bad for the sort of competition Microsoft wants to engender, and ultimately won’t scale to the amount of new content that needs to be generated.

    What is possible — not probable, but at least possible — is to in the long run build an entirely new marketplace for content that results in a new win-win-win equilibrium.

    AI at the center of the new agentic web

    First, the protocol layer should have a mechanism for payments via digital currency, i.e. stablecoins. Second, AI providers like ChatGPT should build an auction mechanism that pays out content sources based on the frequency with which they are cited in AI answers. The result would be a new universe of creators who will be incentivized to produce high quality content that is more likely to be useful to AI, competing in a marketplace a la the open web; indeed, this would be the new open web, but one that operates at even greater scale than the current web given the fact that human attention is a scarce resource, while the number of potential agents is infinite.


    There is, to be sure, a tremendous amount of complexity in what I am proposing, and the path to a marketplace for data generation is quite unclear at the moment. Who, however, could have predicted exactly how the ad-supported web would have evolved, or centrally designed the incredible complexity that undergirds it?

    This is where Scott’s exhortation of openness is spot on: a world of one dominant AI making business development deals with a few blessed content creators, and scraping the carcass of what remains on the web for everything else, is a far less interesting one than one driven by marketplaces, auctions, and aligned incentives.

    To get there, however, means realizing that the Internet’s so-called “Original Sin” was in fact the key to realizing the human web’s potential, while the actual mistake would be in not building in payments now for the coming agentic web.



    Get notified about new Articles