fix: scenario where a user can access another users events given the same session id

test: refine test_session_state in test_session_state to catch event leakage fix: revert app name to my_app for test_session_state test style: fix pyink style warnings fix: add app_name to filter as per suggestion from rpedela-recurly

Author: sindrigunnars

src/google/adk/sessions/database_session_service.py

@@ -459,7 +459,9 @@ async def get_session(
 
  storage_events = (
  session_factory.query(StorageEvent)
+ .filter(StorageEvent.app_name == app_name)
  .filter(StorageEvent.session_id == storage_session.id)
+ .filter(StorageEvent.user_id == user_id)
  .filter(timestamp_filter)
  .order_by(StorageEvent.timestamp.desc())
  .limit(

tests/unittests/sessions/test_session_service.py

@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ async def test_session_state(service_type):
  app_name = 'my_app'
  user_id_1 = 'user1'
  user_id_2 = 'user2'
+ user_id_malicious = 'malicious'
  session_id_11 = 'session11'
  session_id_12 = 'session12'
  session_id_2 = 'session2'
@@ -148,6 +149,10 @@ async def test_session_state(service_type):
  app_name=app_name, user_id=user_id_2, session_id=session_id_2
  )
 
+ await session_service.create_session(
+ app_name=app_name, user_id=user_id_malicious, session_id=session_id_11
+ )
+
  assert session_11.state.get('key11') == 'value11'
 
  event = Event(
@@ -196,6 +201,13 @@ async def test_session_state(service_type):
  assert session_11.state.get('user:key1') == 'value1'
  assert not session_11.state.get('temp:key')
 
+ # Make sure a malicious user can obtain a session and events not belonging to them
+ session_mismatch = await session_service.get_session(
+ app_name=app_name, user_id=user_id_malicious, session_id=session_id_11
+ )
+
+ assert len(session_mismatch.events) == 0
+
 
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
 @pytest.mark.parametrize(