4
$\begingroup$

On page 230 of An abstract notion of realizability ..., Läuchli writes the following:

If we drop the restrictions put on $\Theta$, then we get classical logic in one case and an intermediate thing in the other: [...] the condition $\exists\Theta\forall p$ holds for some intuitionistically valid formulas, e.g. for $$\forall v(R(v)\vee Q)\rightarrow (\forall vR(v)\vee Q),$$ but not for all classically valid ones, e.g. not for $Q\vee\neg Q$.

I'm curious whether this "intermediate thing" — the set of formulas $A$ such that the intersection of all possible "proof assignment sets" $p[A]$ is nonempty (but not requiring that intersection to have an easily-definable or substitution-invariant member) — is more completely understood. Since Läuchli's paper is hard to get a copy of, I've given a sketch of the definition below.


Fix countable disjoint sets $\Pi,\Gamma$; we'll think of these as consisting of possible proofs of atomic facts and names of possible elements of the universe, respectively. To each formula $A$ (not necessarilyl closed) we associate a set $S(A)$ of "possible proofs" of $A$ as follows:

  • $S(A)=\Pi$ if $A$ is atomic.

  • $\wedge$ and $\vee$ correspond to product and disjoint union respectively.

  • $S(A\rightarrow B)=S(B)^{S(A)}$.

  • $S(\forall vA)=S(A)^\Gamma$ and $S(\exists vA)=\Gamma\times S(A)$.

Next, a proof assignment is a function $p$ assigning to each closed formula $A$ a set $p[A]\subseteq S(A)$ satisfying a few rules, namely:

  • $p[\perp]\subseteq p[A]\subseteq\Pi$ if $A$ is atomic,

  • $\wedge$ and $\vee$ correspond to product and disjoint union as before,

  • $p[A\rightarrow B]=\{f\in S(A\rightarrow B): \forall g\in p[A](f(g)\in p[B])\}$ as expected, and

  • $p[\forall vA]=\{f\in S(\forall v A): \forall c\in \Gamma(f(c)\in p[A^v_c])\}$ and similarly $p[\exists v A]=\{\langle c,x\rangle: c\in\Gamma\wedge x\in p[A^v_c]\}$.

By "proof assignment for $A$," I mean a set of the form $p[A]$ for some proof assignment $p$. Let $\mathbb{P}(A)$ be the set of proof assignments for $A$; Lauchli's intermediate logic, then, is $\{A: \bigcap \mathbb{P}(A)\not=\emptyset\}$.

$\endgroup$
9
  • 1
    $\begingroup$ Could not one wlog define $S(\forall vA)=\prod_{c\in\Gamma}S(A^v_c)$ and $S(\exists vA)=\coprod_{c\in\Gamma}S(A^v_c)$? $\endgroup$ Commented Aug 26, 2024 at 4:59
  • 1
    $\begingroup$ @მამუკაჯიბლაძე Yes, I think that would result in the same notion. $\endgroup$ Commented Aug 26, 2024 at 5:10
  • 1
    $\begingroup$ Thank you. Also, what is $\bigcap\mathbb P(A)$? The intersection of a set of functions? If you identify functions with their graphs, then this is the partial function defined on those points where all of these functions attain the same values, is this intended? $\endgroup$ Commented Aug 26, 2024 at 5:11
  • 1
    $\begingroup$ @მამუკაჯიბლაძე Each $p\in\mathbb{P}(A)$ is a set of functions (more or less), so $\bigcap\mathbb{P}(A)$ is (basically) an intersection of a set of sets of functions. I believe what I've written is accurate. $\endgroup$ Commented Aug 26, 2024 at 5:12
  • 1
    $\begingroup$ But by your definition each $p$ is a single function? Do you identify it with a whole set of functions somehow? $\endgroup$ Commented Aug 26, 2024 at 5:13

0

You must log in to answer this question.

Start asking to get answers

Find the answer to your question by asking.

Ask question

Explore related questions

See similar questions with these tags.